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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines variant mimetic strategies 
as the basis for a major dialectic within postmodern 
culture. The method applies and sometimes extends largely 
accepted theoretical statements on literary form. This 
synthesis provides an accessible, if at times complex, 
schema for organizing types, genres, and postmodern products 
based on image production and forms of spatial/temporal 
discourse.
An investigation of several theorists and artists 
grounds a theory of literary and cinematic expressionism as 
the basis for postmodern culture, with particular emphasis 
given to the interpenetration of literary and cinematic 
styles in the twentieth century. An aesthetic dialectic 
emerges in the movement toward literary expressionism as 
opposed to mimetic naturalism. The expressionistic work is 
inherently metatextual and, consequently, more directly 
discursive. Expressionism has followed its own line of 
development throughout literary history. The eventual 
reliance of expressionism on the "material image" as a 
vehicle for signification carries with it a profound 
transformation of ideas about verbal culture, as well as 
aesthetic methods and analytical categories (Benjamin, 
Bakhtin, Ong, and Hillman contribute). The title comes from 
the "contact" function, Jakobson's term for the use of 
medial presentation.
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This dissertation contains two volumes. The first 
volume is largely theoretical, including three chapters.
The first chapter discusses relationships between Jakobson's 
model and contemporary theory. The second chapter includes 
a dialectical history of naturalism, expressionism, 
discourse, and intertextuality. The third chapter considers 
postmodern forms, dream texts, and textual arrays; it also 
includes a generic classification system for images: "The 
image-Genre Grid."
The second volume applies the theory of the first 
volume to a comparison of Kafka and Beckett as writers who 
reveal the inherent indeterminacy of the material image. 
Chapter four considers Kafka's preoccupation with dream 
texts and his consequent anticipation of surrealism.
Chapter five examines Beckett as a theoretical writer whose 
texts present a metatextual language.
PART ONE: THE IMAGE OF TEXT 
CHAPTER ONE 
JAKOBSON'S MODEL AND CONTEMPORARY THEORY
Introduction
Although the term "postmodernism" conveys some 
controversial elements, it also denotes fundamental 
transformations and innovations of cultural forms during the 
twentieth century by proclaiming its difference from a 
monolithic "modernism." Clearly, the term "postmodernism" 
developed as both antithesis and elaboration of "modernism." 
Consequently, postmodernism, insofar as it has depended on 
concepts of modernity for its own formulations, has been 
plagued by imprecision and controversy, especially since it 
has become a rubric for "non-canonical" or "marginalized" 
texts, texts of uncertain "literary" merit. This study 
attempts to clarify matters through a synthesis of several 
theorists and artists.
Cinema has produced new approaches to text production 
and interpretation. Cinematic technology marks the 
historical change, characteristic of the twentieth century, 
which has contributed to broad developments in thought and 
technology that have transformed cultural perspectives.
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Martin Heidegger in his essay "The Question Concerning
Technology" concludes:
the question concerning technology is the question 
concerning the constellation in which revealing 
and concealing, in which the coming to presence of 
truth, comes to pass (33).
He further concludes that the term techne ought to be
understood as not only containing the concept of the
technical, as artifice or technique, but also as including
the revelation and concealment of this "coming to presence
of truth." Heidegger makes clear that the manifestation of
this techne takes place in the realm of art, rather than
science, which is usually associated with technology:
because the essence of technology is nothing 
technological, essential reflection upon 
technology and decisive confrontation with it must 
happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin 
to the essence of technology and, on the other, 
fundamentally different from it. . . . Such a
realm is art (35).
There is a sense in which Heidegger's techne as a 
paradoxical formulation of "truth" as revelation and 
concealment can be understood as phases of revelation and 
concealment: "in Greece, at the outset of the destining of 
the West, the arts soared to the supreme height of the 
revealing granted them" (34) . This "height" corresponds to 
the technological development of literacy, of writing 
systems or verbal technology. The development of cinematic 
or "imagist" technology parallels the encompassing power of 
the impact of literacy itself.
This study recognizes four phases or inodes of cultural 
production which have significantly transformed the means of 
cultural production and its products: orality, literacy, 
print, and cinema. Each phase has engendered the phase 
subsequent to it, and each phase has transformed its 
cultural landscape. No very complex material technology 
(compared to later modes) was required to transcribe spoken 
language into writing, yet the conceptual changes brought 
about by this shift are formidable, as Ong has shown (see 
Oralitv and Literacy 78-81, 96-101). The written word 
engendered the library (and conceptual means for 
classification) and the concept of the university. Print 
and cinema do require complex material technologies, and 
each of these modes corresponds, respectively, to the 
initial and to the international forms of industrialization, 
marked by mass (re)production.
Moreover, each of these phases of cultural production 
has engendered its own form of aesthetic "modernism" (see 
below "The Precession of Modernisms"). The aural word gave 
way to the visual word, with all its logical complexities. 
Eventually, print promoted the vision of the word as an 
image of itself, and the image of the word, in turn, yielded 
to the images of the world and of consciousness. Not only 
have succeeding phases changed the dominant forms of 
cultural production, but all of these phases contribute to 
an increasingly complex aggregate of cultural forms in which
each phase is further transformed by other phases, hence 
Ong's formulation of "secondary orality," an effect of the 
cinematic age, and the advent of "screenplay" styles in the 
novel and the development of graphic novels, other cinematic 
effects (Ong 160).1,1
This study finds that aesthetic descriptions of cinema 
have largely derived from an elaboration in terms of verbal 
categories, in a form of concealment. Film theorists, such 
as Metz and Kawin, have heightened sensitivities to the 
subtleties of filmic presentation, but this has come at the 
expense of the incorporation of cinema into verbal systems 
of linguistics and narrative theory. Metz, for one, in his 
more recent work has gotten somewhat beyond this in his 
analyses (see Psychoanalysis and Cinema; there is also a 
discussion of Metz in Chapter three). Such work is 
significant, for "cinema . . .  is always written," yet the 
tendency to view cinema as a mere extension of verbal or 
print culture invites fundamental error (Brunette and Wills 
61). Freddy Sweet quotes George Bluestone who says "where 
the novel discourses, the film must picture" (56). In this 
case, Bluestone's "view" of filmic representation as 
perception skews one's understanding of cinema, which is 
also an inherently discursive medium.
Roman Jakobson, in an essay written on the development 
of the sound film, emphasizes that objects represented in 
film are actually signs taking "the path of metonymy or
metaphor" ("Is The Film In Decline?" 733-4). Also, these 
signs, related through "montage to the semiotic 
interrelation of things," implicate discourse as an element 
of the filmic surface (734). Jakobson's formulation is 
theoretically anterior to Walter Benjamin's conception of 
allegory or James Hillman's discussion of metaphor with 
respect to the image, and the principal difference is the 
linguistic specificity implied by the terms "metonymy" or 
"metaphor," a specificity which both Benjamin and Hillman 
resist. A "sail" in a filmic context may represent 
something other than the "ship" of which it is a part, just 
as Melville's Peouod goes beyond its literal representation 
as a "machine" in a capital enterprise to metaphorically 
embrace other things as diverse as the state, states of 
consciousness, and even literary representation itself.1*2 
This insufficiency of linguistic specificity is sharply 
foregrounded by post-cinematic literature, particularly by 
Samuel Beckett's novel The Unnamable and its dramatic 
counterpart Endgame (see Chapter Five).
Gradually, cinema has come to be revealed as a form of 
cultural transformation, and this revelation brings with it 
a need to reconceptualize cultural production in terms of 
cinematic categories that recognize the primacy of the 
image, as do Benjamin and Hillman. Paul Coates sums up this 
dynamic of revelation and concealment, of recognition of 
cinematic transformations and subsequent reification:
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film studies once promised to be an open forum for 
reflection upon the separate arts and cultural 
domains. Instead, once exciting theories have 
been deprived of their speculative status and 
frozen into an orthodoxy that needs to be 
challenged in the name of the very theorists it 
takes as canonic. A Barthes or a Benjamin would 
surely have been appalled by his work's cooption 
by the academy. All too often complacent 
orthodoxy speaks of difference and excludes 
anything that differs. . . .  to speak of Theory 
rather than theories is to pursue the fata morgana 
of an impossible totalization; whereas in fact the 
project of totalization would be better served by 
a Multiplicity of perspectives (ix).
Recent literary history demonstrates how from the late 
nineteenth century onwards myriad groups and aesthetic
movements have sought to distinguish themselves from a\
monolithic designation of "modernism" (see Chapter Two).
This widespread contention is copresent with the development\
of cinematic technology. This study finds that Walter 
Benjamin's essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction" contains strong theoretical concepts relating 
to (post)modern forms and to the art of cinema. This study 
seeks to interpret, extend, and synthesize Benjamin's work 
with other strong theoretical statements provided by 
Jacobson, Ong, Bakhtin, and Hillman (and to a lesser extent 
with others, such as Auerbach, McLuhan, Trotsky and Derrida, 
see Chapter Three).
This study proposes to revise and to rehabilitate 
conceptions of modernism and postmodernism and to bring to 
bear a more precise analysis on this rhetorical polemic in 
cultural studies. The method involves a synthesis and, at
times, an extension of strong theoretical formulations of 
problematic literary issues. Technological developments 
will provide a means for grounding developments of literary 
and historical consciousness that are manifested as cultural 
products. Types of discourse, problems of genre and 
signification, and the impact of cinema on literary 
production will provide the focus for this study.
The postmodern has often been questioned as to whether 
it is sufficiently distinguishable from modernism, 
especially when modernism is defined as an umbrella covering 
the wide diversity of styles in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Postmodernism clearly develops from 
modernist tendencies, yet it seeks to differentiate itself 
from the conceptual stage to the product stage from the more 
revered forms of modernism. Postmodernism is often 
characterized by desacralization and politicization against 
modernist reliance on the sublime, preservation of sacral 
tradition, and stylistic elitism and isolationism.
The institutionalization or reification of certain 
"modernist" styles effects a discursive privileging of 
specific stylists; for example, Yeats, Pound, and Eliot 
enjoy a higher regard within academia than do Joyce,
Beckett, and Kafka. This differential in valuation within 
institutional contexts indicates a discursive differential 
common to these sets of authors, especially since the 
conditions of "literary quantity and quality" are strictly
comparable. This discursive differential ought to be 
recognized as types of alternate discourse, as 
distinguishable movements of the "modernist" impulse.
Lyotard recognizes the phenomenon of the postmodern as one 
common to the twentieth century, citing Joyce, Proust, and 
Duchamp (among others 79-80). It may even be, as Lyotard 
suggests, that modernism itself derives from a postmodernist 
impulse "according to the paradox of the future (post) 
anterior (modo)" (81). Nevertheless the discursive effects 
of twentieth-century cultural production are recognizable 
within the context of contemporary political discourses: 
some are more amenable to canonical tradition, and some are 
more resistant to this touchstone of institutional and 
political favor.
Freud shows that the past dies hard, and writers like 
Marquez in One Hundred Years of Solitude prove it by 
detailing the ongoing slaughter of recent history. Such 
fundamentally antagonistic discourses derive from an 
alternative, political context, and these discourses employ 
different forms to achieve such ends. The incorporative 
gestures of the "monolithic modernists" tend to minimize 
differences between radically different political stances or 
ideologies by granting all an innovative status which does 
not pursue too closely the political ends with which the 
various texts are associated.
Fredric Jameson's elaboration of ideological stances
with respect to modernism and postmodernism bears witness to
the politicization of these categories, although he finds:
that most of the political positions which we have 
found to inform what is most often conducted as an 
aesthetic debate are in reality moralizing ones, 
which seek to develop final judgments on the 
phenomenon of postmodernism, whether the latter is 
stigmatized as corrupt or on the other hand 
saluted as a culturally and aesthetically healthy 
and positive form of innovation (425).
Although this debate, as Jameson indicates, is largely a
canonical one, definite political consequences follow from
the disenfranchisement of cultural products (texts) by those
institutions which these products often radically critique.
It is no wonder that this canonical debate continues since
the academy and the technocracy with which it is allied
prefer the more abstracted ethos and the more appreciative
view of classicism associated with "modernism" to
"postmodern" attacks on classicism and ethical complacency,
whether they be subtler, as with Kafka and Beckett, or more
specifically vituperative, as with Pynchon and Burroughs.
Political effects follow this academic debate: students find
that there is no discussion of writers with whom they may be
familiar, a narrowing of free academic discourse; also some
rather quirky literary history develops when writers like
Allen Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac are described as the major




we are within the culture of postmodernism to the 
point where its facile repudiation is as 
impossible as any equally facile celebration of it 
is complacent and corrupt. Ideological judgment 
on postmodernism today necessarily implies, one 
would think, a judgment on ourselves as well as on 
the artifacts in question (425).
By this insistence Jameson implicates the heightened
subjective focus which is a hallmark of postmodernism,
although, perhaps, he would wish otherwise, for the term
"judgment" tends not to be associated with subjectivity.
Alternately, for Kafka, "judgment" is wholly subjective, a
point emphasized throughout The Trial and one acutely
realized in his story "The Judgment," which is a literal
presentation of a Freudian dream. Nevertheless, within the
postmodern the subjective ground is also a highly
politicized, historical consciousness, one that questions
the traditionally objective illusion of history by exposing
its subjective roots. Modernist works tend toward a de
facto historical complacency expressed through cultural
specialization: history is history and literature is
literature. Eliot's The Waste Land, for example, tends not
to consider the historical context of its alienated
protagonist by focusing on a spiritual discontent that is
shored up by a Miltonic system of allusions, which, though
often obscure, tend to incorporate traditional literature.
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A recognition of the subjective, historical dialectic
is the chief virtue of Linda Hutcheon's A Poetics Of
Postmodernism in which postmodernism is characterized as:
historiographic metafiction, like both historical 
fiction and narrative history, cannot avoid 
dealing with the problem of the status of their 
"facts" and of the nature of their evidence, their 
documents. And, obviously, the related issue is 
how those documentary sources are deployed: can 
they be objectively, neutrally related? (122).
She further explains that:
historiography and fiction . . . constitute their
obects of attention. . . . The postmodern
problematization points to our unavoidable 
difficulties with the concreteness of events.
Hutcheon's discussion of various theories of postmodernism
and her profusion of examples illustrate many features of
this subjective-historical dialectic, but her study and this
one differ in some important ways.
While this study agrees with Hutcheon's
characterization of the postmodern as "resolutely
historical, and inescapably political," it does not so
easily find it to be "contradictory," unless this term is an
English usage indicating its oppositional or dialectical
qualities. Moreover, the localization of the postmodern to
"European and American (North and South)" cultures seems too
facile a generalization. The cinematic age increases
cultural internationalism, and Bakhtin has shown how an
international quality is already constitutive of the novel
(11-2). However, this point is raised here without much
support, for the scope of this study does not include
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African or Asian products as counterexamples, but neither 
does it expect such examples to be too few to notice.
More problematic is the temporal localization of 
Hutcheon's work, which smacks of academicism. There is a 
presumption of monolithic modernism underlying her study. 
"Modernists like Joyce and Eliot" and modernism's 
"compulsion to write mixed with a realization of the 
meaninglessness of writing (in the work of Kafka and 
Beckett)" are remarks that both lump together writers of 
radically different political discourses and show a lack of 
sensitivity to the ways in which Kafka and Beckett 
constitute meaning outside of literary convention (6, 43). 
Also, for all her examples of postmodern writing, there is 
not a single reference to Burroughs, who was clearly 
influenced by Kafka and who himself influenced some of her 
exemplars, especially Thomas Pynchon. This attempt to date 
the postmodern as an exclusively contemporary phenomenon and 
this exclusion of major writers widely associated with the 
postmodern impulse implicate Hutcheon in a participation in 
the canonical debate disparaged by Jameson, although Jameson 
himself can be rather eccentric in his appellation of 
particular styles.1 *4
This study emphasizes the works of Kafka and Beckett as 
fundamentally constitutive of the postmodern creative 
impulse through their applications of new theoretical 
concepts informing their texts' production of meaning and
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through textual strategies to make explicit alternative, 
political discourses. While Kafka and Beckett present some 
common qualities, each also possesses unique qualities which 
suggest how each theorized the making of text within a 
cinematic context. Deleuze and Guattari have described this 
alternative theorization and praxis as the impulse toward a 
"minor literature" (Kafka 16-7).
Another difficulty with Hutcheon's view of the 
postmodern involves the status of the term "metafiction" 
itself. Writing about "fiction" is less "fictional" and 
more "discursive"; metafiction is formal writing in which 
the fictional element is problematized. Expressionism 
proliferates metafictional strategies which all tend to 
involve more deeply the audience in the presentation.
Freddy Sweet describes one metafictional strategy, en abime 
structures, as a "layering of reality and fiction" (18). 
Sweet mentions the second part of Cervantes7 Don Quixote and 
Gide's The Counterfeiters where "fiction and life fold in on 
each other." As in Hamlet's play-within-the-play, the 
framing of additional structures within the play's 
presentation reduces the distance between the audience and 
the presentation itself, and fictional elements are 
deemphasized in favor of a broader, discursive 
participation: the audience is brought into more direct 
contact with the formal level of the writing.
This continuous, discursive engagement is a different 
type of reception than that more literal form in which the 
audience reads the fictional elements and then considers 
discursive values derived from those elements. Metafiction 
engages its audience on a critical level, not just on a 
literal level. An emphasis on the "fictional" element of 
metafiction is misplaced in that it creates distance between 
audience and presentation, resulting in a confusion of 
fictional structures. Such an emphasis is one way of 
investing a work with an "aura," in Benjamin's sense, 
promoting authorial power out of proportion and excluding 
the audience from meaningful engagement with the work.
Academic pedagogy would benefit from a broader 
recognition of the pervasiveness of metafiction in 
twentieth-century literature. To its credit, Elements of 
Literature (an academic anthology for students, Oxford, 
fourth edition) includes a short section on metafiction, 
discussing its paradoxical qualities as a blend of realism 
and fiction (493). However, its characterization of 
metafiction as a form of "reading" apparently absolves the 
editors from the inclusion of this category in the general 
literary model presented in the beginning of this text.
This model, which presents two verbal axes of which one 
polarizes "words used to create imaginary persons and 
events" and "words used to express ideas and feelings" while 
the other polarizes "words addressed directly to the reader"
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and "words overheard by the reader," attempts to order the 
genres of story, play, essay, and poem (xxx).
The results are somewhat disappointing. This model 
suffers from its fairly arbitrary distinction between 
imagination and expression; for Croce, for example, 
expression is the presentation of the (largely intuitive) 
imagination (see Chapter Three). The editors of this 
anthology apply film to all their generic categories, 
implying two conclusions: one) that film is easily analyzed 
via verbal categories and two) that film may be equivalent 
to metafiction (xxxi). The first of these is weak; many 
attempts to theorize film through verbal categories lead to 
problematic assertions (again, see Chapter Three on Metz). 
The second is an important concept in this study, but the 
editors of Elements of Literature do not consider this 
connection. Students need theoretical concepts which do not 
displace confusion from one area to another. The editors of 
this anthology deserve praise for their attempt to be 
inclusive by bringing postmodern forms into consideration, 
but their theoretical apparatus is not able to handle the 
complexities that result from this inclusion. This study 
seeks to present categories that are sensitive to the 
complexities of postmodern culture and that are sufficiently 
flexible to promote meaningful discussion.
Although there is no space here to comprehensively 
consider the many propositions of postmodernism (Hutcheon's
study is quite thorough in this regard), some remarks on the 
architectural model of the postmodern may be helpful.
Jameson privileges architectural "terrain" as "the most 
stategic field in which this concept has been debated and 
its consequences explored" (420). Nevertheless, there is a 
sense of default in this privileging which follows his 
assertion that "a dissolution of linear narrative, a 
repudiation of representation, and a 'revolutionary' break 
with the (repressive) ideology of storytelling generally" is 
inadequate to account for stylistic differences of artists 
like Burroughs, Pynchon, Beckett, Reed, the French nouveau 
roman and its variations, the "non-fiction novel" the "New 
Narrative," and, possibly, "nostalgia art" (419-20). All of 
the writers he mentions by name are treated to a greater or 
lesser extent in this study, which seeks to provide 
discursive categories by which these writers can be 
understood both in their stylistic differences, which often 
are not as great as they may appear, and in their relations 
to each other.
As far as the other forms are concerned, some are more 
"ideologically" postmodern than others. If postmodernism 
has become culturally dominant, then postmodern forms may be 
used to transmit "retro" ideologies. Television may be a 
postmodern medium, but this does not preclude its 
presentation of fascist political messages. Orson Welles' 
Home Box Office documentary on Nostradamus, a chilling and
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provocative inquiry, was recut (literally over his dead 
body) and aired on network television to suggest that 
Nostradamus had "prophesied" a successful outcome for the 
United States in the Gulf War. Such an imperialistic 
ideology goes very much against the grain of postmodern 
characteristics, elaborated by Jameson above, but, clearly, 
the producers of this "documentary" were unconcerned about 
the "strain" between form and content.
Jameson successfully elaborates ideological responses 
to postmodernism; he should also recognize that the 
ideological discourse of postmodern products needs to be 
elaborated with regard to particular works. Beckett, 
Burroughs, Pynchon, and Reed, however individual their 
styles may be, all share strong discursive views expressed 
through their satires (one form they have in common), but 
this determination is built upon a thorough examination of 
their works, not a perception of stylistic differences.
Benjamin notes the importance of architecture as an 
aesthetic touchstone, though he believes that film is 
accomplishing more with respect to the masses at the time of 
his essay ("Work of Art" 239-40). Evidently, the field of 
architecture, which produced the term "postmodern," has 
caught up with film these days, but postmodernism is a 
broad, cultural phenomenon that transforms all art.
The dialectic between modernism and postmodernism is 
most strident concerning modernism's conservation of
traditional ideologies, for these contending movements are 
not at odds in their spirit of innovation, as Lyotard shows. 
The methods and results of "innovation" are the objects of 
the postmodern, discursive dialogue, and the maintenance of 
this dialectical, ideological engagement is an important 
feature of the postmodern movement. The postmodern writer 
may allude to the "classics": both Beckett and Burroughs 
allude to Shakespeare's The Tempest (Prospero's speech "Our 
revels now are ended," IV. i. 146-58). Both also allude to 
Eliot. Significantly, in the allusion from The Tempest. the 
emphasis is on dreams: Beckett quotes the line above in 
Endgame; later, he alludes to Eliot's "The Hollow Men" 
("Hamm: Then let it end! . . . With a bang!"), and Eliot's 
The Waste Land is satirized in "Whoroscope" (946, 952, see 
Chapter five for "Whoroscope"). Jennie Skerl brings out the 
allusions to both The Tempest and The Waste Land in "Pay 
Color," the final "routine" of Burroughs' Nova Express (68- 
9). All these allusions are to expressionistic passages; 
though some of these allusions are more contentious than 
others, they all indicate their authors to be in some 
dialogically engaged relation to these expressionistic 
sources. This may represent a difference from architectural 
allusion described by Jameson; in literature, classical or 
traditional recuperation is a hallmark of modernism 
("Tiresias" in The Waste Land). Usually, postmodernists 
most strongly allude to other postmodernists or to
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expressionistic passages in more canonical writers; this is 
discussed at more length in Chapter Three, "Intertextual 
Arrays." The salient feature of the postmodern here is the 
inclusion of ideological dialectics as an integral part of 
postmodern presentations.
The dialectical methods of Hegel and Marx have gained a 
wide theoretical currency, and most forms of the 
modernist/postmodernist dialogue occur as polar oppositions, 
including Jameson's. Hutcheon is something of an exception 
to this in her postmodern formulation, but she is only 
partly successful in her investigation of logical relations 
between polar qualities other than opposition. Part of the 
reason for this involves theoretical relativity. The 
constraint of a linear language tends to cause theorists to 
draw their distinctions with broad strokes, but the 
application of these theories to particular texts alleviates 
this tendency. Often, a strong theoretical formulation will 
prompt a revisioning such that works under consideration 
will yield to the theory unexpected results. Bakhtin's 
distinction between monological discourse and dialogical 
discourse remains a strong one supported by textual 
analysis, but it also promotes the recognition that even 
monological discourse is somewhat dialogical. This is 
apparent in Ong's work on oral literature where an agonistic 
character to oral presentations not only suggests contention 
between individuals but also language's attempt to
concretize subjectivity into the formal illusion of 
obj ectivity.
If any single word could conjure the spirit of
literary-theoretical investigation, that word would be
"dualism." In this digital age of binary information
processing, literary theory presents polar models that
bifurcate areas of inquiry into extreme manifestations, and
the progression of literary studies continues as a dynamic
dialogue or dialectic between these polar manifestations.
Among even the most radical theoretical revisions, such as
deconstruction, this trend is a prominent subject. Jacques
Derrida in "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of
the Human Sciences" concludes:
there are thus two interpretations of 
interpretation, of structure, of sign, of 
freeplay. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of 
deciphering, a truth or an origin which is free 
from freeplay and from the order of the sign, and 
lives like an exile the necessity of 
interpretation. The other, which is no longer 
turned toward the origin, affirms freeplay and 
tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name 
man being the name of that being who, throughout 
the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology —  
in other words, through the history of all his 
history —  has dreamed of full presence, the 
reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of 
the game (264-65).1 *^
Derrida identifies polar oppositions of discursive stances
and provides a dualistic model of contemporary discourse.
The game of interpretation becomes a dynamic registering the
dialectical exchanges of these divergent perspectives.
Rather than disparage the apparent necessity of these
dualistic formulations, this study seeks to consolidate the 
considerable and valuable contributions of various dualistic 
models into a more unified system which no longer considers 
literature and literary criticism as ultimately divergent 
fields and which no longer needs to view signification only 
in the superficial sense of direct correspondence, such that 
we know how many eggs are contained in a dozen. As it 
becomes more apparent that our understanding of language 
itself limits our ability to conceptualize, the more urgent 
grows the need not to be constrained by its limitations.
This consolidation and synthesis is offered in the spirit of 
beginning to move on into a new potentiality for expression. 
This systemic approach distinguishes two types of discourse: 
(one) naturalism which corresponds to objectivism, to a 
discourse mediated by mimetic imitation, to the story 
element in literature, and (two) expressionism which takes 
the dream as its subject, recognizes subjectivity as 
inherent to all discourse, and presents itself directly as 
formal and rhetorical discourse through its multitude of 
divergent surfaces, representing a convergence of real and 
unreal.
In the "material image," a synthesis between Walter 
Benjamin's mechanically reproduced image of cinema and James 
Hillman's psychic image (developed at more length below and 
in Chapter three), signification comes about less through 
direct correspondence than through joint participation, a
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kind of collaboration between the producer and the receiver 
of a work. The material image brings this about by 
withholding a sense of closure (correspondence requires 
closure). Consequently, one must directly interpret the 
discourse of this image, rather than (as is the case with 
closure) decipher the literality of a text. Such a 
procedure transforms conceptions of literality itself and 
even of language.
Traditionally verbal conceptions of literature promoted 
strong correspondences between word and referent, but these 
verbal conceptions are dialectically opposed by visual 
conceptions that produce images and that promote 
associations. Visual production has attained its 
Heideggerian "technological moment." The recognition of 
this ascendence by visual production invites a reevaluation 
of earlier, logocentric forms from an expressionistic 
perspective, creating a discursive typology in which 
logocentric realism differentiates from expressionistic 
surrealism. An exciting, aesthetic consequence of this 
typology is that the field of creative endeavor can be 
elaborated in a more precise and inclusive way than that 
which results from individual systems based solely on verbal 
or on visual categories (see Chapter Three, "The Image-Genre 
Grid").
An important discursive consequence of this typology 
impacts epistemology through the reevaluation of perception
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and representation. The cultural profusion of dream images 
produced by visual technology concretizes into an amalgam in 
which images attain a dual status of perception and 
representation. Derrida has questioned the existence of 
perception, and this study finds that representation remains 
in the absence of perception (272, see also Chapter Five, 
"Film”). Traditionally, dream images were not considered 
perceptions, but they are representations, especially as 
literary ones. This study documents the stages of this 
verbal/visual dialectic to show how these components 
produced a culture called postmodernism.
Jakobson's Model
The past generation of literary studies has provided 
many explicit and implicit dualistic approaches to literary 
analysis. An examination of some of these approaches in 
relation to Jakobson's communication model shows how 
important new concepts emerge and how these conceptions tend 
toward a destabilization with respect to each other, a 
paradoxical result. Ong explains that "the paradox of human 
communication" results from the recognition that 
"communication is intersubjective," but "the media model is 
not" (177). Jakobson arrays his "fundamental" functions for 





("Linguistics and Poetics" 27) .
Although theoretical progress has brought sweeping revision 
to Jakobson's original model of communication functions, 
these changes are most apparent in theoretical recognition 
of the prominence of the phatic function, from which this 
study derives its title Contact Phase.
Christine Brooke-Rose suggests that reference to Roman 
Jakobson's six-function model for communications helps to 
clarify the orientations of various schools (22-29). She 












FIGURE 1. BROOKE-ROSE’S PRESENTATION OF JAKOBSON’S MODEL
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Brooke-Rose explains that for Jakobson all forms of 
communication, including language, consist of these six 
functions and that he assigned different aspects of language 
to particular functions; likewise, his critical practice 
involved assigning different literary genres to particular 
functions. Although he conceded that some overlapping 
occurred, he usually applied the model to demonstrate how 
specific functions related to discourses.
There are difficulties with such an approach because 
the application of any literary theory to literature itself 
derives ambiguous results in certain instances; the model 
requires as much interpretation as the text to which it is 
applied. Also, it is easy to distrust a model which 
confines a text to a category based upon an interpreted 
emphasis, as it appears was Jakobson's practice. A common 
example of such a method occurs if one takes New Criticism 
as a theory focused on text because it insists on the 
objectification of text, when New Criticism also explores 
the complexities of interpretation, conserves elements of 
traditional criticism through an interest in biography and 
autobiography, and reexamines contexts and codes through a 
refinement of literary terms (organic form, irony, 
ambiguity, and so on). It makes sense to view Jakobson's 
functions as simultaneously present in the text, since it is 
from the text that these functions are derived, and Brooke-
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Rose explains: "[current practice] tries, not always 
successfully, to integrate all the six aspects" (29).
In literary presentations, "message" depends on 
"context" (as well as on other elements), and an apparently 
simple declarative phrase like "black cat" can be loaded 
with discursive functions, functions which do not disappear 
with the omission of the adjective "black." In a Freudian 
dream analysis, "black cat" may refer specifically and 
simultaneously to genital organs, bad luck, anger and/or 
lust. This dream image provokes a complex of associations. 
Such imagery operates at a level of discourse other than 
that which is typically connected with a more precise 
referentiality of language.
Like a Freudian dream, notions about language more 
often imply the wish for a clear reference rather than its 
actual provision. The dream image provides a complex 
referentiality that communicates quantitatively more than 
the words which describe the image convey, and the dream 
image must always be described in order to enter into any 
discourse (see below, "Contact"). Indeed, language has the 
"dreams of deciphering, a truth or an origin" as its "raison 
d/etre" while dreams portray the complexity of the world in 
a profusion of images. The literary and cinematic 
production of oneiric images is crucial to the analysis of 
expressionistic discourse. Chapter Three and Part Two of
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this study examine how dreams are fundamental to the 
establishment of postmodern culture.
Jakobson's Model and Contemporary Theory
Brooke-Rose discusses how various schools of criticism 
have focused on specific aspects of Jakobson's model, and 
she describes the relationship of traditional criticism to 
the subjective (authorial) function, of New Criticism to the 
poetic (text) function, of linguistic criticism to the 
metalinguistic (code) function (24-26). Obviously, reader- 
response criticism explicitly orients itself to the conative 
function (reader/spectator), but these simple 
correspondences belie the complexity of some theoretical 
systems. The shortcomings of such an approach to New 
Criticism have been noted above; the integral complexities 
of this system get lost, collapsed into a vulgarization of 
"text." Various formulations of literary theory have 
emphasized particular functions, though often not only 
single functions, and these have usually presented dualistic 
formulations of their emphases. If, however, a useful 
simplification is made, along the lines of Brooke-Rose's 
method, of assigning particular concepts to particular 
functions according to each concept's emphasis, then 
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Beginning from the top of the model, the context, or 
the referential function, which for Jakobson included third 
person pronouns and all declarative sentences, must now be 
considered in a different light of referentiality (Brooke- 
Rose 23). As with the example of the Freudian dream, an 
understanding of referentiality requires an understanding of 
the context of the "context," for Jakobson bases contextual 
referentiality on the reference to a real or natural world 
that is connected to the utterance.
This problem of reference has been theoretically 
qualified in various ways; one common method involves 
distinguishing form from content. The question "what does 
the story say" has two answers: one is the plot or content 
and the other the lesson or the discourse of the story, its 
form. A clear reference ought to be connected to one field 
or to the other. Both pertain to the real or natural world, 
but even with this qualification the actual context often 
remains unclear, due to theoretical ambiguities: fictional 
detail or ethical proposition? Moreover, without this 
"realistic" constraint, as with an "imagined" world, the 
status of a reference is harder to determine (the Freudian 
"black cat"), although such a reference is more likely to be 
discursive than a mere content element.
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When a plot is incomplete or when a story lacks closure 
(that is the sense of an ending) literary analysts often 
would consider this lack to indicate a literary failure.
This attitude that there is no clear reference in such cases 
is countered by the recognition that if discourse derives 
from story and if discourse is a literary quality, then 
discourse is literature even if it does not require a story 
as its vehicle. In other words, some literature consists of 
a presented discourse that formally cuts short the story 
element of its presentation, formal literature.
Some clarification of the term "discourse" is 
necessary, since this term is widely used in different ways. 
First, there is a "narrow" construction where discourse 
refers to some particular idea; like the "moral" of a 
"fable," an idea derived from a literary presentation may be 
called its "discourse." Second, there is a much broader, 
more inclusive, sense where "discourse" refers to the whole 
dialogical, dialectical, ongoing discussion concerning 
literature itself. In this sense, literature is discourse, 
including both literary products and their commentaries 
(critical and theoretical). Difficulties in separating the 
more particular uses of this term from its more general uses 
suggest how formal categories tend not to be stable 
structures.
This study views "discourse" in several ways; one) as 
an idea derived from a story; two) as a term generally
applied as literature and its commentaries; three) as a less 
general term of form, discourse as genre, one distinguished 
from ideology (included in the more general sense) in order 
to show the relationships between genre and ideology. This 
study declines to view "narrative" and "discourse" as 
equivalent terms, though some have argued the contrary, in 
order to pursue "narrative" or "story" in a theoretically 
useful way to show how content elements promote ideas which 
are discursive in the narrower sense. Neither are 
"narrative" and "story" strictly equivalent terms; though 
both discursively designate "genres," "narrative" operates 
as a more general, theoretical term relating to structures, 
and "story" designates more particular content elements, 
such as plot and character, in particular works (see Chapter 
three for a discussion of "narrative" with respect to Metz). 
Again, there is some overlap between these usages, 
especially as they occur in the application of theory to 
particular works, but these terms are more useful with 
limitations that indicate certain elements within a range, 
operating in a relatively loose general structure, 
respecting significant variations.
Walter Benjamin sets up a version of this problem of 
story and discourse in his essay "The Storyteller": "it [the 
story] contains, openly or covertly, something useful . . . 
a moral . . .  a proverb or maxim" (Illuminations 86); but 
"the novel gives evidence of the profound perplexity of the
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living" (87). Benjamin's analysis distinguishes the story 
from the novel by the essential differences of their 
respective discourses in that the story produces discourse 
in the narrow sense while the novel produces discourse at a 
more general, formal level. This distinction has little to 
do with the fictional plot or content of a literary product 
which have come to be called "story" in the technical sense. 
To Benjamin, the referential function of the plot is not 
essential; for him literature is discourse, but a precise 
analysis cannot overlook the presentation of story because 
the discourse is grounded in such particulars: thus, story 
makes up the literary content, and, in isolation, still 
provides a rudimentary discourse, but the analysis of the 
literary product requires the examination of its discourse.
Besides Benjamin, Mikhail Bakhtin also focuses on 
discourse as the salient feature of analysis, and Bakhtin's 
temporal distinction between the discourse of the novel and 
that of the epic provides an elegant resolution of the 
problematic nature of these genres (see "Epic and Novel" 11- 
31). Obviously, both Benjamin's and Bakhtin's essays are 
themselves discursive, since the discourse about literature 
constitutes a literary discourse, and the essential unity of 
literary praxis is apparent from this perspective. The 
story element is not required in a formal literary 
discourse, just as certain forms of literary presentation do 
not require the story element, though, of course, in both
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there is a material surface or content. Consequently, the 
analysis of context requires distinctions between surface 
and discourse, and the ultimate referential function resides 
in its appropriate discourse, designated as genre. The 
context of a product is its form or genre.
Contextual determinations derive from an examination of 
content, either as a presented story or as a presented 
discourse, contained in its surface, or from a further 
refinement of other possible forms (epic, novel, theory) 
implicated in the discourse of a literary product. Yet this 
designation of context as type or genre is somewhat 
abstract; a theoretical analysis of the referential function 
can go further toward materialization.
The polar duality of story and discourse delineates one 
aspect of context, but there is another aspect of context 
that deserves attention. If the referential function 
grounds signification in the world, which world is it? The 
cat in a dream is not the same as the cat on the corner, 
even though they may look alike. The text that constructs a 
dream world exhibits a marked difference from that which 
"reconstructs" the world of reality, and to admit that these 
worlds ultimately may be the same is not to deny that, 
ordinarily, the content, or textual surface, clearly 
demarcates them.
The choice of portraying a natural world or a surreal 
one entails differences of ideology and of representation,
and different forms of representation signal different 
discourses. Of course, these are discursive issues which 
relate to many aspects of this model, not the least of which 
is the previous discussion. The ideology of a text provides 
a contextual category critical to the analysis of a literary 
product. Many communication models suffer from the flaw 
that they do not consider ideology as a specific aspect of 
production, and, consequently, they imply that ideology is 
not significant, or, at least, this lacuna is sometimes 
construed this way. At other times, ideology may be 
construed as a prerequisite or "axiom" in communication: the 
utterance contains a perspective. Perhaps, historically, 
there have been times when a particular perspective was 
widely shared, but a dialectical concept of history presumes 
the opposite case. Moreover, although this dialectical 
concept of history is well established, it is not 
necessarily so widely received as to be itself presumptive. 
Much discourse masks ideological strategies, and this is 
shown by pervasive, dialectical, theoretical inquiries into 
the relationship between form and ideology.
Susan Lanser revises Jakobson's model with the addition 
of speech-act theory to modify his poetic function from 
"message" into "text" with both "ideological and material 
realities explicitly evoked by the text" and "what the text 
is 'about,' describes, symbolizes, etc" as embedded 
structures equivalent to the referential function; in other
words, as a hierarchical precedence within context such that 
"what the text is about" mediates between the text and its 
"ideological and material realities" (The Narrative Act 69- 
72) . Lanser provides a clearer relation between 
representation and ideology, and this probably represents 
the chief virtue of her revision of Jakobson. The model 
presented above is less concerned with hierarchical 
relationships, however valid, than with the presentation of 
critical categories. Clearly, ideology and discourse are 
related as are the content elements of story and 
representation, but all these may not be simply collapsed 
into a single contextual category called "discourse" without 
due consideration of these relationships within 
referentiality and, further, of "context" to the rest of the 
entire model.
The purpose of a literary product can be interpreted in
its historical context, but this context may only represent
a dream of history. While ideology, to some extent, derives
from purpose, just as discourse derives from story, purpose
involves representation. At the content level,
representation may overlap with story, but representation is
not necessarily narrative, although narrative is necessarily
based on representation. In his history of art, Art And
Illusion. E. H. Gombrich asks:
with the question of personal style we have 
reached the frontier of what is usually called 
"representation." For in these ultimate 
constituents the artist is said to express
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himself. But is there really such a sharp 
division between representation and expression?
(366).
Gombrich conceives a close relationship between perception 
and representation, and his concern over the distinction 
between representation and expression corresponds to the 
differences between mimetic and oneiric texts (3 60-6). The 
natural text and the dream text pose an opposition that may 
be resolved at some point, but that point usually does not 
reside in their presentations.
The genre, or genres (this study will make clear their 
multiplicity), of fantastic literature provides an 
exemplary, theoretical site from which to consider the 
confrontation of mimetic and oneiric representational 
strategies. When Eric Rabkin proposed his analysis of 
fantastic literature and its relation to mimetic literature, 
he showed their differences by their referentiality either 
to real worlds or to fantastic ones. After all, in the real 
world one does not stumble over a cockatrice on the way down 
the stairs, but "the time machine that shuttles between our 
time and another makes clear the connectedness of the real 
world with fantastic worlds" (Fantastic Worlds 5).
Actually, the clarity of such a connection varies 
greatly; Rabkin's formula works better with respect to "SF"- 
genre types where presentations clearly demarcate 
differences between the worlds than those "blacker" genres 
where the referenced worlds approach an indeterminate
character. Kafka's The Metamorphosis. for example, confuses 
mimetic and oneiric worlds right at the outset of this 
story; the audience can never be sure that the transformed 
Gregor has actually awakened from the dream which precedes 
h i s  transformation. Walter Benjamin and Stanley Corngold 
both discuss the varieties of interpretation and misprision 
attributed to critics of Kafka (there is a detailed 
discussion of the relationship between Kafka and the 
fantastic at the beginning of Chapter Four). Kafka's 
innovative juxtaposition of these opposed referential worlds 
contributes mightily to this widespread critical confusion.
Rabkin's analysis focuses on interrelationships between 
the author, the text, and the reader framed as psychological 
response, in which the text promotes audience expectations 
by referencing a "real" context and then reverses this 
context to an "imaginative" one, thwarting "realistic" 
audience expectations, and so on. This mechanism of "the 
reversal of the context by the text" is derived from a 
Freudian compensation as shown in Freud's essay "The 
Uncanny" (34) . In The Metamorphosis. the story element of 
Gregor's awakening invites reader expectations of entering 
the "real" from the "dream," but, immediately, the audience 
finds Gregor strangely transformed; the audience has 
reentered the dream. Moreover, Gregor's family's attempts 
to "normalize" this situation, along with Gregor's own 
pathetic attempts to cope, suggest a "real," though uncanny,
context. However, the ongoing fact of this "impossible"
transformation sustains the "dream" context. Todorov
recognized these divergent contexts, but he could not
reconcile them to his concept of the fantastic, because of
their stark divergence (Brooke-Rose 66, again, see Chapter
Four). To this extent, Rabkin's idea of "context reversals"
does work with respect to The Metamorphosis. but with regard
to the recognition of an oneiric context, one that Kafka
immediately introduces, the divergence of referential worlds
in this story collapses into a "black fantasy" with a strong
dose of "realistic" elements. Kafka's work here is surely
fantastic, but neither Rabkin nor Todorov can fully account
for it. Rabkin's linear concept of "context reversal," a
sequential unfolding, is upset by Kafka's continuous
conflation of mimetic and oneiric representational fields.
Before Rabkin, Andre Breton in The Second Manifesto of
Surrealism declares:
those individuals who are drawn to Surrealism are 
especially interested in the Freudian concept 
which affects the greater part of their deep 
concerns as men —  the concern to create, to 
destroy artistically —  I mean the definition of 
the phenomenon known as 'sublimation' (160).
The congruence between Breton's creation as destruction and
Rabkin's reversal of the context by the text recalls the
notion of mimetic representation as wish fulfillment,
expressed both in real presentations and in fantastic ones.
Breton recognizes the importance of dream play in all
representation. On the other hand, Rabkin proposes a
continuum approach to realism and to fantasy in literature: 
"even realistic narratives are minimally fantastic, while 
even thorough-going Fantasies are minimally realistic"
(161). Rabkin suggests that there is some clear demarcation 
between "realism" and "fantasy," but Brooke-Rose in her 
essay "The evil ring: realism and the marvellous" shows that 
involvement of realistic devices in the fantastic can be 
much more than minimal (233-55). Again, representational 
converges do occur. Very often, writers do clearly 
demarcate representational worlds, but theories based on 
this relative frequency fall short in their evaluations of 
more complex fantasies. Todorov's genre of the pure 
fantastic is more successful in its willingness to explore 
the complexities of the fantastic.
Todorov's proposed genre of the pure fantastic provides 
a theoretical site from which to examine how contextual 
issues can complicate mimetic referentiality. Todorov's 
description of the genre of the pure fantastic depends upon 
a hesitation (produced by an ambiguous text) between natural 
and supernatural explanations of apparently supernatural 
events sustained to the end of the story (63, see Chapter 
four for some additional details of this definition). Here 
the appearance of the supernatural signals the possibility 
of the fantastic. Still, the supernatural is too 
restrictive a criterion for fantasy in general, especially 
in the twentieth century.
Colin Manlove has continued to defend a definition of 
fantasy based on "a substantial and irreducible element" of 
the supernatural, insisting that "theorists whose 
definitions differed from mine usually did so because they 
were applying them to quite different works, or contexts" 
(54, 53). Manlove believes that "no synthesis of these 
diverse views is possible" and that his form of fantasy "is 
the modern descendent of a once highly regarded type of 
literature: stories about the dealings of the supernatural 
with man," a largely traditionalist view (54, 64)1,6 To 
some extent, this can be applied to Todorov because his 
genre is limited to a particular historical context in which 
elements of the marvellous are generally manifested as 
supernatural elements.
In more contemporary productions, the effect of the 
fantastic is more purely affective, consisting of a 
hesitation between world views so that interpretation is 
referenced to the dialectic between the real world as 
manifested in the text and the imaginative world that is 
playing off those realistic propositions. Often, as in 
surrealism, the imaginative world is referenced to the 
psychological domain where archetypes appear as images, the 
dream world. This dream world includes supernatural 
manifestations among other archetypes and psychic phenomena, 
and the interpretive problem becomes the determination of 
the textual context. Does the text (or its story) present
an objective mimesis or a subjective one? In Todorov's 
formulation, the hesitation produced by an ambiguous text 
prevents the determination of its discourse as being 
specifically grounded in either a natural or a supernatural 
presentation, so the discourse must be synthesized by 
reference to both of these possibilities, and some kind of 
unitary discourse may be resolved from the ambiguous 
structure. However, the structure is itself ambiguous, and 
the story, consequently, lacks closure. Due to this 
ambiguous representation, form is content; here the 
distinction between form and content loses its effectiveness 
in that the content directly represents formal concerns, 
content as discourse.
This gesture of the ambiguous text brings the reader 
into a contentious, discursive field because the illusion of 
a unitary discourse becomes unavailable due to the lack of a 
unitary surface or story. The hesitation produced by a text 
that is ambiguous with respect to its objective or 
subjective orientation participates in a similar double 
structure to the one that occurs in Todorov's ambiguous text 
which hesitates between a natural or a supernatural 
orientation. This conception of the fantastic marks a text 
as having an ambiguous surface which the reader must apply 
directly to its discourse, but this application is 
complicated by the indirection of its representation. The 
determination of the context remains inconclusive, but
complex. The participation of the reader in the exploration 
of this complex discourse becomes the mode of imaginative 
play in the text. Elsewhere, this study will refer to this 
process as "speculative discourse." The context becomes the 
representation of discursive issues presented in the text 
instead of a "real" or "natural," objective mimesis.
Natural mimesis and speculative discourse present 
differences in ideological orientation roughly equivalent to 
those produced, respectively, by unitary and pluralistic 
discourses. In turn, these unitary and pluralistic forms 
are equivalent to Bakhtin's formulation of monological and 
dialogical discourses, which correspond, respectively, to 
the genres of epic and novel. Todorov's genre of the pure 
fantastic marks a literary-historical locus when writing 
became more overtly conscious, or self-referential, of a 
direct representation of imaginative forms. This 
expressionistic moment is realized in Andre Breton's First 
Manifesto of Surrealism, a generic congruence with the pure 
fantastic.
Todorov's genre of the pure fantastic appeared 
contemporaneously to the gothic novel (62). The marvelous 
or the supernatural component of the fantastic was an 
important element in gothicism, and Andre Breton cites The 
Monk as an admirable source for the marvelous which he 
equates with the fantastic (14-15). Breton notices also the 
dual structure of Monk Lewis' gothic novel, for it is fair
to say that The Monk is about half supernatural thriller and
half romantic adventure, and he contrasts the natural
elements of the embedded story to the supernatural elements
which frame it. Breton feels the supernatural elements
contribute the surreally beautiful quality to this writing,
and, as in the pure fantastic, his exemplar possesses a
double structure of naturalistic and fantastic elements
(14). Because the supernatural element dominates the
presentation in The Monk, this novel would not be considered
as an example of Todorov's pure fantastic, but it shares the
sense of a double structure that is found in Todorov's
genre. The supernatural element projects a discourse well
suited to the intensity of surreal portrayals, and Breton's
choice of the gothic supernatural for its surreal beauty
illustrates the transformation in literature of the
supernatural into the psychological, to the discourse of
archetypes, with which surrealism was largely concerned.
The double structure of this novel along with Breton's
humanization of its supernatural element suggest the complex
effects of Todorov's fantastic texts:
long before the author has freed his main characters 
from all temporal restraint, one feels them ready to 
act with unprecedented pride. This passion for eternity 
with which they are constantly stirred lends an 
unforgettable intensity to their torments, and to mine 
(15) .
Breton's discussion explicitly invokes the author/reader 
relationship to which Breton has been led by the text of The 
Monk. This movement is largely equivalent to that of
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Todorov's pure fantastic, and examples within in Todorov's 
genre show a refinement of this effect.
Edgar Allan Poe's story "William Wilson" illustrates 
how the superimposition of natural and supernatural story 
structures forces the reader to seek in authorial discourse 
what is left unresolved in the story element. As in The 
Monk, temptation and damnation comprise the gothic terms of 
Poe's discourse in this story. Although Todorov considers 
Poe's tales more representative of the uncanny than of the 
fantastic, some of Poe's stories fit Todorov's fantastic; 
indeed, Christine Brooke-Rose has shown how Poe's story "The 
Black Cat" fits Todorov's description of this genre (65). 
Much of "William Wilson" is presented as realistic 
narrative, but supernatural elements occur. It is unusual 
that Poe uses devices related to the authorial level of the 
text to introduce and, at times, to sustain the 
supernatural, including quotes from other texts and 
stylistic parody. Poe's sense of the fantastic also calls 
for the inclusion of more purely psychic devices, like the 
interminable labyrinth of the school where the William 
Wilsons meet. Poe's approach to the supernatural, like 
Breton's, is often modern and psychological. In "William 
Wilson" Poe uses the supernatural element to bring the 
reader closer to the discourse of the tale by providing an 
alternative explanation for the story events and making the 
text an ambiguous one.1 *7
Stephen Peithman believes that "William Wilson" "may 
have inspired Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray"
(79), which itself presents a double structure. In Wilde's 
novel, the naive moral fable overlays a sophisticated 
aesthetic critique that, once recognized, unravels the moral 
presentation. Dorian's living portait becomes the 
consummate image of aesthetic representational mimesis, and 
the precision of this portrait utterly defines Dorian Gray. 
Thus, the limitation imposed upon art of direct 
representation (implying perception of the objective world) 
becomes exposed as a sensual prison which excludes 
imaginative play and which can only foster a vulgar morality 
based on sensual appearances.
Recall that Poe's narrator Wilson sums up William 
Wilson's aping of his dress and actions as "exquisite 
portraiture" (85).
In Poe's story, the naive moral surface of a man who 
executes his "personified conscience" overlays the realistic 
rendering of sequentially but reciprocally violent attitudes 
between the two Wilsons that inevitably result in a 
bloodbath. The final scenes from Poe and Wilde exhibit a 
marked congruency of identical figures, one dead and one 
whole, and the agency of the knife. Most of Wilde's novel 
proceeds as an aesthetic discourse closely related to the 
authorial level of the text, and Poe's influence may have 
extended to Wilde in this element also, through "William
47
Wilson's" complex examination of ethical impulses. The 
relation of these two stories suggests a movement towards a 
self-referential text in which ideology operates as an 
increasingly pluralistic discourse due to a representational 
conflation of mimetic (natural) and of oneiric (supernatural 
and psychic affect) elements. These texts constitute a 
"textual array," a concept fundamental to this study's 
definition of expressionism (Chapter Three).
The ambiguous effects of Poe, of Wilde, and of Breton's 
reading of Monk Lewis show the complexity of the contextual 
issue, for this authorial emphasis more focused on writing 
itself than on the particulars of literary representation 
recontextualizes the story. This is accomplished through a 
more complex field of representation, one which includes 
both mimetic and oneiric forms. Also, the issue of genre is 
determined by this contextual referentiality which 
transforms an author's discourse. Genre may clearly be 
viewed as an aspect of the story, but, at times, what 
appears to be a story may be a discourse. Authors may take 
elements of gothic moral fables and incorporate them into 
complex ethical and/or aesthetic discourses. Such crucial 
transformations show the importance of context in the 
process of interpretation; where context is taken as mere 
referentiality, interpretation focuses more on the story.
The function of context with its related issues of 
discourse, genre, ideology, and representation shows how
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crucial -these rhetorical concepts have become in 
contemporary theoretical approaches. The interrelatedness 
of these concepts indicates their tenuous character. These 
contextual concepts are also closely related to the poetic, 
phatic, and metalinguistic functions: discourse and 
interpretation (poetic), ideologies and modes of production 
(phatic), and representation and codes (metalinguistic). 
Moreover, the relations between author and audience 
constitute a context (emotive and conative). Of course, 
intensive probing into the other functions could provoke a 
similar complexity, but their treatment here necessarily 
will be limited to naturalistic and expressionistic types.
Message
The poetic function or "text" has been the subject of 
many theoretical strategies, particularly deconstructive 
approaches which have provided volumes of discourse on 
qualities of textuality, but this study will focus on two 
general aspects: the physical text itself and textual 
interpretation. These qualities inhere in the idea of 
message so that a message presents a surface that contains 
one or more interpretations of the meaning(s) associated 
with that surface. An ordinary message probably contains 
more "signifieds" than "signifiers."
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The text is irreducibly material, and this focus tended 
to concretize the text as a material structure, a thing of 
apparently independent status that could support a unitary 
ideology: the material signifier may lend substance to the 
abstract signified. Brooke-Rose mentions the Prague 
school's concern with the meaning of text, and this concern 
led to an exploration of the phatic function with its 
presentation of signifiers in its interpretive quest (25). 
Postmodernism often alters signifiers which both alters 
signifieds and calls attention to inherent abstractions in 
the constitution of the sign itself.
The material quality of the text cannot overrule its 
own intimate connection with interpretation, both of 
authorial creation as an interpretive process and of 
audience interpretation. However, once made, the material 
quality of the text provides the ultimate source of 
authenticity and, thus, grounds the evidence of literary 
analysis. This material, textual surface provides content 
as well as generic qualities, and a generic sorting based on 
presented "material images" of the text is useful in 
determining the discourse a text provides (Chapter three).
Interpretation as an aspect of textuality possesses a 
pluralistic quality, a multiplicity of readings that arise 
from the text's material presence. This is paradoxical in 
that the unitary material presence of text may lead to a 
corresponding unitary interpretation, and this idea
corresponds to the desire for a direct correspondence 
between language and reality. Nevertheless, language 
possesses an inherent ambiguity, and this ambiguity provides 
multiple readings which are grounded in the material surface 
of any text. This is the textual image, containing both the 
image of its transmission and an image of itself as a source 
of pluralistic meanings. The practice of criticism has 
demonstrated the plurality of readings available from any 
text, and the desire for direct correspondence engenders 
competition among these readings for the "best" one. 
Theoretical practice considers all readings justified by the 
material text and weighs these with respect to a broader 
discourse based on these interpretations. In this way, the 
direction of inquiry may more soundly seek a unitary 
resolution, but there is no guarantee that a unitary 
discourse can be ascribed to any particular text, though a 
theoretical, systemic approach more ably covers the 
discursive field. Ultimately, text provides both material 
surface and pluralistic interpretation without determining a 
unitary resolution.
Addresser/Addressee
The relations of production of text bear crucially upon 
interpretation, and this is why the subjective and conative 
functions stand in a horizontal relation to the poetic
function in Jakobson's model. The acts of production and of 
reception affect both the material quality of the text and 
its interpretations. Brooke-Rose cites J. R. Searle's 
emphasis that "even so much as to identify a text as a 
novel, a poem, or even as a text is already to make a claim 
about an author's intention" (27). However, such basic 
claims of intentionality (subjective function) or, 
correspondently, of affect (conative function) cannot 
justify elaborate descriptions of an author's intention 
based on scraps of biographical knowledge, even 
autobiographical statements (some authors lie) or, on the 
other hand, doctrinaire elaborations of how a reader must 
view a text. The material text provides evidence for 
intention and affect, and critics should fear to tread 
beyond this evidential base.
Wayne Booth proposed the concepts of implied author and 
implied reader as a way of describing relations of 
production and reception based upon any particular text 
without illogically drawing in particular writers or readers 
(29). Here symmetrical conventions for the narrator and the 
narratee account for relations of the narrative surface in 
the text (equivalent to "voice" in the revised model). All 
these particularizations of production relations are 
summarized by Seymour Chatman in Story and Discourse (151). 
His diagram has been adapted for the expanded model above: 
note that implied author, implied reader, narrator, and
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narratee are considered aspects of the text itself. To this
extent, Jakobson's subjective and conative functions per se
are not being revised so much as elaborated in a revision of
the poetic function.
However logically distanced from the text the actual
author and reader are, their place in the rhetorical process
possesses obvious significance as designated relations of
production, and they can be discussed meaningfully when
relations of production change. Benjamin's essay "The Author
as Producer" explores relations of production with respect
to literary quality, and his conclusion that "a work that
exhibits the correct [political] tendency must of necessity
have every other [literary] quality" shows how the text
remains the evidential basis for a discussion of
developments in authorial intention and receptive affect
(Reflections 221). Benjamin elaborates his proposed
conclusion as a relation of production:
a political tendency is the necessary, never the 
sufficient condition of the organizing function of a 
work. This further requires a directing, instructing 
stance on the part of the writer. And today this is to 
be demanded more than ever before. An author who 
teaches writers nothing, teaches no one. What matters, 
therefore, is the exemplary character of production, 
which is able first to induce other producers to 
produce, and second to put an improved apparatus at 
their disposal. And this apparatus is better the more 
consumers it is able to turn into producers —  that is, 
readers or spectators into collaborators. We already 
possess such an example, to which, however, I can only 
allude here. It is Brecht's epic theatre (233) .
Clearly, Benjamin's remarks include ideological context and
the condition of the finished text as major factors in his
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proposed dialectical description of the relations of 
production, but his focus on the author's intention to cause 
the reader to write and, correspondingly, for the reader to 
write beyond what he has read shows a significant change in 
the relations of production that is meaningfully discussed 
in terms of authorial intention and of reader reception.
This change possesses crucial importance in the elucidation 
of the expressionist type of discourse to which this study 
aspires.
Contact
Theory has shown how differences in the means of 
aesthetic production restructure the aesthetic experience 
and redefine aesthetic standards. The works of Walter 
Benjamin, Walter Ong, and Marshall McLuhan have demonstrated 
how technological changes impact on aesthetics, and their 
conclusions have been supported by theorists who have 
appraised literary qualities from the stylistic and generic 
perspectives, specifically Erich Auerbach and Mikhail 
Bakhtin. Also, Christian Metz's more recent work has 
explored the relations of production in cinema to bring them 
to bear more strongly on the representation of the cinematic 
sign.1 *8 Chapter Three of this study considers phatic 
transformations in detail.
At this point, the major areas of phatic transformation 
include the shift from oral to written presentation, the 
progression from writing to print, and the shift from print 
to cinema with the resultant aggregation of forms of 
cultural presentation. This may be viewed as a shift from 
aural to visual dominance and three stages of visual 
representation (writing, print, cinema). In this 
progression, the signifier passes from the verbal form to 
the image form, and words and images require different 
processes of signification; consequently, different systems 
of aesthetic elaboration develop for each. The shifts from 
writing to print to cinema provide nuances for an 
appreciation of the historical dialectic of modernism, an 
intensive area of contemporary literary research; this is 
the subject of Chapter two. From this perspective, one can 
see that the structuralist focus on signifier and signified 
relations tends to emphasize a linear verbality, derived 
from writing and print, that fails to account for the 
differences brought about by image representation, such that 
images are assumed to be built out of words and signify in 
much the same way as words, that is, by some form of direct 
correspondence either in a one-to-one mapping or a multiple 
mapping of three- or four-to-one as in symbolic and 
hermeneutic approaches.
In Air and Dreams. Gaston Bachelard insists that "the 
literary image must be enriched with a new oneirism" (249).
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Words and images are related in that images are a source of 
verbal descriptions which, in turn, generate
interpretations. This is a necessarily pluralistic process: 
one strives to describe the dream image or the film image, 
but variant descriptions are still available which are also 
appropriate to the source image. Each description, each 
message, generates different interpretations. One "reads" 
the image in a theoretical, systemic way by considering and 
comparing descriptive and interpretive variations of the 
source image; in this way, one comes to appreciate the value 
of a particular image, and one comes to recognize how images 
are inherently values, not just "pictures" of an objective 
reality.
Code
This discussion of theoretical revision of Jakobson's
functions will now be completed by considering the
metalinguistic function and the changes wrought in cultural
codes by image representation. Allegory is often considered
as a specific literary technique in which elements of a
story are referenced to specific concepts outside the story:
when the events of a narrative obviously and 
continuously refer to another simultaneous 
structure of events or ideas, whether historical 
events, moral or philosophical ideas, or natural 
phenomena" (Preminger 12).
Nevertheless, the way in which allegory works as a specific 
literary technique suggests its usefulness as a trope for 
linguistic and literary referentiality in general.
Naturalist literary referentiality proposes to correspond to 
the real, natural world either in a one-to-one fashion (as 
in a "brick") or in a symbolic mode where a word is given 
multiple meanings and, often, one of these meanings brings 
in an inclusive sublime (the suggestion of transcendence of 
linguistic meaning itself; this is considered at more length 
in Chapters Two and Three).
Simple, natural referentiality (the "brick" type) can 
be designated as Allegory I in which the illusion is 
presented of a word corresponding to some natural referent. 
The illusory quality of the reference comes about because 
referentiality is accomplished through an abstraction, the 
"signified," which cannot correspond to the natural object 
in a specific way, but which proposes a general abstraction 
that is connected to a specific word or "signifier" ("brick" 
implies "all bricks"). Although this form of referentiality 
is enormously practical, it accomplishes its ends by 
concealing its abstract component, and few wonder that every 
word invokes some kind of sublime justification for its 
position in the verbal order. Further, signifier play 
ruptures the connection between signifier, signified, and 
referent (what is "brick*"?) so that each word must be 
preserved in a conventionalized form or all meaning is at
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risk, if not lost altogether. Nonetheless, naturalistic 
discourse proceeds by ignoring the concealed abstraction and 
works well, up to a point.
This crisis in linguistic referentiality, where 
naturalism breaks down, can be seen in the development of 
the natural sciences, particularly quantum mechanics.
Recall, for example, the "cloud" model of the atom which is 
not a cloud but which is something like a cloud. The need 
for concision in such descriptions drives these scientists 
to consider the abstractions contained in a word, to explore 
the signified's abstraction. There is a great deal of data 
available to quantum mechanics, so much that linear 
approaches to analysis cannot cope with it all. The problem 
of physical science has become the problem of language 
itself. Thus, naturalism appears too unsophisticated to 
present meaning in its own practical domain, that of the 
natural world. In quantum mechanics verbal representation 
reaches its own limit, appearing unable to describe complex 
phenomena, except by analogy.
Symbolic or hermeneutic representation ascribes several 
meanings or levels of meaning to a single word; this is 
Allegory II. Coleridge's definition of a symbol fused 
traditional hermeneutic interpretation into symbolic 
representation. This form of naturalism is more complex in 
that a single word conveys several specific meanings, but 
the problem of the sublime is not resolved here; instead, it
is given its own level of meaning, often referred to as the 
"anagogic." This form of allegory has in common with the 
first form that a single word conveys meaning, but in the 
second form several meanings are proposed simultaneously 
while the first form proposes a unitary meaning for each 
word. Naturalistic representation is served by symbolism in 
that symbolism invokes the complexity of the natural world, 
but, often, symbols are special cases where a word can be
shown to operate on several levels, and the problem of the
abstract component remains. Nevertheless, the idea of a 
symbol brings the abstract component into prominence by 
ascribing a level of signification to it, rather than 
concealing it as in allegory I ("brick" can also be a
symbol). Symbol is an appropriate word to describe words in
general, although such a formulation is a bit inconsistent 
in that all words are not generally considered to 
participate in fully symbolic signification.
Both these forms of verbal allegory (I and II) function 
through a kind of mapping: one word connects to one referent 
or one word connects to several referents such that each 
form of allegory provides a model or metaphor for the 
phenomenon of meaning in the natural world. However, the 
connection between a word and its referent is problematized 
as the connection between the abstract signified and the 
material world; on the other hand, the signifier is a part 
of the material world, mute but for the abstractions
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invested in it. This distance is inherent to language. The 
natural world itself has changed in the way that it is 
represented: are not dreams part of the natural world? Does 
not quantum mechanics explain that the natural world is 
mostly empty?
One can perceive the need for language to work better, 
but few solutions have been proposed. Considering forms of 
allegory as phases of allegorical referentiality provides 
ways to compare systems of signification with their related 
forms of production and to observe changes within those 
systems. The oral contact form works congruently with the 
unitary signification of allegory I, and writing typifies 
the symbolic phase, allegory II, as with the preeminently 
hermeneutic text The Bible. Print and cinema process the 
image of text and the text of image respectively, suggesting 
a phase of allegory based on the signification of image 
systems. Further, this image of a text and this text made 
up of images suggest stages in the development of image 
processing systems to render meaning. Another allegorical 
phase, allegory III, based upon image presentation and 
respecting differences between the image of text and the 
text of image coheres with the representation of image as a 
phatic form, the image contact, typified by cinema montage.
Peter Burger describes a new form of allegorical code 
in Theory of the Avant-Garde based on Benjamin's proposal 
from The Origin of German Tragic Drama in which "from a
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production-aesthetic point of view . . . elements of
Benjamin's concept of allegory accord with what may be 
understood by 'montage'" (70). These elements involve the 
isolation of materials from traditional contexts and their 
recombination to create meaning; isolation is made possible 
by the mechanical reproduction of art into an image of 
itself, described by Benjamin in his essay "The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction." Benjamin refused to 
treat new media as mere embellishments, choosing instead to 
investigate their transformational power. The idea of the 
material image as a vehicle for literary signification 
derives both from the use of the reproduced image as 
literary material and from this image's availability in the 
material text. The essential quality of textuality becomes 
its presentation through material images; the material image 
both mediates and conveys literary discourse.
Archetypal psychology has, from an idealist 
perspective, arrived at similar conclusions to those which 
Benjamin derived from his materialist approach, especially 
with regard to the signification of the image. Benjamin 
discusses the withering of the aura and the "expressionist" 
equality of images; these are echoed by James Hillman in one 
of his essays in Facing the Gods; "[n]ecessity has no image 
because it works in each and every image . . . the archetype 
is wholly immanent in the image itself" (10). For Hillman, 
"the image is a self-limiting multiple relationship of
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meanings, moods, historical events, quantitative details,
and expressive possibilities. As its referent is imaginal,
it always retains a virtuality beyond its actuality," and
the arts "provide complicated disciplines that can actualize
the complex virtuality of the image" (9-10). Hillman
addresses representation as a form of knowledge:
if archetypal images are the fundamentals of 
fantasy, they are the means by which the world is 
imagined, and therefore they are the modes by 
which all knowledge, all experiences whatsoever 
become possible" (12).
If the natural world is only a site of an ultimate psychic
reality, it remains a place inhabitable by images, for the
space in which they occur, our personal space, is traceable
to a locus within the natural world.
All this seems rather abstract, but an exemplary case
makes this dynamic clearer. Unlike simple allegory, where
one thought directly corresponds to one other, the material
image corresponds to several others, to descriptions and
interpretations derived from a source image, each one of
which is specific and different, but still sufficiently
alike to be designated by a particular image, even though
this image possesses its own specifity. The speculative
virtuality is this set of corresponding systems of ideas or
thoughts which resonate to the presented image, as well as
those which associate to less directly related fields (a
factor of the personal intuition of the subject). Thus, an
explicitly sexual image might suggest aspects of
achitectural design, or vice versa, as in the Eiffel Tower. 
This combination of virtual allegorical systems with other 
associated images constitutes the signifying complex of the 
material image. In this way, the idea of an allegory that 
signifies as "other” is recognized as one that signifies 
other allegories and associations beyond either simple or 
symbolic allegorical correspondences. It is easy to see how 
the material image may include both simple and symbolic 
allegories, but the material image is not restricted to 
representing only simple or symbolic allegories or both.
Hillman has suggested a possible site for signification 
in Archetypal Psychology that makes use of the term "soul" 
which is characterized by a metaphorical signification:
"the metaphorical mode of soul is 'elusive, allusive, 
illusive'. . . undermining the very definition of 
consciousness as intentionality and its history as 
development," and ” [t]he relation of soul to death . . .  is 
thus a function of the psyche's metaphorical activity" (21). 
It would seem that this formulation closely approximates 
Benjamin's formulation of allegorical signification, 
including even "the activity of the allegorist as the 
expression of melancholy" (Burger 69). Hillman's 
formulation of the image also corresponded to levels of 
discourse: it is elusive with respect to the discourse 
derived from story; it is illusive with respect to the
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discourse of form; it is allusive with respect to the 
discourse of ideology.
The material image differs from metaphor in the verbal 
or symbolic sense, but it operates similarly to Hillman's 
use of metaphor. Hillman borrows Langer's term "fecund" 
which furthers and deepens elaboration of the image (8), for 
the image is a discursive form that generates elaborate 
description. Further, the material image illumines the 
chain of intertextual relations between the texts of those 
authors who practice this strategic discourse as an 
aesthetic integration, and it can move easily between verbal 
and visual media. On its surface, the material image may be 
deceptive, causing a confusion with naturalist images which 
are a story-related subset of material images. Hillman 
maintains that "archetypal psychology recognizes that 
psychic reality is inextricably involved with rhetoric" : the 
"value" of the image is recovered through rhetoric (13).
This virtual complex of the material image is an 
intuitive proto-knowledge which is distilled by rhetoric 
into specific understanding; whether the potential knowledge 
of intuition (its ideal form) is more truly "knowledge" than 
its specified elaboration (its material form) is moot, but 
the recognition of both forms as contributory to 
understanding is crucial. Shelley's understanding of the 
nature of poetry as "'the expression of the imagination'," 
an imaginative synthesis which includes intuition, is basic
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to expressionist theories of poetry ("the very image of life 
expressed in its eternal form" and "it acts in a divine and 
unapprehended manner, beyond and above consciousness"
Defence 480, 485-86). Expressionist theories reached an 
acme of development with Benedetto Croce who concluded that 
poetic expression represented an intuition as an image 
(Preminger 266-67). From this perspective, it is a short 
step from expression to expressionism (this is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter two, "Expressionism").
The material image generates the virtual complex, an 
intuitive construct which provides a field from which to 
draw a discourse, a context for understanding. Rather than 
continue to designate meaning by the term "knowledge," it 
may be helpful to consider this image complex as the 
intuitive aesthetic object and the text as the material 
aesthetic object which presents, through rhetoric, the 
mediating image which conveys this discourse. To this 
extent, the artist and the theorist may use similar means to 
attain their ends, and the use of a category like "fiction" 
does not adequately convey this sense of convergence in 
which a set of representations substantiates textual 
presentation. Further elaboration of expressionism, textual 
arrays, and specific texts are contained in Chapters two and 
three.
The consideration of the way in which the material 
image impacts upon code can be extended from the elaboration
of the signifying process to the generation of generic 
systems based upon the material image. If all knowledge 
projects some form of fantasy, as Hillman says, the material 
image can help distinguish between forms of fantasy. Here 
is another dualism, a temporal one. Time is historical, 
specific, natural; time is also surreal, mythological, 
unreal. Each view of time presents an appropriate form of 
imagery, and these forms are generally distinguishable. 
Bakhtin demonstrated the utility of a temporal discourse as 
a means to distinguish genre. Any projected image occurs in 
some spatial-temporal continuum, and, for heuristic 
purposes, one can envision differentiated continuums in 
which differentiated images occur. Mundane images derive 
from a natural and historical universe while dream images 
signify the psychic cosmos. The realm of the marvelous 
portrays flying horses and other oneiric, incongruous images 
of the unreal, but the natural, historical projection is 
typified by a train. These distinct image fields convey 
distinct discourses with appropriate rules for 
interpretation of each; these represent two basic forms of 
fantasy, the pedestrian and the magical. These forms 
coexist in the culture, but each is separate and distinct. 
Todorov's theory of the pure fantastic makes use of these 
distinct types of images to distinguish the marvelous from 
the uncanny, the dual elements which make up the pure 
fantastic. Todorov examines the supernatural image in order
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to consign it to the natural world, the world of the 
marvelous, or both.
In a critical study of Sade's work, Angela Carter 
concludes "his characters represent moral absolutes in a 
world where no moral absolutes exist." She finds that 
against the historical relativism of the world presented in 
Sade in which "good and evil are not the same thing at all 
times and in all places" Sadean "psychology relates his 
fiction directly to the black and white ethical world of 
fairy tale and fable" (The Sadean Woman 82). For Carter, 
the character provides an image grounded in fantasy, one 
that clashes with the more purely historical world of the 
setting in Sade's novels. Unlike Todorov, who considers the 
convergence of real and unreal in the pure fantastic, Carter 
finds a destructive tension in the cohabitation of real and 
unreal in Sade. For both Todorov and Carter, the 
recognition of real and unreal images is crucially important 
in the determination of literary value. These real and 
unreal fields are types of representation with specific 
approaches to interpretation of each; one reads them 
differently to determine the discourse which each conveys. 
The separation and convergence of these image fields help to 
establish generic qualities based on the presentation of the 
material image as real or unreal.
Temporal presentation of these images also affects 
interpretation, as Bakhtin has shown, and this is further
related to primary forms of production (oral, written, 
printed, cinematic). The discourses of the past and of the 
present function differently, altering the relations of 
production in their presentations. When the temporal 
discourse of the image is compared with its reality type, a 
generic pattern results that allows for classification of 
literature based on the presentation of the material image 
(see Chapter three, "The Image-Genre Grid.") This image 
continuum presents another theoretical dualism which, along 
with the dualist approach to allegorical signification, 
problematizes Jakobson's metalinguistic function.
Having arrived at the end of this examination of 
theoretical issues and Jakobson's functional theory of 
rhetoric, one can conclude that Jakobson's identification of 
specific areas of discourse in his model has been enormously 
helpful as a ground for theoretical investigation. 
Theoretical progress has elaborated his functions in ways 
that suggest further revision of these functions. One can 
see that both the code and the context tend to merge into a 
variety of subtextual issues, and these all ensue quickly 
upon one's reception of the presented product, or text.
Also, relations of production merge when artists produce for 
other artists, as Benjamin has noted. All this suggests a 
dualist reduction in rhetorical studies which could focus on 
the textual product with its related subtexts and on the 
relations of production. However, such a reduction is less
the fulfillment of theoretical analysis than is the 
discovery of salient features for description, and Jakobson 
provided a helpful means to envision rhetorical dynamics. 
Theoretical practice has elaborated significant areas of 
discourse and recognized their simultaneity in cultural 
experience, their synchronicity. This study would simplify 
without compromising this theoretical progress into cultural 
studies which might, in turn, provide a basis for a 
reconceptualization of cultural products and issues.
The Precession of Modernisms
The precession of modernisms is a concept that allows 
for the recognition of a type of modernism which is 
associated with each form of production (oral, written, 
printed, and cinematic) and which recognizes in contemporary 
culture an aggregate of such forms. Literary history shows 
how different ages past have maintained their own sense of 
the modern and how subsequent conceptions overthrew previous 
ones.1 *9 The rest of Part One and Part Two of this study 





Throughout this study, the term "naturalism" designates 
a traditional, aesthetic mimesis which asserts a faith in 
the referential function as linguistically accurate and 
which subsumes aesthetic production within a monolithic 
tradition. Naturalism is often a source for certain 
philosphical constructs as in "natural" knowledge or 
"natural" law in which the content of such terms is exactly 
what their authors suggest, but this is somehow augmented by 
the brute silence of natural "reality" (the referential 
field) taken by these authors as the silence of assent to 
their constructions.
The attempt to pluralize naturalism into various forms 
has some advantages. These advantages are dramatically 
demonstrated by Auerbach in Mimesis where they show how 
significant differences in representations entail different 
discourses. Auerbach's method is followed by Preminger in 
his essay on "nature" (551-6). However, a point of 
diminishing returns is reached when all artistic production 
is considered as one form or other of "mimetic"
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representation. In this way, a totalizing discourse seeks 
to define a plurality of aesthetic movements, many of which 
define themselves as opposed to traditional mimesis, within 
a common mimetic endeavor.
This study takes the attitude that a more accurate 
typology recognizes that differences in representation are 
representative of dialectically opposed forms of discourse. 
Such a typology accounts for radically different styles of 
literary and cinematic production by considering their 
positions with respect to discourse. Such a typology is 
fully elaborated in Chapter Three (see the "Image-Genre 
Grid"), and a major advantage of this typology is that it 
allows for a recognition of pluralism in aesthetic 
production and, consequently, discourse. In the first 
chapter, relative forms of "modernism" were elaborated with 
respect to dominant technologies of aesthetic production, 
considering "postmodern" as an appropriate response by an 
image-based aesthetic technology to a "modern" attitude 
based on a linear, verbal technology (print). Of course, 
both these forms are relatively modern to other forms, so a 
focus for describing these relative differences is sought in 
different forms of representation, considered here as 
naturalistic and expressionistic, respectively. The 
historical approach of this chapter will focus on the 
development of expressionism and on the cultural dialectic 
that expressionism illuminated.
The purpose for this discussion of "the image of text” 
is to show how writers gradually came to realize this 
expressionistic/naturalistic dialectic in their texts. In 
many of these writers, a representation based on mimetic 
naturalism came to be replaced by an increasingly explicit 
concern with the production of images and metatext, more 
direct forms of discourse. Gestures of mixing styles or 
genres in specific works indicate the movement away from a 
mimetic formula, in which a verbal style presents 
information in a linear fashion, and a movement toward the 
recognition of the text as an image of itself, an image 
capable of containing and of comparing various styles or 
genres within itself. This metatextual image does not 
merely provoke discourse, but it is itself a form of 
discourse which overrides facile distinctions between "fact" 
and "fiction," categories based on mimetic forms.
Traditionally, "naturalism" takes many forms, and more 
modern forms of naturalism exhibit expressionistic 
qualities. Preminger notes that for some "naturalism" is 
equivalent to "romanticism" (550). Indeed, the romantic 
period is when the dialectical rift between naturalism and 
expressionism becomes an explicitly self-referential 
concern, particularly with respect to the "gothic." Mary 
Shelley's Frankenstein portrays the monster acquainting 
himself with Milton, and Byron's "Dedication" to Don Juan 
ridicules forms of conventional, contemporary poetry.
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Dialectical forms of "modernism" emerged with respect to 
these variant romantic trends, as extensions of them.
Preminger's discussion of Zola's "naturalism" as 
deterministically based on a rigorous objective/subjective 
dichotomy extends classic naturalism's concern with an 
imitative mimesis. "Underlying" this, Preminger explains, 
is "a humanitarian desire to change the existing social 
conditions" (551). A more emphatic call for change is 
characteristic of expressionism, but the discourse of Zola's 
naturalism, while it may wish for better conditions, is 
presented in an aesthetic form allied with the creation of 
oppressive conditions, namely, an elitist determination 
which emphasizes production and profit and which considers 
the social sphere as an exploitable raw material, the same 
attitude taken toward "nature" in general. A parallel case 
to Zola occurs in American literature in Crane's The Red 
Badge of Courage; this graphic depiction of war is less a 
statement against war, than it is an observation of the 
state of war. While one reader may question war's 
necessity, another may find it ennobling. Crane's novel is 
a far cry from Heller's Catch-22 or Pynchon's Gravity's 
Rainbow, although it is quite likely that both these authors 
read Crane's novel with interest. This sort of literary 
naturalism is related to impressionistic painting which 
developed a new form of "contact," but which vitiated this 
form by portraying "nature" images or idyllic middle-class
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scenes, again, art essentially allied with the status quo as 
a naturalistic reification (see Burger 35-54).
A more postmodern form o f 'naturalism has come to be 
associated with Robbe-Grillet in that his works tend towards 
an undecidability or indeterminism by problematizing the 
objective/subjective polarity. His texts produce images 
which the reader must interpret along the way, thereby 
participating in the development of discourse as a part of 
the act of reading, rather than deferring such 
interpretation until the story has run its course. As a 
rule, conventional naturalism denies subjectivity as a valid 
source of representation, and Auerbach bucks this trend by 
asserting the mimetic value of the styles of Joyce and Woolf 
(see "The Brown Stocking").
There are some areas of overlap, however, where 
naturalism grants some value to subjectivity. One occurs 
with regard to the representation of "true" dreams (see 
Chapter Three). Another occurs with respect to the use of 
the supernatural in gothic writing, where the supernatural 
is interrogated to determine if it is genuine or a form of 
subjectivity: if it is discovered to be subjective, such 
subjectivity is "natural" in that it is illusory. On the 
other hand, the genuine supernatural supports institutional 
discourses allied with naturalism, literally as a super­
naturalism, allied with the natural argument for the 
existence of God. Expressionistic, fantastic forms contest
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this traditional supernaturalism with the presentation of 
secular forms of unreality, largely based on dreams.
Yet another form of valid subjectivity for naturalism 
is associated with "realism" in that subjectivity is 
considered a real illusion (this problem is discussed with 
respect to Metz in chapter three). Also, realistic 
portrayal tends to be conventionalized so that ultra- 
realistic devices which coincide with subjective views 
paradoxically take on an air of unreality due to their 
difference from conventional realism. This is the case with 
Welles' expressionistic use of deep focus in cinema (see 
chapter four). Conversely, the deep focus lens, which 
approximates human vision, would be prized as a naturalistic 
signifier if this use accorded with realistic conventions.
A similar problem emerges with Marker's use of still 
photographs to construct a film (see Chapter Three). These 
photographs are realistic, but they are unreal in a 
cinematic context which conventionalizes realism as 
represented motion, and within this unreality such 
photographs are indistinguishable from subjective 
impressions. Paradoxically, realism is not always 
indicative of a naturalistic discourse, particularly in 
film, but it also often is an indicator of naturalism, and 
in such a naturalistic context subjectivity may be granted 
some validity. Largely, naturalism defines itself by a 
representation of an objective field, and subjectivity is
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consigned to an inconsequential, even decadent, area of only 
marginal concern to the naturalist. Dialectically, 
subjectivity is a crucial concern in expressionism.
Expressionism
In general, the term "expressionism" has referred to 
deviations from naturalistic or realistic presentation in 
modernist works. Twentieth-century techniques, such as 
stream-of-consciousness, fragmentation, surreal abstraction, 
and signifier play present distinctively marked variations 
immediately apparent in modern texts. Expressionistic 
techniques proclaimed their own differences from those of 
naturalistic mimesis. This quality of self-proclamation 
helps show the development of expressionism from an 
expressionist aesthetic orientation. By making art more 
rhetorical in principle and in practice and by proclaiming 
qualities readily identifiable with those of expressionist 
sources, expressionistic artists emphasized the subjective 
dimension in representation.
Aesthetic history from the latter nineteenth- through 
the mid-twentieth centuries, a period of about a hundred 
years, has been marked by controversial, "avant" approaches 
to aesthetic production which, while they are distinct from 
each other, use similar techniques to achieve their self- 
proclaimed effects. Abstract expressionism, dadaism,
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surrealism, futurism, activism, cubism, and expressionism
all used bold techniques in complex presentations, but all
also differed ideologically. Precedent movements
(decadents, aesthetes) also proclaimed their ideological
differences from naturalism, but the early twentieth-century
groups expressed ideological differences with naturalism and
with other movements; sometimes these others might be viewed
as "naturalized" or "reified."
Paul Siegal in his introduction to Trotsky's aesthetics
describes the ideological variations of futurism:
the Bolsheviks, far from seeking to set aside the 
past, had their own revolutionary tradition, which 
was foreign to the futurists, but the internal 
dynamics of the futurists' rebellion against old 
values propelled them to the new social order. In 
Italy, on the other hand, the futurists were 
attracted by the pseudorevolution of fascism . . .
the diverse directions taken by futurism 
illustrates, as does, for instance, the existence 
of the reactionary romanticism of Scott and the 
radical romanticism of Shelley, that a literary 
school is neither a mechanical contrivance 
constructed by a social class nor an independent 
entity immune to the changes in the intellectual 
and emotional environment created by changes in 
economic structure (Trotsky 12).
Cultural expressionism demonstrated its rhetorical emphasis
through dialectical movements. These movements often saw
themselves as anti-movements with respect to other
movements, but the techniques which these movements have in
common demonstrate their relatedness, and the rhetoric which
they use identifies them as commonly concerned with similar
issues as were pre-romantic and romantic movements. Trotsky
describes this aesthetic dialectic:
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it [bourgeois society] was able to control and 
assimilate every "rebel" movement in art and raise 
it to the level of official "recognition." But 
each time this "recognition" betokened, when all 
is said and done, the approach of trouble. It was 
then that from the left wing of the academic
school or below it —  i.e., from the ranks of a
new generation of bohemian artists —  a fresher 
revolt would surge up to attain in its turn, after
a decent interval, the steps of the academy.
Through these stages passed classicism, 
romanticism, realism, naturalism, symbolism, 
impressionism, cubism, futurism. . . .
Nevertheless, the union of art and the bourgeoisie 
remained stable. . . . The artistic schools of the
last few decades —  cubism, futurism, dadaism, 
surrealism —  follow each other without reaching a 
complete development (105).
By not "reaching a complete development" Trotsky suggests
that these more recent movements have not completed this
process of reification.
Today the status of these movements argues against a
complete reification in that their self-referential
antagonism towards tradition still survives in some works,
while others demonstrate a cooption. Surreal textual
production, for example, maintains an integrity in Ishmael
Reed's Mumbo Jumbo (1972), even as it has been coopted in
advertising, and Dali's turn to fascism indicates a kind of
self-reification. On the other hand, impressionist art
generally commands art-auction prices of over a million
dollars per piece, an indication of a thoroughly reified
form. Expressionistic film practice has also been put to
various ideological uses, sometimes in spite of the
directors. Orson Welles' The Magnificent Ambersons and
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Touch of Evil were both recut by the studio before being 
exhibited to large audiences (see Welles' interview).
The self-referential quality of expressionistic 
production allows, at least, a potential to escape 
reification, but individual works must be considered to 
determine the actual extent of reification or lack of it, a 
controversial process. The romantic movements mentioned by 
Siegal (above) also emphasized their dialectical differences 
from received tradition, and these movements have been shown 
to be the more direct influence on modernist forms. From 
this perspective, one may see the evolution of the 
dialectical character of the expressionistic movement. The 
essence of modern expressionism combines dialectically 
political engagement with its presentation of image. The 
forms of modern expressionism are various, as are its 
styles, and the postmodern age of the late twentieth century 
has been marked by a progression of these various styles and 
by an emphasis on ideological dialectics. Common techniques 
are often used to serve divergent ideological interests, and 
the issue of ideology has itself become even more prominent 
than it was in early twentieth century modernism. Here a 
brief discussion of expressionism as a quality of twentieth- 
century modernism will be helpful.
Poetic expression, the rhetorical elocutio. is seen by 
Preminger as progressing through literary history and being 
reformulated by major figures including Cicero, Coleridge,
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and Pater, but reaching its most comprehensive description
in Croce (266). Croce's emphases upon intuition and image
refined the previous formulations which had focused on
"thought” or "emotion" in this subjectively oriented
approach to poetics. To Croce should be added developments
by Gaston Bachelard and James Hillman (Hillman is discussed
throughout this study). Bachelard insists that "one must be
receptive, receptive to the image at the moment it appears"
(1149). Further, Bachelard forsakes any objectification of
the poetic image:
I tried to consider images without attempting 
personal interpretation. Little by little, this 
method, which has in its favor scientific 
prudence, seemed to me to be an insufficient basis 
on which to found a metaphysics of the imagination 
(1150).
Bachelard anticipates Hillman through the former's 
formulation of "a phenomenology of the soul" with an 
emphasis on "the dreaming consciousness" (Chapter Three and 
Part Two of this study develop the concept of a literature 
of dreams). As Hillman does, Bachelard witnesses the 
metatextual quality of the image: "the poetic image has an 
entity and a dynamism of its own; it is referable to a 
direct ontology" (1149). In Jakobson's terms, one might say 
the image, according to Bachelard, does not so much refer 
one to a context (reference) as it constitutes a code, and 
in this role it generates its own context, or, at least, the 
image is itself the point of overlap between context and 
code.
There are several important poets who have anticipated 
these later developments of poetic expression. Recall 
Shelley's concern with intuition in his poetics, an 
anticipation of Croce. Also, for Oscar Wilde "thought and 
language are to the artist instruments of an art" (the 
preface to Dorian Gray 17); this coheres with the subjective 
and rhetorical orientation in poetic expression. The 
Victorian Pre-Raphaelite movement refined the presentation 
of poetic images anticipating the modernist preoccupation 
with starkly visual poetry as well as contributing a visual 
praxis to the field of poetic expression. Blake's impact 
upon poetic presentation was contemporary to that of these 
painter-poets, and his work calls attention to the quality 
of self-consciousness emphasized by poetic expressionists in 
their dialectical confrontation with traditional forms of 
objective mimesis.
In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Blake explains that 
he will expunge "the notion that man has a body distinct 
from his soul . . .  by printing in the infernal method, by 
corrosives . . . melting apparent surfaces away and 
displaying the infinite which was hid" (39). His self- 
referential poetic image emphasizes the reliance on the 
sublime common in Romantic poetry, but it also presents an 
artistic method which provides a context for the projection 
of the sublime. Similarly, his "Printing house in Hell" 
describes reality as a result of aesthetic production; the
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real becomes equated with the image of a library (40). 
Blake's illuminated manuscripts join visual images with 
poetic images and crystalize the concern with visual 
presentation of texts which had broadly influenced 
eighteenth-century textual production.
Expressionistic practice recognizes the importance of 
image in the co-presentation of content and context. In 
other words, the context of art is emphasized as well as the 
content. This rhetorical orientation which provides a 
dialectical stance vis-a-vis its content describes a 
tendency throughout literary history toward expressionism 
(see below, "discourse and intertextuality"). Theories of 
poetic expression systematized this rhetorical tendency, 
and, eventually, Croce's elaboration of aesthetic metatext 
as intuition and image provided a precise formulation for 
the co-presentation of content and context as "an a priori 
synthesis" (Preminger). Early modern expressionistic praxis 
calls attention to its own alignment with theories of poetic 
expression along with its refinement of expressionistic 
techniques.
The emergence of expressionism affected painting, 
drama, poetry, and the novel, as well as cinematic style 
(Holman 178). Both Frank Whitford in his Expresssionist 
Portraits and Preminger agree that the writer Kasimir 
Edschmid best formulated the principles of this movement:
No one is in any doubt that the superficial
reality which we perceive cannot be the truth.
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Reality has to be created by us. The true meaning
of the object has to be uprooted. We must not be
satisfied with the trusted, presumed, recorded 
facts; the image of the world has to be mirrored 
honestly, without falsification. But that image 
is in ourselves alone.
Thus the entire world of the Expressionist artist 
becomes visionary . . .
Facts have significance only insofar as the 
artist's hand reaches through them to grasp at 
what lies behind (9; 267).
Mimetic art is replaced by the image of mimetic art, as a
subjective projection, and the discourse of that image
proclaims the validity of psychic states and religious
revelations and the unreliability of naturalist approaches.
At this point, justifications for both political engagement
and religious conviction inhere in the expressionistic
pronouncement. Pre-Raphaelite artists often chose religious
subjects, and the devout expression of religious conviction
is classified within expressionism.
The dynamics of expressionism have largely demonstrated
political engagement, although severe ideological disputes
occurred between specific groups. Ludwig Rubiner, an
Activist, proclaimed: "the proletarian liberates the world
from the economic past of capitalism; the poet liberates it
from the emotional past of capitalism," while Futurists
"often sounded like proto-fascists" (Whitford 13). indeed,
Walter Benjamin discusses the aesthetic emphasis on the
image of war by the Futurists in the epilogue to "The Work
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction":
[mankind's] self-alienation has reached such a 
degree that it can experience its own destruction
as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This 
is the situation of politics which Fascism is 
rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by 
politicizing art (Illuminations 242).
In "The Artist as Producer," Benjamin criticizes Activism:
"the very principle on which this collective is formed is
reactionary; no wonder that its effect could never be
revolutionary," but he insists that "[Futurism's]
formulations deserve to be accepted by dialecticians"
(Reflections 227, Illuminations). Benjamin's commentary
sheds light on the difficulties of ideological analysis in
movements like F.T. Marinetti's (Italian Futurism) and
Activism; differences persist, but so do anti-traditional
attitudes, setting them apart from naturalism.
A woodcut in the program of the first Brucke announces 
With faith in evolution, and in a new generation 
of creators and enjoyers, we summon the young to 
unite —  and as the young, the bearers of the 
future, we will wrest from the entrenched older 
forces the freedom to act and to live. To convey 
the creative impulse, direct and unfalsified, is 
to be one of us (Whitford, text facing title 
page).
This proclamation helps show the relatedness of 
expressionism to poetic theories of expression through the 
focus on the creative impulse and through the revolutionary 
spirit associated with romanticism.
The antirealism of expressionism is both an extension 
of and a reaction to impressionism which tended to 
concentrate on the presentation of image in the service of 
naturalist discourse. The aspect of distortion noted by 
Holman as a feature of "European expressionistic drama"
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demarcates the reaction to impressionism which sought a
harmony with naturalist presentations, and "distortion" has
become a common way of describing expressionism's products
(178). The perception of a distortion is only possible
through comparison to a naturalist rendering, so the gesture
of distortion evokes a metatextual perspective in that it
implies its dialectical opposition to naturalism. At times,
impressionistic techniques might be applied in an
expressionistic work because the ideological orientation of
this product can emphasize a dialectically antirealistic
discourse opposed to naturalist realism.
Expressionism was prominent before World War I, but
after the war the surrealist movement employed techniques
associated with expressionism (First Manifesto) and, later,
emphasized the importance of ideology in aesthetic praxis
(Second Manifesto). Benjamin recognized the importance of
surrealism's contribution to historical materialism:
Only when in technology body and image so 
interpenetrate that all revolutionary tension 
becomes bodily collective innervation, and all the 
bodily innervations of the collective become 
revolutionary discharge, has reality transcended 
itself to the extent demanded by the Communist 
Manifesto. For the moment, only the Surrealists 
have understood its present commands 
("Surrealism" 239).
To approach an expressionistic work, one must consider its
rhetorical stance, the quality of its discourse, which in
expressionism is evoked by the image presentation of the
text. This expressionistic perspective with its emphasis on
discursive strategies transforms conventional literary 
categories: a work operating at a metatextual level ceases 
to be a fiction; rather it is a discourse similar, though in 
a less formal sense, to academic discourse which itself is 
not properly a fiction. The inward turn taken by surrealism 
comes ultimately to embrace expression itself. For this 
reason the term "expressionism" better designates this more 
fully discursive approach to aesthetic production, for both 
surrealism and expressionism refer to particular artistic 
techniques, but surrealism remains more recognizable as art 
dealing with unconscious mental sources brought out into the 
light, as it were, and as a technique precisely articulated 
by Breton and others, while the lack of a clear 
understanding of expressionism is rectified through the 
comparison of ideology and technique within the historical 
context of the development of theories of poetic expression.
It seems fair to say that surrealism is a major part of 
modern expressionism, particularly with regard to its 
political orientation and to its dedication to subjective 
space, but metatextual, discursive elements are less widely 
identified with surreal techniques. Brooke-Rose discerns "a 
certain confusion as to just what [postmodernism] involves" 
(344), and she structures her study of contemporary writing 
according to the "formal division . . . between parody and 
stylisation," between metafiction and surfiction (364). The 
recognition of expressionism as a general movement including
86
both these categories or tendencies enables the recognition 
of the transformation of aesthetic production by the 
ubiquitous image of the cinematic age. Moreover, it 
resolves the awkward problem of "dating" the postmodern as 
post-1945- or post-1960-production, when many "postmodern" 
gestures develop before World War Two.
This recognition of an aesthetic dominance of cinematic 
production also allows the characterization of modernist 
writing as expressionism (an identification already widely 
accepted) with the differentiating tendencies of modernism 
and postmodernism described according to their ideological 
allegiance or antagonism, respectively, towards traditional, 
naturalistic discourse. For the purposes of further 
discussion, this "modernist" tendency will be referred to as 
"expressionism," and that "postmodern" tendency will be 
referred to as "modern expressionism." This may seem a bit 
confusing, but, on the whole, it will allow for a 
recognition of a modernist attitude in pre-twentieth-century 
literature as an expressionistic one, while it designates a 
postmodern attitude as a twentieth-century phenomenon 
associated with cinematic production. This discussion of 
expressionism concludes with some remarks on expressionistic 
cinema.
Expressionistic cinema "defied the conventions of 
'realism' . . . turning the image into an artifice of 
madness"; it "formulated psychological structures through
artificial, highly stylized sets that reflected characters'
states of mind” (Kolker 7, 21-22). This expressionistic
approach typified a broad trend of reaction against American
cinematic naturalism which included several movements,
including the early French avant-garde (often surrealist
projects), Eisenstein's use of montage, Italian neo-realism,
and even American film noir (7-8). This last is not
surprising in light of the strong contribution of American
playwrights, like Wilder and O'Neill, to dramatic
expressionism (Preminger 268). German expressionistic film
usually projected a "stagey", tone since "expressionist films
were always shot in the studio, never outdoors" (Katz 397).
This relation between dramatic and cinematic production,
characterized by the image of the stage, suggests an
essential link which connects these forms, a link that
suggests a potential partially recognized by Aristotle in
his characterization of drama as a superior art form in The
Poetics (115).2,1
Paul Coates' recent study describes the dialectic of
expressionism in film:
it is often claimed that there are two tendencies 
in film history: on the one hand, realism, 
transparent reproduction of the world's 
appearances; and on the other the stylization and
distortion associated with expressionism.........
It would however be too large a generalization to 
subsume expressionism under stylization. . . . 
Expressionism's legacy is in fact the use of 
stylization to indicate the state of mind viewing 
the world (156).
The virtue of expressionistic film is thus found in its 
projection of a subjective attitude mediating a view of the 
world, a process parallel to perception itself. The claim 
of objective perception has seemed insufficient ever since 
Freud emphasized the reflex arc of sensual perception. Due 
to the sensory lag time of this reflex arc, one can never 
perceive what is, only what was. and if objectivity only 
consists of an approximation, rather than an exact 
observation, the distinction between perception and illusion 
is much less apparent. Moreover, it is this sensory lag 
which makes film possible as the illusion of motion 
instilled by moving still frames. Therefore, the 
recognition of subjective play in all perception and in 
cinematic representation is much less pretentious than the 
blind assertion of objectivity in the face of all this 
sensory/sensorium play.
Coates also describes some of the important motifs of 
German expressionistic cinema "shot through with images of 
revolt against the father," a rejection of traditional 
values (52). "Expressionist language was a primal scream at 
one's isolated entry into this fierce world . . . localized 
as the German fathers' hatred of the sons they were to 
dispatch to the trenches of World War I" (48). Here the 
subject is seen as an object of manipulation by systemic 
forces, promoting fear, not paranoia —  since this is a real 
condition of being manipulated —  but such fear also
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engenders reactive rebellion, and this, in turn, effects a
kind of split in the subject. Coates describes:
the expressionistic double is the individual who 
is one person in him/herself and another when in 
the crowd, borne along by a mob that externalizes 
repressed rebellious instincts. It is the 
doubling of rationality by myth described in 
Adorno's analysis of the archaic bedrock of 
apparent enlightenment (49).
Such a motif recalls the familiar, doubled figures of Poe's
William Wilson and of Wilde's Dorian Gray, suggesting them
as rational beings caught up by an unreal, mythic fate, in
the terms of Coates' analysis. Poe and Wilde will be
considered in the next section as practioners of
expressionistic aesthetics. This expressionistic theme of
the double will also be discussed with respect to Beckett's
treatment and, perhaps, resolution of it in his Film (see
chapter five). What is important about Coates' remarks on
motifs of German expressionistic cinema is the recognition
that reactive, antagonistic attitudes towards tradition and
that complex subjective states informing representation are
generalized in the larger, aesthetic movement of modern
expressionism as postmodern attitudes. Moreover, the
real/unreal opposition in expressionistic representation is
fundamental to the ordering of generic discourse presented
in the next chapter (see the "Image-Genre Grid").
As in the other arts, cinematic movements that showed
independence from naturalist conventions varied in their
degree of distance from these conventions, but they all
employed the metatextual opposition to typical realism 
through some kind of alteration of their presented images, a 
gesture roughly equivalent to signifier play in printed 
texts. A more detailed discussion of expressionistic film 
will take place in Chapters Four and Five. Here, the 
recognition of dialectical congruence between cinematic 
forms and other art forms of twentieth-century expressionism 
suggests that these dynamics are typical of the cinematic 
age. The alteration of presentations to distinguish them 
from realism and the dialectical exchanges among the various 
movements characterize much of twentieth-century modernism 
and postmodernism. Highly individualistic styles convey a 
metatextual, discursive opposition to naturalism, and the 
growing emphasis on ideological orientations characterizes 
this dialectical tension in modern expressionism. This 
tension allows for aesthetic freeplay, marked by the 
individualistic styles of the artists, to be balanced by 
specific ideologies, the social component of art.
Discourse and Intertextuality
Discourse
The correlation of forms of discourse with forms of 
production shows how expressionism emerges from metatextual 
tendencies with roots deep in literary history. Writing
systems presented a quantum leap in the development of 
literary discourse by freeing the text from the dominion of 
memory. The external inscription of text brought literary 
production out of the monological discourse of orality, 
where "there is nothing outside the thinker, no text, to 
enable him or her to produce the same line of thought again 
or even to verify whether he or she has done so or not" (Ong 
34). Writing enabled the development of logical systems; 
consequently, a conception of the modern informs Aristotle's 
Poetics, arguably the first literary theory of a 
comprehensive range. This literary theory describes the 
formal aspects of expression; in other words, this text is 
metatext. The difference between a formal system and an 
informal one is only that an informal system is less 
obligated to be complete. With Aristotle, a pronounced 
intention to provide a complete system must be considered 
against the fact that only part of this system survives, so 
his study to this extent is informal. This quality of 
incompletion, a lack of closure, requires thought to fill in 
the gaps, developing a participatory discourse, and such 
informality is often an aspect of aesthetic presentations.
Parody is one aesthetic device that requires a meta- 
literary awareness for its comprehension. Petronius' 
Satvricon. despite its many lacunae, portrays a protagonist 
who is a student of rhetoric, and, in the course of this 
portrayal, much is said about rhetoric indirectly through
examples of "good" and "bad" poetry. Indeed, "Petronius' 
'epic' on the Roman civil wars has set scholars to arguing 
whether or not it is an actual parody," provoking a 
discursive dialogue of which the true subject is canonical 
ideology (Crumb 144)2,2 This novel exhibits expressionistic 
tendencies in that it presents an informal metatext which 
provokes discourse. Further, according to Chambers' 
typology, this discursive dialogue concerning Petronius' 
"epic" (and The Satvricon in general) is ironic in that it 
challenges canonical agreements, and this indicates a 
political opposition to received tradition.2 *3 Petronius 
and his literary disciple John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, 
both employ an expressionistic, novelistic discourse with 
explicit political overtones, so, to this extent, they are 
not only representative of "modernist" discourse, but they 
also anticipate the emergence of "postmodern" discourse.2 *4 
Satirical writing always provides a metatext in that it 
demands a comparison to some originary discourse, and this 
is particularly the case when satire involves the conversion 
of lyric poetry forms into vehicles for scathing social 
commentary, since the parodic turn implies a more formal 
discourse. This remains true whether this conversion is 
brought about by the later Roman poets or by the Earl of 
Rochester, so long as the conversion brings about the new 
use of an older form. Expressionism did not just arise in 
the twentieth century as a new technique; it developed out
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of expressionistic techniques used in literate cultures 
which had some conception of modernity.
Parody and satire develop a conception of the image of 
text by providing text which demands a comparison with an 
original text; this comparison emphasizes differences 
between the texts as a discursive dialectic, but this 
dialectic is also contained in the differences of the images 
of these texts. This conception of the image of text is 
widely acknowledged with respect to literary allusions, 
considered to be images of other texts (see 
"Intertextuality," below). Another metatextual device 
promoting this conception can be found in epistolary novels 
which use the form of letters to portray stories. This 
approach is not required for a naturalistic mimesis; 
although it often heightens the illusion of actuality in 
novel portrayal, it is also an affective device, seeking to 
close the emotional distance between text and reader and 
heightening the impact of emotions in the story. This 
subjective component to epistolary presentation is hardly 
objective; in its attempt to give greater weight to the 
emotions conveyed by the story, it emphasizes a subjective 
dimension of the text.
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein uses letters to frame the 
image of her text; the narrative story line is contained 
within letters which seek to close the great distances 
separating the correspondents. Just as the letters
themselves close the distance between characters, the images 
of these letters close the distance between the text and its 
reader. The text situates itself within the more personal, 
experiential context of a reader who receives letters as a 
personal correspondence. Such letters use the image of text 
to strengthen their connection to personal subjectivity with 
the rhetorical consequence that this use of letters serves 
to personalize the story, to bring it closer to readers. 
Through this artifice which seeks a reduction of aesthetic 
distance, it becomes an expressionistic device; its 
heightened emotions reveal a broad concern with social 
transformation on a more intimate level with the audience. 
The letters of Mary Shelley's novel not only focus on the 
wild, natural terrains of her settings, but they also reveal 
relatively dysfunctional systems of justice, as well as 
framing the creature's perusal of Milton's Paradise Lost, 
contextualizing the broad social sphere to which her 
discourse addresses itself through her story of an 
"artificial man," as a kind of allegory of humanity's 
artifices of civilization. Richardson's Clarissa and 
Stoker's Dracula also seek to implement social change; 
indeed, it may fairly be said that Stoker seeks to undo what 
Richardson has wrought, but all this "affective" writing has 
little to do with the actual stories that are told. 
Consequently, these novels emphasize the importance of an
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affective discourse in writing, a subjective component of 
the image of text.
These rhetorical devices —  parody, satire, epistolary 
presentation —  all refer the reader to a metatextual, 
discursive context in order to situate the story element, 
its literal message. This positioning is necessary to 
convey contextual differences within the text; this 
positioning is dialectically opposed to mainstream, 
naturalistic presentations of story which implicitly 
subscribe to a monolithic, totalized context. Such 
rhetorical devices ought to be recognized as expressionistic 
tendencies in literature insofar as they call attention to a 
dialogical, polarized context underlying literary 
production. Further, in the twentieth century, they 
represent fundamental approaches to literary expressionism 
in which parody and satire figure as major forces of 
representation and in which the subjective dimension 
emphasized through letters has broadened into a variety of 
subjective forms of contact based on dreams. Coates writes: 
"at a time when the holy texts of traditional religion have 
lost their authority, the locus of authority shifts to 
dreams" (160). The concept of intertextuality plays an 
important role in this metatextual, subjective shift in the 
aesthetic domain, and the relation between expressionistic
V
writing and forms of intertextuality is explored in the 
following section.
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An incomplete system is equivalent to a lack of 
closure, and contemporary thought is faced with the 
conception of the necessity of incomplete systems.
Discourse as dialogue or dialectic is inherently incomplete: 
there is always more to be said or written. This same 
incompletion or lack of closure also characterizes the 
image, for the image is made up of discrete bits of 
information, but there is no point at which an image 
achieves completion.
Some may feel a photographic image to be more complete 
than a literary one, but literature conveys in its images 
more as well as less than a photograph; indeed, ideas like 
"feeling" and "tone" applied to photographic analysis are of 
literary origin and, to some extent, represent an aspiration 
of the photograph to achieve a literary density. In this 
sense, the formal, linear analysis of literature structures 
perception of visual technologies. McLuhan remarked: "when 
faced with a totally new situation, we tend always to attach 
ourselves to the objects, to the flavor of the most recent 
past"; such an attachment is the very image of Freud's 
sensory reflex arc of perception (The Medium is the Massage 
74). Moreover, photographs always distort some qualities of 
that which they represent: the technologies of reproduction 
enforce incompletion.
All forms of image reproduction are approximations; 
this fragmented quality of the image is the basis for
Benjamin's revisioning of allegory through the recognition 
that completion is impossible. Insofar as the image 
represents a systemic presentation of data, the image is 
discursive, and this discursiveness emphasizes incompletion. 
The reader is left to speculate about aspects of this 
discourse and about the thoughts of the author who provides 
it. In this way, the subjectivity of the author is 
emphasized, and readers can only approach the author's 
subjectivity through their own subjectivity. Audience 
speculation, however, is enriched by the discourse of the 
text which provides images conveying its discourse. Texts 
that participate in various metatextual strategies 
constitute an expressionistic "tradition" which is 
discernibly different from that of texts which seek to 
provide a naturalistic sense of closure, a complete 
rendering of representational mimesis. The impact upon 
readers is intense because the naturalistic tradition 
invites them to participate in an illusion of a complete 
discourse, while expressionist texts proclaim their illusory 
qualities, forcing readers to participate in the 
construction of discourse, in effect, to become writers.
This difference is theoretically useful because it is 
readily discernible from the surface of texts through their 
presented images, so the participation of any particular 
text in either the naturalistic or the expressionistic type 
of discourse can be ascertained with less controversy. Of
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course, such participation is often a matter of degree, but 
the recognition of these types of discourse accords with the 
historical differences between oral and written forms of 
production, with naturalism arising from orality and 
expressionism from literacy, respectively, although the 
broader development of expressionistic discourse evolves 
coextensively with the domination of print technology until 
it becomes itself a more dominant form in the era of image 
production. An unexpected and somewhat paradoxical 
conclusion develops here in that the oral form which is 
actually more limited by the subjectivity of its authors 
resists this limitation through naturalist objectivity, 
while the more formal verbal forms which mainstream the 
production of the objective text actually invite more 
subjective freeplay, and a number of writers choose to 
emphasize the subjective dimension in their texts.
Expressionistic writing develops out of its own 
expressionistic "tradition," as a dialectical reaction 
against monolithic formularization of literary production 
which counterproductively narrows literary discourse. 
Probably, the creative impulse itself resists cumbersome 
restraints, but the restriction of discourse is anathema to 
itself, since such restrictions eventually would diminish 
the capacity to conceptualize, bringing the advancement of 
knowledge to a halt. The common conception of expressionism 
as a character-based form of distortion is deceptive: a
definition of this sort obscures the formal, discursive 
priorities conveyed through the expressionistic image. 
Expressionism's attention to form broadens the range of 
discourse in writing to include purely formal aspects, 
imparting a metatextual dimension to all portrayals. Image 
devices that bring about formal recognition in such texts 
operate differently from those used in naturalism, and since 
the natural is considered real, formal concerns are viewed 
as distortions. Thus, the common conception in this matter 
itself becomes a distortion through the legerdemain of 
elevating the natural over the formal when both partake of a 
discursive telos and both offer ways of structuring 
perception.
The attraction of modern writing, of "modernism," 
resides largely in its use of formal devices. Film as a 
medium typified by its use of montage is more a form of 
expressionistic writing than of naturalistic writing because 
the manipulation of image can only be approached from formal 
perspectives which interpret the discourses conveyed by 
these images, while a naturalistic, objective mimesis tends 
to reduce discourse to an illusory sense of closure based 
only on the surface of the cinematic image as a complete 




Intertextuality is a general literary quality that 
operates across both generic and story elements. Chambers 
finds that canonicity is "a variant form of what we 
otherwise call intertextuality: a relational network linking 
all texts, known and unknown, actual and potential” (19).
Any relation between two or more texts, or even discourses, 
may be characterized as intertextual. The adaptation of a 
novel or a play into a film, an intermedial movement, is 
intertextual since two texts are produced and remain in a 
certain relation to each other. All forms of allusions are 
intertextual. A typology of intertextual relations would be 
helpful, but, clearly, such a typology could be an enormous 
undertaking. This study provides an elaboration of 
intertextual comparisons in the image-genre grid and of a 
particular kind of allusion called the intertextual array 
(see chapter three). This section focuses on a short 
history of intertextual dynamics and attempts to elaborate 
certain concepts of intertextuality, such as consensual and 
conflictive forms of intertextuality and the concept of an 
expressionistic "moment.”
The variations of an epic bard might be called 
"intertextual" insofar as an "oral literature" context 
remains in conventional usage. Oral art reproduced as 
literary text produces a tendency to view oral and written
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forms as subject to common textual evaluations. The work of 
Walter Ong (Oralitv and Literacy) and others clearly shows 
that this view is not correct; oral and written works are 
structured differently. Variations in epic telling ought 
simply to be seen as a common story, unless common elements 
are observed in different epic tales. The epic conventions 
represent a form of oral intertextuality.
At the next level, that of written manuscripts, the 
technology of writing systems implies the conveyance of 
written products across national boundaries; the text can 
travel more easily than can the poet. An international 
perspective becomes possible because of this broader base, 
and Bakhtin has suggested that knowledge shared on a 
multilingual basis is a fundamental aspect of discourse in 
the novel (11). For Bakhtin, the novel arises in later 
Greek and Roman culture, and by combining conclusions from 
both Bakhtin and Ong certain correlations emerge. Poetry 
becomes the typical form of oral discourse associated with a 
local nationalism based on a common language and with a 
valued national past, while novelistic discourse represents 
the aesthetic result of writing technologies exchanged on an 
international basis and grounded in contemporary dialogue. 
Here the idea of modernity finds its typical expression in 
the novel, and, in turn, the novel becomes a possible site 
for expressionistic literary representation.
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The exchange of written manuscripts and early print 
texts tends to keep intertextual relations at a level of 
borrowing story elements; for example, "The Knight's Tale" 
by Chaucer is borrowed from an epic by Boccaccio, and this 
borrowing contributes to the argument that The Canterbury 
Tales functions as a novelistic discourse. Since Chaucer's 
story is a naturalistic portrayal of an epic story, there is 
little incentive generated by Chaucer's text to move to the 
metatextual, expressionistic ground for comparisons between 
the two versions. Chaucer's presentation neither requires 
nor invites such a comparison. One reads the natural, if 
borrowed, story.
The widespread dissemination of printed texts 
transforms intertextual relations in several ways; here, the 
eighteenth century begins to yield examples of early 
expressionistic writing because print presents text as the 
image of text. Sterne's Tristram Shandy with its black page 
and squiggles calls attention to the print medium in its 
capability of reproducing more than just written words. 
Mandeville's Fable of the Bees in its two-volume course 
explicitly groups within the generic label of "fable" such 
diverse presentations as doggerel verse, philosophical 
dialogue, the essay, and even the reproduction of an actual 
legal indictment. Blake's illuminated manuscripts integrate 
word and image in a single presentation. Rex Stamper has
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suggested that the problems of narration in Fielding's Tom
Jones may be ameliorated by the recognition that:
the central critical issue might not be a matter 
of authority versus freedom but in developing in 
each reader the capabilities for finding and 
developing a multiplicity of responses that will 
accept the author's authority as well as the 
reader's right to freely accept or reject that 
authority depending upon individual needs (196).
Such a reading accords with the idea of image reception as a
participatory, speculative discourse described above.
Swift's Gulliver's Travels in its several parts
connects stylistically to other important works, and,
further, it invites this recognition for a full
appreciation. Some explanation may be helpful here:
Gulliver's adventure in Lilliput is presented in the style
of Rabelais, as Gulliver here suggests the image of
Gargantua; the story in Brobdingnag often uses the
presentational style of More's Utopia in its rehearsals of
the giants' reasonable society; the voyages in part three
obviously parody the Royal Academy, but, beyond this, their
stylistic ironies recall Dante's Inferno: only in part four,
the kingdom of the Houyhnhnms, does Swift present his own
style that is of a completely surreal presentation, and this
has some antecedent in Apuleius' The Golden Ass. It is no
accident that his narrator, Gulliver, remains so fully
attached to these creatures. Gulliver's attachment
functions as a textual mark of Swift's signature, an image
of his stylistic development. Today one might remark on the
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common effect between this last section of Gulliver's 
Travels and of Kafka's The Metamorphosis (a discussion of 
intertextual relations between Swift and Kafka comes in 
chapter four). Swift anticipates twentieth century styles, 
which are often highly allusive, by assembling a variety of 
styles within a single work. Further, the discourses of 
these antecedent styles possess a common feature in that 
they are all social critiques. Within his own social 
criticism, Swift has mobilized an army of antecedent 
stylists, stylists who are, to varying degrees, critics of 
received tradition. With Swift the concept of intertextual 
borrowing or plagiarism does not really describe his 
insciptions of major styles. These images of style invite 
the recognition of their sources, and the content of these 
stories is Swift's own, so "borrowing" is a less appropriate 
description than is a "comparative discourse." Swift's 
novel is an example of expressionistic writing.
Matthew Lewis provides a more conventional avoidance of 
plagiarism through formal allusion by crediting the sources 
"of which I am aware myself" in an "advertisement" that 
precedes the text of The Monk (6). Lewis may represent a 
more conservative pole with respect to tradition than Swift, 
but, nevertheless, such intertextual strategies as these of 
Swift and Lewis suggest a "collaborative" intertextuality 
cited by Kellman as a quality of feminist discourse (7).
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While such "collaborative" or consensual
intertextuality may be a characteristic of feminist
discourse, it is hardly limited to feminist discourse.
Feminist consensual intertextuality tends to be anti-
traditional, an important feature of the allusive strategy
of the intertextual array, and feminist consensual
intertextuality is not limited to allusions to female
writers: Wittig alludes to Kafka and LeGuin alludes to
Beckett (see Chapters Four and Five). Ascribing this form
of intertextuality solely to "feminist" discourse is a
restrictive obfuscation. Consensual and conflictive
intertextual strategies play an important role in the
development of expressionistic discourse. Often,
expressionistic discourse coheres with feminist discourse,
but this is not always the case (surrealism is one example
of this controversy).
The consensual forms of intertextuality practiced by
Swift and Lewis are only half the story. The famous "satire
wars" carried out in eighteenth-century texts constitute the
conflictive side of this intertextual development. To cite
just one example, Rochester provides an antecedent to
Byron's attack on the poet laureate in Don Juan in this
invective against Dryden in "Timon":
"As if our old world modestly withdrew
And here in private had brought forth a new."
There are two lines1 Who but he durst presume 
To make th' old world a new withdrawing room,
Where of another world she's brought to bed?
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What a brave midwife is a laureate's head!
("Dialog, Decadence, and Expressionism" 146).
All these examples demonstrate the broad 
interpenetration of textual modes in the eighteenth century, 
operating across all levels of narrative structure, from 
text presentation to generic transformation to textual 
complexity of the story element. These arose as a 
consequence of the more widespread dissemination of printed 
texts. Further, they manifest the development of consensual 
and conflictive forms of intertextuality as an 
expressionistic literary device. Taken together with other 
forms of expressionism, such as Richardson's epistolary 
presentation in Clarissa and Mackenzie's "gun-wadding" novel 
The Man of Feeling, all these works indicate a broad 
aesthetic tendency toward expressionistic writing by 
developing the production of the image of text during this 
period of literary history.
During the nineteenth century, expressionistic 
intertextuality continues and innovates new literary 
strategies; moreover, strong formulations of expressionist 
theory develop (Coleridge, Mill, and Pater —  Preminger 
266). Previous expressionist praxis evolved into a movement 
of expressionist aesthetics, and this integration of theory 
and practice, again, in turn provided the basis for the 
development of expressionism. One may view the genre of the 
gothic as a generic site within which naturalism and 
expressionism engaged in their dialectical play, ultimately
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deriving the expressionistic genre of the fantastic 
(Todorov's), typified by James' Turn of the Screw and Poe's 
"The Black Cat" and "William Wilson" (Brooke-Rose 65; 
"Narrative Discourse in Poe" 33). In The Monk (1796), 
naturalist concerns allied with a conventional 
supernaturalism are offset by metatextual strategies 
including intertextual richness (above) and the inscription 
of an adventure story within the supernatural frame, so the 
text presents two "stories," one natural and one 
supernatural. Breton found Lewis' novel to be exemplary of 
surrealism (First Manifesto 15) In William Beckford's 
Vathek, an oriental supernaturalism is presented, and this 
invites a comparison with Christian supernaturalism. Such 
strategies engage the usual thrust of gothic endeavor (to 
establish a world of natural reasonableness supported by a 
pious supernaturalism) by complexing naturalist portrayal 
into metatextual discourse and by elaborating the 
supernatural into a diverse field inviting speculation.
Miller's analysis concludes by finding "the Gothic as a 
literature of spiritual disquiet" (204; see also Chapter 
Four). The infusion of occult images from alchemy and the 
Tarot contributed to alternate supernatural and even secular 
unreal forms of representation. Alchemical and Tarot 
imagery are presented by Poe in "William Wilson," "Ligeia," 
and "The Fall of the House of Usher" ("Narrative Discourse 
in Poe" 37-8; Peithman 68, n. 35)2,5 The Victorian satire
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and bemused antecedent to Eliot's The Waste Land. James 
Thomson's City of Dreadful Night connects its presentation 
to the major trumps of Tarot.2,6
Another gothic "classic," Oscar Wilde's The Picture of 
Dorian Gray conflates the presentation of a naive moral tale 
with a complex aesthetic analogue. Both Dorian's portrait 
and the extended aesthetic conversations ground this novel 
in a discourse more aesthetic than moral, and the novel's 
story functions as a critique of naturalist mimesis 
("Narrative Discourse in Poe" 33). In addition, Dorian's 
unique picture anticipates image dynamics that are inherent 
to cinematic presentation. Wilde's novel may be seen as 
participating in highly conflictive modes of intertextuality 
operating through literary parody. The lampooning of styles 
that occurs in Poe (the howlers "How to Write a Blackwood 
Article" and "A Predicament") and Melville (Tashtego's 
"birth" in Mobv-Dick and early parts of Pierre) is 
ideologically at odds with the textual sources called forth; 
this indicates a drive toward revision of sources taking 
place within the broad context of the gothic.
Harold Bloom's The Anxiety of Influence details a 
theory of conflictual intertextuality, of the revisions of 
sources, and, indeed, his treatment focuses on romantic 
figures involved with expressionism. Bloom's theory is 
limited by its lack of inclusion of more consensual forms of 
intertextuality, since its premise requires revision that is
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always substantial in order to justify a high degree of 
aesthetic achievement.
Obviously, the discernment of a consensual or of a 
conflictive intertextual relation between a text and its 
source reveals a significant mark of ideological perspective 
in literary works. The use of image in texts during the 
nineteenth century often broadens received discourses by 
providing alternatives. Lord Byron in Don Juan as well as 
Poe and Melville (as cited above) would parody more 
traditional styles, and the tension between text and context 
developed discourse into more formal freeplay. Melville in 
Pierre and Stoker in Dracula provided unconventional social 
images to provoke social complacency. Wilde's novel turns 
the naturalistic image on its head by emphasizing the 
deadening qualities of realistic portrayal, and Flaubert in 
Salammbo reanimates the dead image of ancient history with 
an active, imaginative freeplay. The consolidation of the 
expressionistic movement manifested itself through an active 
engagement opposing naturalist traditions in which 
expressionistic images contended with classical naturalism. 
This resulted in a generally expanded discourse, but also in 
a general confusion concerning the values and categories of 
literary production.
One may ask whether these types of intertextual 
relatedness, consensual or conflictive (collaborative or 
contentious), merely constitute another form of the artist's
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relation to tradition. Ong, Benjamin, and Bakhtin have all 
suggested that the aesthetic of any art form is related to 
and affected by its mode of production. Within this 
context, the concept of tradition does not allow for 
sufficiently precise formulations, since each major form of 
production contributes a different discursive approach to 
"tradition" and since a monolithic aggregate of literary 
production considered as "tradition" argues against 
differentiation. Moreover, Benjamin's discussion of the 
image of art disrupts the connection between art and 
tradition. The era of the printed text is already history; 
analysis can no longer be served only by literary categories 
based on the typographical representation of language on a 
page. Books still play a crucial role in making aesthetic 
determinations, but the electronic image has become just as 
crucial a factor. It would be premature to assume that 
electronic presentation has not transformed the entire 
system of signification. Consensual and conflictive 
intertextuality will partly characterize the relation 
between a text and its antecedents and help to determine the 
formal types of the literary product: expressionism or 
naturalism.
Neither expressionism nor naturalism are static 
concepts, but each participates in a dynamic way in the 
formal constitution of any literary work. The consensual 
intertextuality of Swift (above) is expressionistic since it
invites the appreciation of its source texts to fully 
apprehend its discursive field, and the consensual 
intertextuality of Stoker in Dracula where the characters 
recall Shakespeare's Hamlet in order to present a literary 
analogue for the situations they are experiencing, shows how 
expressionism can be employed as a mimetic device in order 
to more clearly tell the story during a time when the 
comparison of life to writings is a popular pastime, for 
this occurs as well as the discursive connection between 
these texts which is expressionistic (this bears upon the 
theme of the soul and the related problems of contemplation 
and action). It is useful to have a concept of an 
"expressionistic moment" to help determine if and how an 
expressionistic device is discursively functioning in a 
work. This can help determine if a specific device is part 
of a strategy of reification or a part of a more progressive 
discourse. Sometimes a conservative discourse prefers a 
modernist presentation to suggest a more progressive 
orientation; in such cases, expressionistic intertextual 
connections serve a naturalist discourse. In regard to 
Eliot and Thomson (above), one may say the device of the 
Tarot intertext enjoys its expressionistic moment in The 
City of Dreadful Night, but in The Waste Land this intertext 
serves more traditionalist concerns of a naturalist 
discourse. Because Eliot uses the Tarot as one item in his
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list of spiritual impoverishments, his metatext is narrowed 
more than it is broadened.
The widely recognized phenomenon of nineteenth-century 
conflictual intertextuality, often anti-traditional in its 
applications, during the twentieth century often provides a 
vehicle for the conveyance of more traditional ideas, while 
anti-traditional works come to a broader participation in 
forms of collaborative or consensual intertextuality, a 
gesture represented by the signatures appended to The Second 
Manifesto of Surrealism and applied in textual arrays. Of 
course, the word "tradition" here is used in its 
naturalistic conception, for expressionistic nineteenth- 
century conflictive intertextuality often forms a 
"tradition" with its twentieth century consensual 
counterpart. It no longer seems possible to speak of a 
single tradition in literary discourse other than the 
general production of literary products, so more formal 
discursive categories serve better, such as the typology of 
naturalism or expressionism and the recognition of forms of 
production as types of discourse. Both share a general 
orientation as representation, and neither is mutually 
exclusive, allowing for a more precise description of 
literary structure.
This thumbnail sketch of the history of intertextuality 
has helped to provide two ways of classifying 
intertextuality as it contributes to expressionist writing:
consensual/conflictive intertextuality and the expressionist 
intertextual moment. Forms of intertextuality provide 
discursive strategies that must be appreciated on the 
metatextual level. It remains to consider the changes in 
twentieth-century technologies to fully describe the nature 
of expressionistic writing and to appreciate cinematic 
presentation as an expressionistic medium. This is the 
subject of Chapter Three.
PART TWO: THE TEXT OF IMAGE 
CHAPTER THREE 
POSTMODERNISM, DREAMS, TEXTUAL ARRAYS
During the twentieth century new technologies of 
aesthetic presentation have developed, and changes brought 
about by these new products have become an important 
aesthetic concern. Just as developments in printing 
technology fostered the development of a more expressionist 
approach to literary production, visual media which 
presented text as image promoted the avant-garde techniques 
of expressionism. The industrial age, during the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, brought forth the innovative 
aesthetic media of photography and cinema; these became more 
widespread and more refined in the early twentieth century. 
Moreover, astonishing developments in systems of thought 
(like quantum mechanics) as well as innovative ideological 
conceptions (like Marxist analysis) contributed to the 
broadened ambience of aesthetic endeavor at this time. A 
late twentieth-century perspective in which the consummation 
of the marriage between video cameras and computers is a 
fiat provides an appreciation of how these visual media have 
transformed the aesthetic arena by providing a universal 
medium which can accommodate images whatever their source 
(video) with a source which can generate any image 
imaginable (computer). Neither is sound out of reach, for
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the synthesizer can generate any physical frequency or 
sound, and this may easily be mixed into either the computer 
or the video component. Truly, the production of the visual 
image is now limited only by the imagination of the 
producer.
Postmodern Forms
Photography, film, and video are the typical aesthetic 
contacts of the post-industrial or electronic age, just as 
printed texts became the typical mode during the earlier 
period of industrialization. Not only have these media 
proliferated, but visual presentation has also transformed 
the writing styles of printed texts. This study recognizes 
three phases of visual presentation in printed texts. The 
first, discussed in the previous chapter, concerns the broad 
movement in literature toward the development of the image 
as a discursive vehicle when text began to be a means to the 
end of the production of images. The second, developed at 
length in the next two chapters on Kafka and Beckett, 
involves the production of texts as image montages in which 
discourses are altered by structural differences in the 
images of these texts (see "Definite and Indefinite Images," 
below). The third, more contemporary form, for the present 
outside the scope of this study, describes the production of 
texts in which images are structured as if they were films,
116
writing more or less as screenplay; exemplars include 
Burroughs and Pynchon. In general, the first of these 
phases correlates to "modernism" while the second and third 
are characteristically "postmodern." Although a postmodern 
"moment" can occur in any of these phases, typically, the 
second and third phases are characteristically postmodern.
Visual technologies have brought about a quantum leap 
in the capacity of art to signify in that any image contains 
much more information than does a word, but appreciation of 
this condition has lagged behind, and theories of 
signification have remained based upon the verbal, the 
written word. There is a kind of inertia involved here; 
since theories of meaning have reached a high level of 
development with respect to words, the tendencies have been 
to separate the studies of verbal arts from the studies of 
image arts, an infertile compartmentalization, or a more 
promising development has been to apply theories of verbal 
meaning to image production, but this has its limitations. 
Christian Metz explains one major limitation: "the problem 
of cinematic signification cannot be convieniently treated 
if one holds to the definition of language as a system of 
signs destined to be used for communication" (288).3 *1 This 
is basically the problem of linearity associated with codes 
of direct correspondence which assume an effective, 
naturalistic referential context. This is the reason why 
this study develops a synthesis of theorists, like Benjamin
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and Hillman, who have developed broad approaches capable of 
handling both verbal and imagist aesthetic production.
Despite the chronological progression, of verbal arts 
giving way to imagist forms, this study finds a 
reconciliation in treating image production as prior to 
verbal production, based on the coherence between image 
production and sense-perception. After all, language seeks 
to mediate perceptual experience. There is a larger 
philosophical problem here, an epistemological difficulty 
articulated by Beckett (see Chapter Five on Film) that 
perceptions themselves may only be representations. While 
film spectators sometimes need to be reminded that the 
images of film are still only representations, not 
perceptions frozen in time, these representations do call 
into question one's presumed faith in perception itself.
This problem, however, does not interfere with treating 
image representations as prior to verbal representations by 
considering language as subordinate to the image field; in 
fact, this priority of the image may be more accurate in an 
epistemological sense.
The work of Walter Ong delineated differences in 
reception and signification between the written word and the 
spoken word, and although "writing" in the Derridian sense 
remains the model of meaning, presentation became a cogent 
consideration in the interpretation of aesthetic meaning. 
Typically, discussions of signification focused on
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allegorical versus symbolic understanding of oral or literal 
presentations (see allegory I and allegory II, chapter one). 
Marshall McLuhan sought to identify changes in signification 
and reception brought about by electronic media (The Medium 
is the Massage), and he provided some helpful suggestions in 
this area, especially his designations of "hot" and "cool" 
media, based on physiological reception of presentations: 
"hot media are . . . low in participation, and cool media 
are high in participation or completion by the audience" 
(Understanding Media 36). This is an important distinction 
which sets a precedent for the distinction between definite 
and indefinite images (below). Even though print and cinema 
are characterized as "hot" media, innovative writers, like 
Kafka and Beckett, developed image strategies to increase 
the participation of the audience through a sort of "hot" 
and "cool" imagery.
Often, the appreciation of the importance of 
presentation in the production of meaning remains limited to 
verbal analysis, with film being treated as a kind of 
embellishment more than as a transformative factor. "The 
printed book had encouraged artists to reduce all forms of 
expression as much as possible to the single descriptive and 
narrative plane of the printed word," to a linear, 
naturalistic discourse (62). Although the previous chapter 
has focused on writers who exploited the image potential of 
print, McLuhan's characterization accounts well for
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mainstream production and criticism. The complexity of 
image presentations brings about "information overload" and 
the "resort to the study of configurations, like the sailor 
in Edgar Allan Poe's Maelstrom" (viii).
A configurative or systemic approach interprets 
discourse more directly from the presentational surface 
(verbal text or image). This is the attitude of a writer 
(who produces text); in this reading discourse is emphasized 
as a component of the surface rather than being presumed to 
follow the surface, as discourse follows for that reader who 
gathers information and who will complete a reading and then 
interpret a discourse. Naturalist presentations use the 
image surface as a sufficient condition, expecting a 
didactic reading, and discourse proceeds as an obvious 
consequence to this surface, while expressionistic 
presentations explore the discourse of the presented image, 
provoking its reader to read, as a writer does, into 
interpreting every step of the way, so the surface becomes 
more directly discursive.
A satirical joke about stories and their morals will 
illustrate how this process works by presenting the joke 
from indefinition to definition to closure. "A man 
collected" is an indefinite image, for one may not be sure 
whether "collected" is a verb or an adjective, and each 
usage proposes a somewhat, different meaning. "A man 
collected things" is more definite, assuring the usage of a
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verb, but there is still much information wanting. So far, 
the reader who writes has progressed from weighing two 
possible interpretations to considering what sort of man 
collects things. The joke begins: "a man collected thrones" 
which presents still more definition, promoting the 
recognition of a monarchic fetish. "A man collected 
thrones, and he lived in a glass house"; now this reader 
considers that the man puts his monarchic fetish on display, 
that this is also a metaphor for public life, and (a well 
read reader) that in Zamyatin's anti-Stalin, dystopic novel 
W e . the characters lived in glass apartments, a metaphor for 
Stalin's own monarchic power fetish. Clearly, this simple 
statement has already provoked a good bit of interpretation. 
The joke continues: "a man collected thrones, and he lived 
in a glass house; one day a particularly heavy throne that 
was stored in his attic broke through the floor, and 
continuing its fall destroyed the whole house." The writing 
reader interprets: "it is not surprising that monarchic 
greed should lead to destruction, a lesson of history," or, 
perhaps, "a public figure should not be so subservient to a 
fetish." These negative overtones are suggested by the term 
"attic" which carries a negative psychological load. The 
response of a naive reader at this point may simply be: too 
bad this man had so much trouble, but what is the point?
Here the punch line arrives in the form of a moral to 
this story: "people who live in glass houses should not stow
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thrones." Now this joke has arrived at closure; since it is 
complete, the naive reader understands its "point," a silly 
reversal of the proverb "people who live in glass houses 
should not throw stones." This joke provides a model of 
discourse following a story's closure; this is also an 
expressionistic model since it is divided into "story" and 
"lesson" segments where ordinarily the "lesson" or discourse 
is left for the reader to discover after having gotten the 
complete story. Still, expressionism in this joke goes much 
deeper. The original proverb suggests that vulnerable 
people should not be arrogant, and this extends to public 
figures not being unnecessarily judgmental. The punch line 
of the joke, however, conveys a similar discourse to the 
proverb, since there is a kind of arrogance in public 
figures with monarchic fetishes. Two things ought to be 
noted that the naive reader may miss: l) in spite of the 
silly reversal of terms, a similar discourse is conveyed 
both by the proverb and the joke; this emphasizes how 
language can be determined by reference, that a, perhaps 
"vertical," quality of language continues to convey a 
meaning in spite of a deformity of the utterance (an effect 
familiar to readers of Joyce and Pynchon); and 2) the 
writing reader does not require the punchline of the joke to 
get its discourse; by presenting the joke in bits, it is 
clear where the discourse begins to achieve a definition 
through image.
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If collecting things is not particularly ominous, 
although it may be read that way (Fowles' The Collector), 
collecting thrones does carry an ominous political load in a 
democratic context, and stowing the thrones in a glass house 
sets the stage for disaster, since glass associates not only 
some form of clarity but also fragility. Although the 
discourse may not be completely transparent without full 
disclosure, much of it is conveyed well before closure 
occurs. The writing reader does not really need to hear 
about the house falling down, for this is almost inevitable 
from the initial images. If this reader does not hear the 
punchline, the connection to the proverb with its overtones 
may be missed, but most of the discourse contained in these 
initial images will have been conveyed, so this reader will 
get most of the "point" or discourse of this joke from only 
hearing the first half.
Both Hillman and Benjamin recognize that the image 
presents more than its surface seems to present, not only a 
picture but also a "perception," and this recognition is 
fundamental to understanding the image contact. Taken 
together, Hillman's idealist analysis and Benjamin's 
materialist analysis form a theoretical synthesis of the 
broadest sort. The basic character of the aesthetic image, 
because of its presentation of large quantities of 
information, is inherently metatextual and innately 
discursive, since discourse is metatext. The praxis of the
123
recognition or denial of these qualities distinguishes the 
respective types of discourse: expressionism or naturalism. 
Naturalism insists that the image is merely mimetic, an 
imitation of the real, and through this insistence seeks to 
control discourse by enforcing its dependence upon closure. 
Expressionism on the other hand, calls attention to the 
discursive qualities of the image, often by breaking mimetic 
conventions to provoke questioning and discursive 
participation by its audience throughout the course of its 
presentation, not just when closure has been achieved. 
Strategies of definite and indefinite images and of textual 
arrays (discussed below) are expressionistic devices which 
provoke the discursive participation of the audience.
The complexity of image presentation leads to shock, 
and Benjamin insists that shock "should be cushioned by a 
heightened presence of mind" ("Mechanical Reproduction"
238). His work precedes that of Ong and McLuhan, but all 
three of them recognize the theoretical importance of the 
manner in which aesthetic presentations impact upon psychic 
structures to produce meaning. The material image raises 
consciousness through its discursive qualities which promote 
the recognition of this image as a representation of 
consciousness itself, instead of as a false projection of an 
objective closure. To this extent, its reception is 
intuitive, but any form of explication of this intuitive 
construct requires a rhetorical discourse for description,
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and this discursive character promotes the continuation of 
discourse, which cannot be subjected to closure. The 
material image resists closure because it signifies only 
discursive options, rather than some strict, referential 
correspondence as do other allegorical tropes (I and II).
This discursiveness enhances the context of the image, 
inviting comparison among similar images, which, in turn, 
promotes more discourse. This inherent discursiveness of 
the image inhibits direct transmission of images by 
deforming images throughout successive rhetorical 
incarnations. Rene Girard traced image patterns in 
successive incarnations of stories, such as the myth of 
Oedipus and Sophocles' drama about the myth, and he 
discovered shifts of emphasis occured from the mythic 
version to its revision: "the extent of the poet's 
understanding of the myth and its origins is hard to 
ascertain, but it does not have to be complete for tragedy 
to represent a progress in the direction of mythical 
dismantling" (Violence and the Sacred 84). Subtle 
differences become much more pronounced when image severs 
the contextual connection between the image and tradition; 
this will be an important aspect of the second part of this 
study. Image discourse also integrates scientific and 
aesthetic thought by providing a common context; the 
rhetorical distillation of a particular image from an 
intuitive field becomes a common practice for both artists
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and scientists, as aethetic constructs and as models, 
respectively. Girard's careful attention to images provides 
a sound basis for scientific hypothesis, but this is only to 
cite one example in a whole range of converging discourses. 
Images also surmount barriers between parties who use 
different languages; this is also indicative of their 
metalinguistic, metatextual character.
The material image, like image in montage, is cut off 
from tradition, so any connections to other texts need to be 
established through its own image presentation, and such 
connections are relatively frequent. Expressionistic texts 
make clear these intertextual connections through allusive 
strategies, such as textual arrays, by means of the close 
resemblance of common images. Image media are often 
exploited through the assertion that the image is only 
surface. Such an assertion makes the image into a 
naturalist signifier by providing a false closure and by 
masking its discursive qualities.
This enforced sense of closure is what occurs with 
respect to aesthetic transcendence, or the appeal to the 
sublime. Consider Eliot's use of the untranslatable 
Sanskrit word "shantih” to end The Waste Land. The sublime 
is invoked as a metatextual realm providing a transcendent 
source for meaning, but the use of this indefinite image as 
a signifier for such a transcendence literally has no 
referent because this image is already a self-referential
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metatext. While it may generate further discourse 
concerning its significance, it cannot reference anything 
beyond its own image. The use of this word is a device to 
invest this poem with authorial distance, an aura. This 
device accords with other devices in this poem, such as the 
formal footnotes which connect his poem to other, more 
traditional works, after the manner of Milton. Gestures 
like Eliot's here constitute the "modernist" form of 
expressionism in which self-referentiality garners support 
from traditional sources. Eliot's poem "The Hollow Men," on 
the other hand, suggests a more contemporary expressionism. 
In the "postmodernist" forms of expressionism, allusions or 
arrays develop with respect to non-traditional sources, 
suggesting an anti-traditional discursive agreement.
Hutcheon credits Benjamin's essay "The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" with a kind of 
"prophecy" regarding the postmodern; this may be the result 
of a complicity with a widespread tendency to date a 
postmodern "period," either as post-1945 or post-1960.3 *2 
This kind of chronological thought contributes to the 
difficulties of understanding just what constitutes 
"modernist" practice when "modernism" is used as a 
descriptive term to lump together the widely divergent 
aesthetic movements of the early twentieth century.
Benjamin witnessed the emergence of a "postmodern" aesthetic 
movement from "modernist" practice among his own
127
contemporaries, and, although he did not use the term 
"postmodern” or the term "expressionism" in the general 
sense that it is developed here, his essay is the most 
important contribution to the synthesis of specific 
parameters of postmodern practice.3 *3 Hillman has also 
contributed significantly, as well as others, to this 
elaboration of "postmodern" parameters:
1) political relations, not the sublime or the 
beautiful, become the fundamental justification of 
expressionistic art;
2) expressionism is a fundamentally discursive 
approach, so story becomes less crucial to 
expressionistic discourse, unlike naturalism where 
discourse arises from story;
3) the means of representation in expressionism is 
the material image, and cinema as a mode of 
production possesses a basically expressionist 
character;
4) reception of expressionistic art involves 
participation through speculation for an audience 
of producers;
5) metatextuality, criticism, subjectivism, and 
illustrations or visual presentations function as 
marks of expressionistic discourse, and these 
elements are usually overdetermined when a 
particular work is designated as expressionistic;
128
6) ideological stances often are clearly 
recognizable in expressionism because of its 
rhetorical and political orientation, not 
mysterious or speculative (even though actual 
signification in expressionism usually requires 
speculative participation, cf. "4"), and, 
consequently, no part of an expressionistic text 
is exempt from ideological treatment;
7) in expressionism meaning is coded through an 
indefinite allegory (one image leads to another) 
as opposed to naturalism in which traditional 
forms of allegory (one-to-one or symbolic 
correspondence) produce meaning. The material 
image provokes an intuitive, virtual complex of 
meaning. From this field a specific discourse is 
refined through rhetorical praxis.3 *4
The Image-Genre Matrix
Since the material image emphasizes both surface and 
discourse, other allegorical forms of images can be 
approached through its domain, but these other forms cannot 
encompass the material image within their logical fields. 
One understands that a word can be viewed as an image of 
itself (an understanding which provokes image strategies 
discussed in the previous part, "the image of text"), but a
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word generally is characterized by its reference function in 
that it combines with other words to produce discourse or to 
produce image. By itself a word can only generate an image 
of the most abstract and indefinite sort: "car" lacks the 
specificity usually attributed to images, including autos, 
railroad types, toys, and so on. A word requires some 
context to function like an image, in that an image produces 
discourse.
A symbol may also be viewed as an image of itself, but 
a symbol functions as a closed construct, with a 
specifically limited discourse; for example, a word may be 
called a symbol with an understanding that a word signifies 
some sort of referent, a discourse, if you will, but one 
limited to the function of a word, albeit in a general 
sense. A more complex elaboration of word as a symbol 
limits it discourse to several functions (literal, 
allegorical, moral, even anagogic), but these all still 
delineate a limited discursive field in which the symbol, 
unlike the image, serves a discursive purpose, instead of 
being a source of discourse, generating a variety of 
meanings, which is the function of an image.
Since the material image can contain these forms, word 
and symbol, within its functional discursiveness, it 
provides a common medium for classification of images. 
Moreover, the image possesses a potential for the 
integration of generic categories. Ong describes some of
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the genres of verbal art affected by "the shift from orality 
to literacy": "lyric, narrative, descriptive discourse, 
oratory, drama, philosophical and scientific works, 
historiography, and biography" (139). He then chooses 
narrative as his topic, but he also adds "drama, which, 
while it presents action with no narrative voice, still has 
a story line, as narrative does." Ong discusses novels a 
great deal in his study, but here he subsumes the novel 
within "narrative." His method here, while both precise and 
valid, indirectly shows the difficulties involved with 
generic classification, because in order to discuss plotting 
he must select genres which tend to contain plot, and his 
discursive concentration must be theoretically applied 
across genres. Although the presentation of story is a 
fundamental aspect of literature, generic categories are not 
described with reference to the presentation of story, even 
though "narrative" appears to be organized about this very 
presentation of story. "Narrative" is not sufficiently 
inclusive; perhaps "novel" is not mentioned here because the 
case that all novels tell stories is not so easily made, and 
only those novels which do tell stories are subsumed within 
narrative. Ong's theoretical works cuts across generic 
lines because those genres have not been organized along 
theoretical principles so much as traditionally rhetorical 
ones, so different classifications become coextensive with 
respect to particular qualities.
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The material image can provide an integrative approach 
to genre organization which can prioritize the discursive 
qualities of images as generic tendencies as well as sort 
generic images according to surface presentations.
Variations of styles could be compared with respect to the 
kinds of images produced in those styles, and emphasis on 
particular kinds of images could characterize the discursive 
directions of particular products. Unlike Ong, who must 
decide whether to discuss "historiography" with regard to 
narrative, one could approach theoretical problems at a 
level of generic organization which would be coherent with 
respect to accomplished theoretical practice. This kind of 
an integrative field is set forth as an image-genre grid, or 
matrix (below), and its formative parameters will be the 
next subject of discussion.
This study has been at pains to point out the 
correlations between major forms of production and their 
typical forms of discourse: orality as a typically 
monological discourse expressed through the epic, writing as 
dialogical discourse expressed through the novel, and 
cinematic as expressionistic discourse, both dialogical and 
metatextual, presented through film or an equivalent text of 
images. Bakhtin's discernment of temporality as a crucial 
distinguishing feature between monological and dialogical 
discourse accords well with the analysis of images since 
images occupy time and space. If monological discourse
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rhetorically emphasizes the past and if dialogical discourse 
rhetorically emphasizes the present, cannot this formula be 
extended to consider expressionistic discourse as 
rhetorically emphasizing the future?
Hillman has suggested that the image is characterized 
by rhetoric (above), but futurity has a double rhetorical 
function. First, the use of a future scenario, or a utopian 
presentation, actually rhetorically emphasizes certain 
aspects of present temporality. This rhetorical selection 
is very much a metatextual strategy, for the dialogue of the 
present becomes refined into a probabalistic projection much 
like a scientific hypothesis, and such hypotheses themselves 
constitute metatext. This metatextual emphasis accords with 
expressionistic discourse. Second, rhetorical presentation 
of futurity can be prophetic in that its future may actually 
come to pass.
The possibility of writing prophecy is controversial, 
but if one accepts the possibility that it can happen in a 
philosophical qualification (such as, induction cannot show 
conclusively that prophecy cannot occur), then a rhetorical 
category for prophecy possesses some validity. Certainly, 
there are texts that lay strong claims to prophetic writing, 
so such a category is less a matter of speculation than it 
is a real problem of literary analysis. Expressionistic 
discourse does not exclude the rhetorical possibility of 
prophecy; indeed, religious texts containing prophecy, like
133
mystical texts, are largely considered as a form of 
expressionism. Expressionistic discourse can accommodate 
both aspects of rhetorical futurity (see also Chapter Five, 
under "Future Genres"). These two types of futurity are 
also distinguished by their real and unreal contexts, as 
rational projection and as more indeterminate forms of 
prophecy, for if prophecy does come to pass it becomes 
history; its nature as prophecy is only valid before the 
event.
Earlier in this discussion it was shown how images 
could be categorized by their real or unreal contexts, and 
the temporal categories of past, present, and future are all 
consistent with real and unreal spatial worlds. Using these 
three discourses typical of the major modes of production as 
three axes of categorization (it has already been shown how 
print media breaks into both dialogical and expressionistic 
discourses), one can sort the discourses indicated by their 
image presentation into a three-dimensional generic field. 
Such a field can represent both existing genres as well as 
theoretically possible ones, so the field can demonstrate 
valid rhetorical categories which may not yet have been 
realized as text. Practically, though, most categories have 
exemplary texts, if not many (see part two of this study). 
This integrative theoretical field can instruct more 
precisely about the nature of genre than have past methods 
of rhetorically sorting text production. Although methods
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of analyzing production should also to lead to a precise 
theoretical organization, since the inductive method is 
supported by actual production, past systems have not been 
based on sufficiently inclusive parameters. This inductive 
formula of organizing genres by image type and by discourse 
type is accomplished by assigning a discursive value to the 
temporal-production category of the presented image and by 
distinguishing real and unreal image presentations as 




UNREAL TIM E 
(Absolute)
UNREAL IMAGE SPACE REAL IMAGESPACE
Past Ghost tales + Historical Accounts +
(Oral) Faity Tales - Folk Tales -
Present Romance + History and Realism +
(Verbal) Fantastic - Satire -
Future Science Fantasy + Science Fiction +
(Image) Surrealism - Tragicomedy -
Past Mythology + Heroic Legends +
(Oral) Dreams - Auguries -
Present Dreams (Jungian) + Dreams (Freudian) +
(Verbal) Black Fantasy - Black Humor -
Future Prophecy + Projection (deja vu) +
(Imagist) Tarot - I Ching -
. -----------  . . 1-----------------------------
FIGURE 3. IMAGE-GENRE GRID
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This is a two-dimensional representation of a three- 
dimensional generic matrix in which spatial-temporal axes 
are arrayed with respect to a discursive axis. This 
configuration shows lines of generic development, and the 
generic categories integrates all forms of textuality.
This matrix is read as follows: the ground state of the 
image plane (discourse = zero) can be viewed in two ways.
The first takes this image grid as pre-representational or 
as a priori images; this accords with Vico's proposition 
that literature invests pre-existent forms with irony (Vico 
3 01). This ironic investment correlates with oral 
production; in fact, it is likely that forms of production 
and discourse can be configured with respect to the trope of 
irony as well as that of allegory used in this study 
(Chambers and Hutcheon both discuss the role of irony in the 
production of discourse).
The other approach simply views this ground state as 
equivalent to oral production, commonly considered as zero- 
degree narration to designate its discursive limitations.
In this case Vico's pre-representational forms literally 
"zero-out," and the grid considers only forms of actual 
representation. The four naturalistic categories generated 
by oral production include: ghost tales, historical 
accounts, mythology, and heroic legends. These genres 
correspond to other, generic forms of "oral expressionism," 
including fairy tales, folk tales, dreams and auguries.
The next step up the discursive axis corresponds to 
verbal production which produces the relatively naturalistic 
categories of romance, realism and history (including 
contemporary nonfiction), Freudian dreams, and Jungian 
dreams. Here a discursive value of one corresponds to 
dialogical presentation. Here a couple of clarifications 
will be helpful. First, the distinction between Freudian 
dreams and Jungian dreams is made on the basis of the images 
presented in them. Frued showed that many, but not all 
dreams are based on wishes and develop their imagery from 
"everyday," mundane objects and occurrences. Jung's 
discussion of dreams which present archetypal, often unreal, 
images elucidates dreams for which Freud's system could not 
account; these are different dreams, dreams not at all 
easily characterized by a wish as a source. As a matter of 
frequency, Jungian dreams are much rarer than Fruedian 
dreams, which occur very frequently, and, also, Jungian 
dreams are characterized by a high degree of vividness. 
Second, one should recognize the relative character of 
naturalistic genres generated within an unreal temporality; 
in other words, naturalistic and expressionistic qualities 
are blended within such contexts. Corresponding to these 
"naturalistic," dialogical genres, there are more 
expressionistic ones as well. Expressionistic, dialogical 
production generates the categories of the fantastic (after 
Todorov, also early forms of surrealism allied to the gothic
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are characterized as fantastic), satire, black fantasy, and 
black humor.
A discursive value of two here corresponds to 
metatextual discourse typified by image production and 
emphasis on forms of future temporality. These generic 
categories are all relatively expressionistic in character, 
but "naturalistic" trends can be followed within them.
These relatively naturalistic genres include science 
fiction, science fantasy (the SF genres), prophecy, and 
projection (projection is characterized by "deja vu" as 
opposed to "prediction" which is associated with science 
fiction). More thoroughly expressionistic generic 
correspondences to these genres include surrealism, 
tragicomedy, and prophetic machines, typified by Tarot and I 
Ching. A more detailed discussion of these future image 
forms takes place in Chapter Five ("Future Genres").
These generic categories indicate the typical 
discourses associated with specific forms of production. 
These categories also possess an aggregate character: for 
example, verbal production tends to include not only its 
special forms but also previous oral forms presented 
verbally. Also, Ong's famous phenomenon of "secondary 
orality" situates particular qualities of orality within 
essentially imagist presentations (this accounts for the 
sometimes "monological" power focused through the image and 
for the less "formal" qualities of image presentation as
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compared with verbal production). This model shows a 
historical sensitivity in that these discursive forms can 
occur at any time, but the production of typical forms tends 
to correspond to the historical period in which particular 
production forms dominate. The "+" and signs have been
arbitrarily used to designate naturalist ("+") and 
expressionistic (H-") approaches within each discursive 
category.
This matrix provides helpful conclusions about generic 
properties. The category of science fiction develops along 
with the broad trend toward expressionism in the nineteenth 
century as exemplified by works of Poe, Wells, and Mary 
Shelley. The development of dream texts also comes about at 
this time, typified by Poe and De Quincey (this will be 
developed at more length shortly). Unreal images of the 
past tend to be associated with religious discourse while 
verbal use focuses more on the nature of psychic structures, 
and imagist unreality invokes form of futurity. Taken 
together, these generic movements provide an index of 
shifting religious attitudes toward secularism (see also 
chapter five, "general conclusions").
These categories provide a formal organization with a 
"built-in" flexibility, so the allegorical tropes typical of 
production forms which distinguish naturalism (allegory I 
and II) and expressionism (allegory III) may be applied to 
any category, while each particular category reveals its
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innate discursive qualities. As stated above, the 
classification of any particular work should depend upon a 
discursive overdetermination. The specific categories of 
oral production tend to focus more on the nature of an 
objective world, and those of the verbal and the imagist (or 
"cinematic") more clearly provide a discourse of 
consciousness. Thus, one may conclude that verbal 
production eventually began to undermine the objective 
mimesis projected by oral cultures and long reinforced by 
verbal formality, when verbal production began to 
concentrate on the production of images.
The usefulness of this combination of rhetorical 
temporalities, image types, and production discourses is 
two-fold. First, this matrix provides strong suggestions 
concerning formal categories while it integrates all forms 
of cultural production. Second, it provides a clear basis 
for its own reorganization and further development of 
generic inquiry. This matrix both helps to explain 
important features of contemporary culture by specifying 
structures previously lumped under critical catch-alls (the 
"absurd," the "postmodern," the "nouveau" incarnations, and 
so on) and by providing direction for further theoretical 
formulations. This matrix conserves the importance of 
structure because it operates out of the material text, 
using surface characteristics for classification (remember 
that in expressionism the surface tends to be discursive),
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but it also avoids linear rigidity through its recognition 
of the relative character of trends and through its flexible 
specifications. These evidential qualities help to 
alleviate controversies. Also, this matrix promotes 
sensitivity to the operant rules of specific discourses as a 
guide to interpretation.
Dream Texts
The image-genre grid displays certain paradoxical 
qualities. First, only some of the genres actually 
represent achieved literary forms; others are experiential, 
and some, as in the cases of divination systems, a mixture 
of both. This empirical representation of literary 
production accepts "mimetic" representation in that literary 
production attempts the representation of some form of 
"reality," likely as perceived consciousness, but, 
paradoxically, the generic areas designated as 
"experiential" are actually forms of subjectively 
experienced "unreality" (like dreams and deja v u ) . Such 
representations take on their own form through the languages 
of either words or images, and, in turn, they are modified 
by a variety of contacts. Perhaps it is best to consider 
the image-genre matrix as forms of (con)textual contact, 
possible forms of "elaborated" consciousness, or, more 
generally acknowledged, as forms of mediation. In any case,
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it remains an advantage that generic products are ordered by 
forms of contact that entail specific discursive features, 
allowing access to interpretative values.
Second, many more of these genres contain 
expressionistic tendencies than naturalistic ones. Indeed, 
from this perspective, the naturalistic strategy of direct 
representation of reality is relatively restricted to real­
time oral genres and to naturalistic verbal genres; that is, 
some forms of monological and dialogical discourse. The 
rest of these genres either display expressionistic 
tendencies or some stronger degree of expressionistic 
production such that there are generic areas where the 
representational impulse begins as an expressionistic one 
and permits of further expressionistic development; thus, 
all forms of imagist representation involve expressionism.
Third, any form of verbal production, dialogic, or 
novelistic discourse not strictly naturalistic involves the 
literal production of some kind of dream text. Further, all 
forms of imagist production are visionary. It has been 
mentioned before that Derrida considers all forms of mimetic 
production as a kind of dream (see Chapter One), but this 
analysis of textual effects displayed in the image-genre 
grid allows for the naturalistic "fantasy" of actual 
reproduction of the real for the practical purpose of 
describing productive values. Moreover, the concept of 
distinct spatial-temporalities with regard to the material
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image provides something of an index to indeterminacy. It 
has been acknowledged from the outset that the material 
image is only a plastic (to varying degrees determinable) 
rhetorical condensation or distillation of a relatively 
indeterminate virtual image complex and that distinct fields 
of unreal spatiality and unreal temporality provide 
descriptions of stages of indeterminacy as "genres" and more 
or less indeterminate impulses within such genres.
A major advantage of this image genre grid is its 
recognition of the aesthetically limited strategies of 
generic development within naturalistic representation.
More traditional systems have sought to constrain aesthetic 
production within this relatively narrow field, although a 
great deal of variation could occur with respect to 
strategies of naturalist presentation. Traditional systems 
valued aesthetic qualities based on the degree of 
verisimilitude, but, as has been shown above, this 
verisimilitude itself results from the investment of an 
aesthetic distance lending perspective, and this is 
equivalent to the aura.
While there has been a lot of talk about the aesthetic 
"possibilities" or the "potentional" of the "avant-garde," 
this grid attempts a description and elaboration of specific 
strategies of discourse, areas of generic development, which 
are not based on a beautiful semblance to the real, but 
which flood the real with unreality. Expressionistic
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representation stands apart from naturalism, in a sense, 
turning it on its head by insisting on a subjective 
grounding of representation. Productive values with a non­
natural foundation are arrayed in this image matrix allowing 
the specification of a variety of expressionistic stances 
and providing a base for comparison of stylistic strategies 
once lumped into the realms of the "experimental" or the 
"unsuccessful," depending on the generosity of critics. One 
might well ask about generic boundaries, such as whether 
real and unreal spatial-temporal ranges or domains actually 
merge, and so on, but, if they do, it is clearly in the 
direction of indeterminacy as far as representation goes, 
and, more importantly, for purposes of classification, they 
tend not to merge, but the more extreme forms of 
expressionism increase indeterminacy. This discussion of 
margins with respect to these representational trends will 
be further developed with respect to the indefinite and 
definite image (below and in Volume Two of this study).
Using this image-genre grid, one ought to be able to assign 
an image strategy to a generic area, and, with careful 
consideration, one ought to determine an aggregate of image 
strategies within a specific work to follow a particular 
discursive direction or pathway.
For many works a preponderance of discourse in a 
particular direction will determine classification; for 
example, Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow not only contains a
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variety of expressionistic image strategies but also highly 
precise mathematical descriptions, a sine qua non of 
naturalistic presentation. However, the radical blocks that 
Pynchon has prepared to prevent linear elucidation, -not the 
least of which involves the innovation of the "disappearing 
protagonist," have the effect of recontextualizing his 
mathematical presentations (there are also "unreal" forms of 
mathematics), and these become almost unrecognizable within 
his chaos of representational forms. Indeed, little enough 
attention has been paid by critics to the mathematical 
equations presented by Pynchon; this is probably a 
shortcoming of specialization by critics for whom 
mathematics is far afield from their areas of preparation, 
where their qualification is problematic.
It might fairly be said that extreme expressionism 
reveals the indeterminacy underlying all expression, but 
that it is the suggestion of the real, the chance or 
possibility of presence which creates the indeterminate 
(this is fundamental to the concept of definite and 
indefinite images). A similar conclusion has been reached 
by McHoul and Wills in their discussion of meaning as 
transference (131-62). The major writers addressed by this 
study, Kafka and Beckett, are both involved in the 
production of dream texts; that is, they work in generic 
areas which have much in common with dreams, and their 
representation involves the presentation of dreams and
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expression concerning dreams, although they at times
achieve other effects.
Traditionally, the representation of dreams in
literature is placed in a controversial context, that of a
subjective illusion, but those dreams which are represented
tend to come about, and this opens a discourse which
considers subjectivity as a base for representation. This
problem is expressionistically presented by Chaucer in his
"Nun's Priest's Tale"; in the discussion between
Chauntecleer and Pertelote concerning the validity of
dreams, Chauntecleer argues for the validity of dreams while
Pertelote insists they are illusions. Many examples of true
dreams are cited, including that of this tale itself, but
the whole effect works toward a naturalistic acceptance of
dreams, if they are true ones, but there is little sympathy
for the illusory qualities of dreams.
Many of these illusory qualities probably possess
validity, but the coding of dream language is different, and
the difficulties of extracting a discourse from the
indeterminate images of dreams have been considered all but
insurmountable. Metz's 1975 semiotic study on the relation
of dreams to film illustrated some of these difficulties:
it is before such [narrative] dreams that the 
spectator adopts a very particular visee de 
conscience which is confounded neither with that 
of the dream, nor with that of the daydream, nor 
with that of real perception, but which retains a 
little of all three, and is installed, so to 
speak, at the center of the triangle that they 
mark out . . .  If films which are not at all
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narrative (there are in fact rather few of these) 
should one day become more numerous and 
persuasive, the first effect of this evolution 
would be to dismiss, at a single stroke, the 
threefold play of reality, dream, and phantasy 
("The Fiction Film" [1975] 101-2).
Metz's conclusions developed the differences between these
forms, but he also recognized the remarkable similarities
between the real, the film image, the dream, and fantasy.
Eventually, Metz himself opted for these similarities and
the relation of Freudian structures to film theory (see
Psychoanalysis and Cinema. 1982).
Nevertheless, a consideration of Metz's distinctions
between these forms tends to destabilize his elaborated
differences between them, which he eventually realized.
First, "the first and principle difference between the
filmic and oneiric situations" involves knowledge in that
the dreamer does not know he is dreaming while the spectator
knows he is at the movies (75). This objection is
relativized by the case of the lucid dreamer who knows that
he is dreaming. Metz asserts that this "almost never"
happens, but, in fact, it happens more and more frequently.
Anyone who pays attention to their dreams for a sufficient
time and whose dreams are not characterized by obsessions
(recurrent dreams indicate an ego resistance to dream
material) will move into an appreciation of their dreams as
they occur; in other words the lucid dream becomes the rule
rather than the exception. In such cases the acts of
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falling asleep or of going to the movies take on a much 
greater equivalence.
Second, "filmic perception is a real perception (is 
really a perception); it is not reducible to an internal 
psychic process" (80). Here Metz encountered many 
difficulties, because the objective-subjective dichotomy is 
invoked to instill difference. Perception of a film is 
perception of a representation, just as is reading a book, 
but different media produce the images (of words or of 
pictures). The perception of an object produced by another 
can only be more of a perception than an image produced by 
oneself in a dream because of its material existence, but 
this condition relegates self-perception to the status of 
illusion, no matter how accurate such perception may be.
The achievement of a linguistic "certainty" with respect to 
the objective must yield up any "certainty" with respect to 
the subjective, even though both make claims to accuracy. 
Paintings and photographs are envisioned by their creators 
before they come to be finished works; such creative 
previsioning is as much a perception for these artists as is 
their perception of other photographs or paintings: here 
similarities tend to overrun differences. Another problem 
involves perception itself, for is not perception a 
representation produced by the senses, and are not dreams 
representations produced by those same senses? The eye 
whether it is open or closed will still see (see below,
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"Dream Theories": Bergson). This problem of perception as 
representation is the whole point of Samuel Beckett's Film 
(discussed at length in Chapter Five). One cannot presume 
that it only requires an objective focus for perception to 
be valid. Consider the varieties of interpretive readings 
and misprisions of a particular text where the same object 
produces many different perceptions (as can the instructions 
for assembling a bicycle; imagine trusting the directions 
for operating a motor vehicle to a text). This objective 
view of perception is invalidated by the indeterminate 
nature of any particular perception being characterized as 
true or as illusory; indeed much critical quibbling takes 
this form.
Third, Metz argued that "the diegetic [narrative] film 
is in general considerably more "'logical'" and 
"'constructed'" than the dream (88). Again, this is really 
an extension of the objective-subjective dichotomy to 
presume that a demonstrated logic, like geometry, is 
superior to the logic of dreams. The comfort taken in the 
known "object" confers a superiority over a logic developed 
by the dreamer of and for himself. Metz characterized dream 
logic as "truly alien" when, in fact, it is the most 
intimate form of logic (89). It is likely that dream logic 
is always understood by the dreamer, for whom the dream is a 
particular message. The difficulties arise in translating 
this dream logic into the logical systems of linear
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language. Nonetheless, Freud (who is the major source for 
Metz's metapsychology) succeeded to a large extent in making 
this translation (see the next section on dream theories). 
Also, Freud's discussion of how dreams are constructed does 
not imply that they are any less constructed than texts; 
there are, after all, political censors equivalent to 
psychic censors (Metz later comes around to this in 
Psychoanalysis and Cinema).
Fourth, Metz insisted upon the special origin of 
images: the dreaming subject who passes "from the dream to 
the filmic state" can only lose because "the images are not 
his" (98). This statement can only have a partial accuracy. 
At the level of a cultural archetype, images are held in 
commom. This is the basis for the concept of the material 
image: that image representations in cultural products 
partake of this archetypal quality. Freud's "Oedipus," for 
example, is characterized by its universal quality; 
differences may exist between it and that of the myth or the 
play, but these differences are fairly trivial with respect 
to the figure itself. Further, this image or figure itself 
generates discourse more than it is the object of discourse, 
because as an archetype it is only an approximation which 
requires a rhetorical refinement. The intertextual strategy 
of the textual array (see below) is a device by which 
authors share images indicative of a common discourse in 
which they are engaged; these correspondences are not exact,
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but they are indicative of a common endeavor. The attempt 
to distance the image, to specify its originality with 
respect to authorship, to authority, in short, is a 
reification, a reinvestment of the image with an aura, an 
exercise in cultural nostalgia.
Metz's argument locates many areas where difference 
between dreams and film may be sought, and he discovers many 
similarities between them as well. This study has been at 
such pains to critique Metz's older argument, to show how 
his differences become problematized and destabilized into 
relative continuities, in order to show how linear thought 
can fail at the appreciation of its object, not to discredit 
Metz's thoughtful endeavor. The basis for Metz's argument 
lies in the discursive category of "narrative." For Metz 
the essential difference between dreams and film was found 
in their respective narrative contexts, and his elaboration 
followed from this distinction. It has already been shown 
how "narrative" fails Ong in his elaboration of cultural 
contacts. This is why the image-genre grid functions at the 
level of the image itself by treating all images as valid 
representations which provoke discourse. The generic 
quality of a given work is described with respect to the 
kinds of images presented in the work.
In fact, this matrix began as an attempt to elaborate 
conventions of fantastic literature, but in developing its 
focus on representations, it became clear that any
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representations, of oral, of verbal, or of cinematic images 
formed basic units of discourse allowing for precise 
classifications without requiring unwieldy discursive 
structures. In this way, one can recognize that Metz's 
"evolution" of the synthesis of dream and of film does not 
require aesthetic production of largely non-narrative forms 
so much as it requires a discursive turning away from the 
category of "narrative" as a principle premise for literary 
analysis and a turning toward "representation" as a more 
self-evident perspective on literary production. 
Expressionism, with its metatextual use of the image, 
provokes discourse both through narrative and non-narrative 
forms. Expressionism represents the dream, constructed 
verbally or cinematically, as text, dismantling the 
projected distinctions between them.
This study develops an analysis of the forms of the 
material image found in dream texts, definite and indefinite 
images, and considers how these images constitute generic 
areas and approaches, making possible stylistic comparisons 
and analyses in a more effective way than has been 
forthcoming with regard to the distinct styles of some 
writers, particularly Kafka and Beckett. Before proceeding 
to the demonstration and application of this generic method, 




Freud's study of dreams as contained in The 
Interpretation of Dreams provides important theories and 
data about the dreaming process. His theory that dreams are 
engendered by wishes not only holds for many dreams, but it 
also provides a common theoretical ground that unites much 
of traditional and modern dream interpretation. His 
discussion of dream wishes and anxiety explains how manifest 
dream content becomes oppositional to the dream wish; this 
has also been a tenet of traditional dream interpretation in 
that many dreams should be interpreted in senses opposite to 
their literal content (Freud 193, 270, 619-23; 508). Dreams 
involving sexual concerns illustrate this tendency in that 
direct sexual content in dreams often masks concerns other 
than sexual ones. In fact, often an apparent absence of 
sexual content indicates a dream of sexual nature, for 
example, examination dreams, while a broad development of 
sexuality in a dream may indicate more pedestrian concerns, 
for example, an examination (Freud 310 [examinations], 403-5 
[staircases], 432-435 [disguised sexuality]).
An important implication of dream temporality also 
arises from Freud's study in that some event provokes the 
dream, and, in turn, the dream provokes the dreamer to some 
action, if only the recognition of an affect (97, 197-202; 
497-99). The conception that an event "real" or psychic
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(like a "random encounter" or a wish) provokes the dream 
suggests that dreams themselves are reactive phenomena 
connected to our perceptions (or representations) of the 
world and of ourselves. That these "events" are more or 
less indeterminate does little to prove their irrelevance 
with respect to dreams when dreams themselves often quite 
readily divulge aspects of real events within the dream 
presentation. Freud took great pains to demonstrate the 
importance of such connections, and he also studied how 
dream presentations portray logical operations; again, the 
real elements of logic have their place in dreams as well 
(345-53).
Kafka's story "In The Penal Colony" becomes much less 
inscrutable within this context, as a dreamed response to a 
psychic event. "The Judgment" also presents a classic 
anxiety dream, although when viewed as a story alone, it 
seems incredible. The degree of determination of a dream 
over subsequent events is certainly variable, and even 
debatable, but, nonetheless, it is more certain that some 
behavior will follow the dream and that knowledge of the 
dream is part of the context of this behavior (even though 
such behavior may only be a thought). Freud also detailed 
certain dream symbols; for example, a staircase symbolizes 
copulation, and a staircase has significance in Kafka's 
"Cares of a Family Man." Part of this detailing of symbols 
involves dream terrain where a forest may represent the
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body's pubic region, a hill the breast, and so on. These 
elements of Freud's theory of dreams are highly significant 
in literary representations. Indeed, it was often to 
literature that Freud went to explicate dream theory, and 
the Freudian school of literary interpretation often makes 
use of these symbols.
Jung developed the archetypal theory of dream 
interpretation; this theory differs from Freud, but so do 
the dreams which are subjected to interpretation by this 
theory:
For Freud, accordingly [to denoting the 
unconscious as the state of repressed or forgotten 
contents], the unconscious is of an exclusively 
personal nature, although he was aware of its 
archaic and mythological thought-forms. A more or 
less superficial layer of the unconscious is 
undoubtedly personal. I call it the personal 
unconscious. But this personal unconscious rests 
upon a deeper layer, which does not derive from 
personal experience and is not a personal 
acquisition but is inborn. This deeper layer I 
call the collective unconscious. . . . The
contents of the personal unconscious are chiefly 
the feelina-toned complexes. as they are called; 
they constitute the personal and private side of 
psychic life. The contents of the collective 
unconscious, on the other hand, are known as 
archetypes (Four Archetypes 3-4).
Archetypal dreams are rarer occurences in the life of the
dreamer than are Freud's everyday "wish-fulfillment" dreams,
but for Jung it is problematic to systematize dreams:
owing to the diversity of the symbolical material 
it is difficult at first to perceive any kind of 
order at all. Nor should it be taken for granted 
that dream sequences are subject to any governing 
principle" fPsychology and Alchemy 28).
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This concept of the archetype, presented by Jung and 
further developed by Hillman, is directly involved with the 
development of the material image which allows a revisioning 
of text production, a revisioning which calls for 
recognition of the importance of dreams in literature. 
Archetypes are also common in literature, although they may 
not be considered strictly as symbols since they are 
inherently less determinate than symbols and since they 
refer to aspects of individuation in the personality. On 
the whole, it seems better to consider Freud's and Jung's 
theories of dreams as aggregate; that is, each explains well 
the type of dream appropriate to each theory. This 
consideration is more effective than the conflictual 
attitude concerning which theory is "correct." In literary 
production, Melville has been shown to be amenable to 
archetypal analysis, and this study will discuss in detail 
archetypal analysis in Kafka's work: for example, Gregor's 
metamorphosis into a "dung beetle" (the maid's version) 
invokes the archetype of the scarab, a powerful occult 
structure (see chapter four).
In addition, Henri Bergson made a study of dreams which 
emphasizes the precision with which the imagination produces 
dreams through the physical medium of the sleeping,
"unseeing" eye. Recalling Benjamin's remarks on the 
reception of film art as shock and as a "habit of 
distraction" provides insight into the signifying power of
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film, for distracted persons not only perceive what is
presented to them, but other things as well. Benjamin
suggests that shock requires a heightened presence of mind.
Of course, dreams also provide the shock effect, and it may
be that Bergson's theory of dreams contributed to Benjamin's
"aesthetics of distraction" in cinema, providing a precedent
to the synthesis of dream and of cinematic representations.
In "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," Benjamin shows his
acquaintance with the theories of Bergson (160). Benjamin
also may be referring to Bergson's material analysis in
Dreams (1914):
to sleep is to become disinterested . . .  in the 
dream the same faculties are exercised as during 
waking, but they are in a state of tension in the 
one case, and of relaxation in the other . . . the 
memories which it gathers most readily are the 
memories of relaxation and distraction, those 
which do not bear the mark of effort (48, 50,
55) .
One can easily see how the inward movement of surrealism and 
of Benjamin's appreciation of cinema coheres with this 
effortless, distracted aesthetic, as well as how hostilely 
more traditional aesthetes would view this turn (as Metz 
once did, above). In the first place, the subjective field 
was considered additional to the field of mimetic 
objectivity, but now it is becoming clear that the 
subjective field has swallowed whole the objective one. One 
can still speak of an outside, but only on the qualified 
terms of a projection.
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This is part of the reason why Kafka's writing is so 
deeply affective, for the subjectivity that his writing 
explores directly affects that of his readers. This 
represents the fulfillment of expressionist art, realized 
most particularly in Kafka when the text conjoins the 
subjectivity of the writer with that of the reader in a dark 
dance of speculation, an effortless immersion in a huge 
oneiric field of representation. Words provide an entry to 
this territory, but words cannot encompass this space.
Later, an examination of how Welles uses the vehicle of the 
dream to bring about Kafka's expressionist fiat in his 
cinematic adaptation of The Trial will not only provide 
evidence of Welles' recognition of the dream in Kafka but 
also of Welles' inclusion of deia vu as a dream device which 
can structure narrative (see Chapter Four).
The collective impact of these dream theories can help 
to explain a difficult phenomenon like deia vu. This, along 
with other prophetic dreams, was denied by Freud because it 
could only awkwardly fit within his theory of dream as wish- 
fulf illment. However, the phenomenon of deia vu makes sense 
as a dream phenomenon: some event sparks a dream, the dream 
content is exactly a future event, elaborated in minute 
detail; eventually, the dreamer comes to this event and is 
overpowered by the memory of the dream which predicted it, 
for it has truly been "already seen." For Freud, "the 
ancient belief that dreams foretell the future is not wholly
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devoid of truth," but he believed the temporal connection 
was accomplished by the wish which transmitted the image of 
the past into the future (660) . Freud's understanding of 
landscapes in dreams that produced the feeling of deia vu 
was that they "are invariably the genitals of the dreamer's 
mother; there is indeed no other place about which one can 
assert with such conviction that one has been there once 
before" (435). Although Freud offers convincing evidence 
that such an explanation for this phenomenon is probably 
appropriate at times, notably, the transmission of affect in 
dreams ("affects have remained unaltered" [498]), one 
wonders if there are not cases where the place remembered is 
an actual place.
This phenomenon occurs in powerful literary uses, 
particularly in film. Film's facility for the duplication 
of shots makes possible an elaborated dream image of minute 
detail which can then be presented later as actuality. This 
implies a paradoxical break with traditional dream 
presentation, due to the extremely naturalistic presentation 
of the unreal imagery of a dream. One cannot be sure if 
Chaucer (above) presents a deia vu effect or a more 
indeterminate, but prophetic dream. Nevertheless, the 
wealth of naturalistic detail in a deia vu dream remains an 
unreal construct because it occurs within an unreal 
temporality where the naturalistic orientation of a 
sequential temporality from past to future is reversed.
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John Carpenter provides a plausible, scientific 
explanation, cinematic representation, and narrative 
structure of deia vu in his recent film Prince of Darkness. 
Cavalcanti uses this phenomenon as a narrative structure in 
his influential film Dead of Night (1946), and in this film 
he critiques the Freudian explanation that it is "the 
creation of a dream after the event which alone makes 
prophetic dreams possible" (664). Calvalcanti, Welles 
(whose adaptation of The Trial is discussed below), and 
Carpenter all portray deia vu as some kind of dream 
phenomenon.
An even more radical presentation occurs in Chris
Marker's "Bergsonian science fiction short La ietee" (Cook
484; this was produced in 1962, but its release was delayed
until 1964 [Katz 777]). In this film a young boy sees a man
shot and grows up to be this man who is shot. Due to
Marker's manipulation of time and the method of time travel,
it is impossible to maintain distinctions between dreams and
events. The protagonist travels through time by means of
drug-induced dreams which constitute the technology employed
here. The Sobchauck's describe Marker's unique method of
presentation:
the film, except for one brief moment, is entirely 
composed of still photographs which freeze motion 
and destroy the distinction between past and 
present as we usually perceive it in the ongoing 
immediacy of the motion picture (390).
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Marker dissolves the boundaries between dream and reality 
and reverses the temporality of past and future within his 
deia vu narrative structure. Another angle on deia vu 
occurs in D.M. Thomas' novel The White Hotel; here the 
phenomenon also structures the narrative, but it is 
presented more as symptom than dream (of course, symptom and 
dream are closely related). Thomas critiques Freud's work 
by having the character of Freud in his novel treat this 
"symptom" as simple hysteria, but the novel shows that the 
source of this symptom is actually the future destiny of the 
woman protagonist, so her "symptom" is actually prophetic 
and specific enough for this "symptom" to be considered a 
form of deia vu.
Dream phenomena like deia vu and dream content based on 
divination systems call into question both dream and reality 
temporalities based on the conventional distinctions of 
past, present, and future by suggesting forms of temporal 
simultaneity such that past, present, and future can 
"merge." This appears linguistically in the word "before." 
What is "before" one? This word operates to show both the 
past and the future are "before," requiring a contextual 
specification to explicate its reference with respect to 
convention, but in the word itself past and future merge or, 
at least, reside as oppositional and simultaneous. The 
image-genre matrix relies on the conventional distinctions 
of past, present, and future because these conventions
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appear to be inherent in literary production, but this 
matrix also includes forms of unreal temporalities which 
oppose conventional chronology and which suggest that this 
convention may not be a rigorous one. Clearly, a more 
sophisticated theory of temporality would be an important 
factor in the revision of this model, but, currently, the 
problem of temporality is more a problem than a rigorous 
formulation. Thus, this matrix follows an integrated 
representation of temporal forms as significant production 
values. These forms are further specified by spatial 
conditions, recognizing the interrelatedness of space and 
time as continuous.
This summary of dream data and theories should help the 
recognition of the representational kinship between dreams 
and literature, particularly expressionistic literature. It 
should be clear by now that "literature" is being used as a 
general heading to include cinema as well. What follows is 
a method for using the material image to interpret and to 
classify literary works. Following this there will be a 
brief discussion of textual arrays to conclude this chapter 
and the first part of this study.
The Material Image in Dream Texts
The basic unit of interpretation with respect to the 
image-genre grid is the material image. This material image
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is considered a common unit of representation that allows an 
equivalence between oral, verbal, and cinematic forms of 
production. The material image derives from two sources: 
first, Benjamin's material equality of images in 
mechanically reproduced texts and in the art of cinema and, 
second, a literary application of Hillman's development of 
the psychic image as a unit of representation in archetypal 
psychology. The material image promotes a sense of equality 
with respect to cultural representations, and it recognizes 
that cultural representations share an archetypal quality, 
as do representations in dreams.
The material image is a source of discourse which is 
necessarily produced rhetorically with respect to any 
particular image; the term "closure" cannot be applied to 
discourse, for the essence of discourse is continuous, 
dialectical play. This suggests that the material image 
itself cannot be subjected to "closure." Indeed, Benjamin's 
development of the concept of allegory as fragment also 
implies this lack of closure with respect to images. Also, 
Hillman's designation of the psychic image as a virtual 
complex also eludes closure in that this image continues to 
generate rhetorical descriptions of itself as a prelude to 
and as a part of its discourse. An illusion of closure may 
be promoted by aggregates of image representations, and a 
photographic image provides an illusion of closure through 
its representation of a tableau (many subtle perceived
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qualities, such as shades of color or shading itself either 
escape or are forced by photographic representations). The 
material image promotes the recognition that all 
representational images are inherently open, and so are the 
texts which they combine to produce (see chapter one for the 
sources of this summary).
There are two kinds of material image which develop as 
a kind of continuum moving from relative clarity to 
indeterminacy. It may help to recall the various degrees of 
clarity with respect to dream images, since, after all these 
types tend to appear in dream texts. First, the definite 
material image: this type of image is visually elaborated so 
that it is clearly perceptible. For naturalism, most 
imagery is of this type; film also tends to consist of 
definite images; thus, there arises a tendency to identify 
film with naturalism. The definite material image provides 
a basis for comparative discourse (one image is easily 
compared to another). It helps to produce the illusion of 
image closure.
Second, the indefinite material image: no matter how 
fully elaborated, this type of imagery cannot be fully 
grasped; this withholding of definite form from the material 
image emphasizes the lack of closure inherent in image 
production. This kind of image sometimes is part of 
cinematic representation, for example, the "soft focus" shot 
in which objects cannot be distinguished until the focus is
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adjusted to bring them to clarity. Expressionistic verbal 
production presents this type of image regularly. Since 
image media cannot present closure, the indefinite material 
image becomes the paradoxical juncture of verbal and of 
cinematic production. Paradoxically, image reality cannot 
be fully grasped.
These distinctions between the definite and indefinite 
forms of the material image are based on textual effects.
One can easily read this definite or indefinite quality in a 
presented image. However, the indefinite type problematizes 
the definite one. At what point is an image definite? 
Paradoxically, one must consider where the illusion of 
reality is invoked to recognize the definite, but the 
recognition of this illusory quality disqualifies the 
definite. Naturalism depends on faith in the illusion of 
mimetic representation, and, in this type of discourse, the 
indefinite image may also participate in the form of the 
sublime (see the discussion of Eliot above). From a 
theoretical perspective, the indefinite material image 
either is designated as failed writing or itself designates 
the failure of writing to provide the illusion of the real, 
as it often does with Kafka and Beckett.
This conceptualization of a definite-indefinite image 
continuum will become clearer with respect to specific 
examples (one can be found in the "throne stowing" joke, 
above), and the method of the second part of this study
involves the comparison of definite and indefinite image 
structures in the texts of Kafka and Beckett. There are 
some precedents to this kind of conceptualization with 
respect to image representations. The first, mentioned 
earlier, involves McLuhan's designations of "hot" and "cool” 
media based on the degree of participation by a receiver in 
the contact form itself. McLuhan designates both print and 
cinema as "hot" media in that they present a totality of 
information to the receiver, while the telephone and 
television are "cool" media insofar as they require the 
participation of the receiver to complete the media contact. 
This participation occurs at a somatic level; for example, 
in watching television the viewer completes the picture, 
presented as a dot matrix, with the viewers own facility for 
active imagination. Where the film more or less replaces a 
spectator's dream capacity with its own high-resolution 
representations, the image contact of television actively 
solicits the viewer's dream capability to complete its own 
representation. In this sense, watching television is more 
literally a dream text since it partially induces its viewer 
to dream. This difference between film and television may 
be a sufficient cause for the disparate psychological 
effects often attributed to these similar image media 
(Cronenberg's film Videodrome explores this question of 
biological reception).
Analogous to this kind of somatic participation is the 
more literary issue of interpretative participation in which 
the audience must somehow complete the text which is 
presented to it. The indefinite image provokes 
participation by requiring the audience to question the 
presentation as it is taking place, while the definite image 
promotes a sense of completion or closure. Herman 
Melville's Mobv-Dick provides examples of both kinds of 
imagery, since his story-telling narrator requires an active 
attention from his "listener," literally his reader. 
Melville's chapter entitled "The Great Heidelberg Tun" 
provides an example of the definite image through its 
precise, geometric description of a "Sperm Whale's head" 
because, as his narrator puts it, "to comprehend it aright, 
you must know something of the curious internal structure of 
the thing operated upon" (286). Melville's narrator not 
only provides a complete description here, but his quoted 
remark implies that elsewhere he may not be so thorough. 
Indeed, this is exactly the case with respect to the fate of 
Moby Dick, the great white whale. Nowhere does Melville 
indicate whether this whale lives or dies after his 
encounter with Ishmael's ship. The reader must search after 
clues and prepare a case concerning the fate of this whale, 
and, though the whale's escape may be a less likely 
conclusion, this fate is characterized by a certain 
indefiniteness even as it is certainly an issue in the
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story. The reader must work interpretatively to complete
the text because of the indefinite quality of Melville's
image of the last appearance of Moby Dick: "the harpoon was
darted; the stricken whale flew forward" (468).
Another precedent of this definite-indefinite image
dichotomy can be found in Roy Caldwell's ludic
interpretation of Kafka's novel The Castle:
the novel obliges the reader to become a 
participant, rather than a spectator, in the 
making of the text . . . K. functions analogously 
to the reader —  i.e. both must decipher, must 
"read" the castle . . . the castle, an empty 
referent, is constituted by the discourse about it 
. . . this discourse takes the form of stories 
told about the castle and interpretations of these 
stories . . . the interplay between story-telling 
and story-interpreting becomes so complex that the 
two operations are no longer distinct; finally, 
the reader's interpretation of the novel becomes, 
in effect, a continuation of it (44).
Here Caldwell's designation of the castle as an empty
referent is equivalent to the consideration of the castle as
an indefinite image. Caldwell reads Benjamin's discussion
of Kafka as "an activity of producing, of discovering
meanings" as essentially ludic in which "the locus of play
may be found neither in the one nor the other player but in
the relation between them" (43, 51). This kind of interplay
is characteristic of both Kafka and Beckett. As the
forthcoming discussion will show, the relation between the
definite and indefinite images in dream text is
characterized by a paradoxical interplay in which definite
images aggregate into indefinite image complexes, and
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indefinite images are composed of definite components, like 
Caldwell's "stories about the castle."
Textual Arrays
The textual array will also provide a useful tool in 
that works found to be in an array will help deepen 
discursive appreciation. Arrays are necessarily involved in 
adaptive writing, so a clear qualification of adaptive fit 
arises from the analysis of image use in a cinematic 
adaptation by way of comparison with its source. If such an 
analysis reveals a discursive and generic congruence, one 
may agree that the adaptation fits the source text; on the 
other hand, the movement of generic discourse from one field 
to another will reveal to what extent a source text is being 
incorporated into other discourses. Clearly such discursive 
movement has significant ideological consequences. Other 
kinds of arrays will help to specifically show discursive 
connections between writers, connections that heretofore may 
have been rather vague. It should be stressed that an array 
alone provides limited evidence; each work involved ought to 
be subjected to an image analysis sufficient to classify it 
on its own terms before consideration of how its discourse 
is modified by participation in arrays.
The intertextual array is a form of allusion that 
enforces the non-traditional literary stance of
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expressionistic writing. In Deleuze and Guattari's study 
Kafka. they develop the concept of a "minor literature," 
texts in which "language is affected with a high coefficient 
of deterritorialization," in which "everything in them is 
political," and in which "everything takes on a collective 
value" (16-7). Usually, the intertextual array involves an 
allusive strategy, partly formal and partly informal, 
between texts of this kind of non-traditional orientation. 
This definition of the intertextual array has appeared 
elsewhere:
the intertextual array involves the incorporation 
of images of other specific texts within a 
particular text; this kind of allusion is a 
frequent occurrence in postmodernism. This array 
goes somewhat beyond the tacit inscription of 
images of other styles, either literal or parodic, 
which is a feature of both consensual and 
conflictual intertextuality (often referred to as 
"collaborative" and "contentious," respectively, 
see Kelman 7). The primary distinction between 
these types of intertextual devices involves the 
subtle formal or informal acknowledgement 
(somewhat between the lack of acknowledgement, as 
in tacit allusions, and the formal footnote) by 
the author of the borrowed image which has been 
inscribed; thus, the surface of the text more or 
less readily yields the indication of the specific 
text. Also, this acknowledgement tends to 
indicate a collaborative discourse, such that the 
discourses of the inscribed text and the text 
which bears the inscription are at least partly 
congruent. . . This allusive strategy of the 
intertextual array is primarily distinguished from 
other intertextual relations by two features: l) 
the inscribed image comes from an acknowledged 
specific text, even if the style of the 
inscription is very different from the style which 
has incorporated this image, so the text which 
bears the inscription provides some provenance for 
the recognition of the specific text that has been 
the source of this inscription (although such 
provenance may only be the mention of the name of
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the source text); and (2) there is a discursive 
congruence between the texts of this array; in 
other words, the textual image usually does not 
serve a discourse at odds with its original usage 
(31-2).3 *6
The second part of this study provides a number of examples 
of intertextual arrays with regard to Kafka and Beckett, but 
here two related examples will illustrate the recognition 
and discursive effects of such arrays. These are to be 
found in the works of Joyce and of Borges.
The first, which has been discussed at length 
elewhere, involves the inscription of an allusive image by 
Joyce from Swinburne's poem "Dolores."3 *7 Even though "the 
name Dolores [Swinburne's title] only occurs in Ulysses in 
"Sirens" (11.518, 734)," these two occurrences of this name 
mark a complex allusion endowed with a double structure 
which reflects the double structure of Swinburne's poem 
itself (Crumb "Sweets of Sin" 239-40). In that discussion 
an explanation is provided of how several elements from the 
poem "Dolores" enter into Joyce's allusion, how the figure 
of "Dolores" provides a kind of unifying archetype between 
Bloom and Molly, and how this figure likely inhabits Bloom's 
character-consciousness, not just the "narrator" level of 
Joyce's novel. Nevertheless, there is another dimension to 
this intertextual array not included in that discussion, a 
dimension clarified by a brief excursion into literary 
history.
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Swinburne's poem •'Dolores" has undergone a kind of
marginalization with respect to this poet's other work, and
this "occulted" quality of "Dolores" has likely contributed
to the lack of recognition of this poem's presence in
Ulysses by previous Joycean scholars. Samuel Chew in his
extensive study Swinburne (1929) recognizes "Dolores" as one
of this poet's greatest metrical achievements:
the history of the "Dolores" stanza, which is 
probably more closely associated with Swinburne 
than any other he employed, is complicated and can 
barely be indicated here. Gay used the eight-line 
anapestic trimeter for comic effect in "The 
Beggar's Opera"; Byron turned it to serious 
purpose in the "Stanzas to Augusta" and gave it 
greater weight by employing double rhymes in 
alternate lines. The stroke of inspiration by 
which Swinburne turned this jog-trot stanza into a 
thing of beauty was the truncation of the last 
line. When, with this shortened eighth line, 
consonantal and vocalic harmonies are empoloyed,
Gay's old jingle becomes dignified and majestical 
(91-2).
It is worth recalling how influential Gay's play by way of
Brecht and Weil has become in twentieth-century culture,
but, it is a little surprising today that Chew attributes a
similar effect to "Dolores" by referring to "the thousands
of people who have chanted Swinburne's perverse litany to
his Lady of Pain" and to this anecdote:
Professor Saintsbury has told of the band of 
sudents, of whom he was one, who marched in lock 
step around the courts and the cloisters of 
Oxford, chanting "Dolores" . . .  to understand 
Swinburne's prestige and influence from 1866 till 
about 1880 we must call into service that same 
historic sense which is necessary if we would 
understand the power of "Byronism" a generation 
earlier (93, n.l, 72).3,8
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Swinburne, who had not completed his degree at Oxford and 
who had failed to win the Newdigate poetry prize there, must 
have felt some satisfaction at such a display, even if it 
contradicted his own opinion of this place: "that nobody in 
Oxford could be said to die, 'for they never begin to live'" 
(Morris 102, 224, 227, 48).
Such stirrings of life carried with them an anti- 
institutional flavor which Joyce could hardly have failed to 
appreciate, whose entire "Ithaca" episode of Ulvsses is a 
lampoon of academic discourse. All this suggests an 
essentially political component to Joyce's development of 
his complex allusion to "Dolores," one apparently justified 
by a prolonged lack of recognition of any involvement of 
"Dolores" with Joyce's text, no doubt contributed to by the 
consignment of Swinburne's poem to the back pages of only 
the more "complete" Victorian anthologies.
Although Joyce has since become an academic "industry," 
there has remained some academic resentment towards him, 
manifested by a lessened canonical status as compared with 
Yeats and Eliot, the canonical "moderns," and by academic 
attacks on Joyce's allusive style. Such attacks probably 
prompted Borges to develop an intertextual array with 
Joyce's Ulvsses in his story "The Immortal" in which Borges 
provides an informal discussion of various intertextual 
approaches. The narrative of "The Immortal" includes a
174
postscript in which a professor concludes this story to be
"'apocryphal' because of 'intrusions of thefts'," but:
Borges, as narrator, presents a short history of 
stylistic borrowings reaching back to Greece and 
including "the artifices . . .  of Eliot," but the 
story's postscript documents the borrowings in the 
manuscript of Joseph Cartaphilus which "abounds in 
Latinisms" (105) and who was once a Roman tribune. 
Consequently, this story is arrayed with the 
writings of the documented authors, . . . but 
probably even more so with Joyce who is never 
mentioned. Naturally, the name "Ulysses" appears 
in the course of the story, and this is also the 
name of Joyce's novel. However, such a subtle 
reference, although sufficient, is not all that 
Borges provides, for it is commonly known that 
both Vico and Sinbad figure as important images in 
Ulvsses (Crumb 34).
Borges, in his characteristic metatextual storytelling,
refuses to accept an identity between the tacit allusion and
plagiarism, suggesting a common quality of textuality:
"When the end draws near," wrote Cartaphilus,
"there no longer remain any remembered images: 
only words remain." Words, displaced and 
mutilated words, words of others, were the poor 
pittance left him by the hours and the centuries 
(34) .
Of course, Borges' postscript to his narrative provides an 
informal documentation (one discovered by Christ to be of 
exceeding complexity, see The Narrow Act), and his 
references to images in Ulvsses provide another informal 
from of documentation by including the name which is also 
Joyce's title (35). Borges' only formal allusion is an 
ironic one to Vico (35). Nevertheless, a number of tacit 
allusions remain, including one to the intertext of 
Petronius' novel The Satvricon in which a structural parody
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of The Odvssev is replicated, with a vengence, by Joyce;
this is suggested by Borges' invention of Homer's design of
a "mad" city:
so horrible that its mere existence and 
perdurance, though in the midst of a secret 
desert, contaminates the past and the future and 
in some way even jeopardizes the stars. As long 
as it lasts, no one in the world can be strong or 
happy ([111] 36).3 *9
This satirical city parallels the satirical text, and
Borges' play with the titles of Petronius and of Joyce is
indicative of his own complex play with his own title of
this story:
we have fallen upon several meanings of "the 
immortal," as if they were so many swords. There 
is the human, authorial immortal to whom this 
remnant of text makes an end even as it provides 
its testament. There is the immortal text, the 
remnant of the author, which exists in self-denial 
of its authenticity and of its indeterminable 
author who is the narrator of the frame, who is 
the dreamer, who may be Borges. There is the 
immortal city of text of which the Cartaphilus 
manuscript is a microcosm and which encompasses 
the world, mocking that world through its satire 
of it, since all attempts at representation fall 
short. Perhaps not finally, there is the immortal 
dream-text, insubstantial, yet more present to 
itself than to the world which occasions it and 
which, like the city, threatens to undo this 
world.
These variant meanings of the title image 
apply to the general questions of writing and of 
styles, the metatextual component of 
expressionism, through social alignment and 
political engagement, the postmodern form of 
expressionism (39).
The complexities of Borges' title elaborate the various
dimensions of textuality: the individual author, his
material product, the collectivity of texts, and the
universality of dreams which provoke their production all 
contribute to the seamless interweavings binding text to 
life itself. Within such a context, it becomes possible to 
speak of "living texts" which obliterate the distinction 
between subject and object and which continously reinvent 
meaning by means of their continual interplay. This study 
now moves to its second volume, the consideration of dream 
texts produced by Kafka and by Beckett.
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Kafka and Beckett: General Remarks
Franz Kafka and Samuel Beckett produced distinctive
writing styles; readers often consider their styles to be
unique, but a few comparisons have been forthcoming.
Sandbank discusses an influence (acknowledged by Beckett and
pursued by several critics) of Kafka's The Castle on
Beckett's Watt (55-6). Sandbank concludes that:
Beckett may be said to carry out a potential in 
Kafka that Kafka himself was determined to avoid, 
though not without the desperate struggle to which 
his diaries and notebooks give ample evidence 
(56) .
Here a kind of literary "hearsay" based on authorial 
"intention" is employed to draw a broad distinction between 
Kafka and Beckett. This study seeks to show that a broad 
consideration of their texts does not justify such a 
conclusion, although it is clear that Beckett does extend 
some major literary strategies which appear in Kafka.
Deleuze and Guattari link Kafka and Beckett with Joyce, 
in a general way as writers of minority, making language 
"vibrate with a new intensity" (Kafka 19). Their laudable 
project discovers Kafka as a writer of minority opposed to 
the grand scheme of naturalistic portrayal, but they find in
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Beckett "nothing remains but intensities." Linda Hutcheon 
compares Kafka and Beckett as examples of a form of 
"modernism," demonstrating "its compulsion to write mixed 
with a realization of the meaninglessness of writing"; in 
this way she applies the "nihilist" charge of institutional 
naturalism against them and proceeds to dismiss them from 
any participation in her form of "postmodernism" (43) . This 
same charge of nihilism also has been used to exclude them 
from participation in "modernism" as well (in a seminar at 
Louisiana State University, Cleanth Brooks said that Kafka's 
"nihilism" disqualified him from literature altogether, 
simply a failure). This study seeks to show that not only 
do Kafka and Beckett participate in literary postmodernism, 
but that each articulates fundamental literary qualities 
that make postmodernism possible, including: an exposure of 
the myth of linguistic reference, an awareness of the limits 
of signification of the image, a ruthless denial of 
institutional history, and a production of text that 
challenges its reader, enforcing on that reader a 
participation in and responsibility for its discourse.4 •^
In this study's context of image-production analysis, 
many similarities between these writers emerge. Their 
expressionistic texts often engage a dream temporality, 
developing archetypes and erasing the boundary between the 
subjective and the objective. Both can be read as black 
humorists and as black fantasists. Both produce forms of
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the definite and indefinite material image, and this 
suggests that both employ writing to reveal the 
indeterminacy inherent in expression by exposing the 
falsehoods of institutional structures which validate 
meaning and by implicating the reader in the production of 
discourse. Paradoxically, both produce strong textual 
effects which have been variously described as religious, 
psychological, fantastic or marvelous, and naturalistically 
realistic. The recognition of a dream context, an oneiric 
representational field, in their writing provides an 
interpretive ground that reconciles many of these disparate, 
contradictory effects.
It is important to recognize both the similar and 
dissimilar structures found in Kafka and Beckett, but to 
over-emphasize differences between Beckett and Kafka leads 
to these writers being viewed as isolated and unique 
stylistic "experimenters,” with great controversy concerning 
the relative success or failure of their "experiments."
This study seeks to elucidate both common and distinguished 
stylistic techniques in Kafka and Beckett through image 
analysis. The application of the image-genre matrix cuts 
through the superficial stylistic differences which seem to 
be such formidible obstacles to an understanding of their 
common mastery of literary expression. Both Kafka and 
Beckett produce texts of image-montage which emphasize 
indeterminacy. Beckett applied his writing to many medial
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forms, while Kafka focused on a few forms of written 
presentation. Both are distinquished, however, by their 
complex uses of verbal technology, exposing the paradoxical 
quality of written language to reveal new terrains of 
expression and to conceal special significance.
In addition, some attention to other artists will be 
helpful, paticularly with respect to Kafka, in that they are 
arrayed with Kafka's writings. These include Orson Welles 
(film The Trial), Alberto Moravia (The Conformist), Bernardo 
Bertolucci (film The Conformist), Georges Bataille (Blue of 
Noon), William Burroughs (Naked Lunch and Nova Express), 
Edgar Allan Poe ("William Wilson"), and, with respect to 
Beckett, H.P. Lovecraft ("The Unnamable") and, finally, Jean 
Cocteau (Orpheus), who not only "reads" Kafka into this 
film, but who also provides some insight with respect to 
Beckett's "other-wordly" vision of resistance. Strategies 
of image arrays help to illustrate how discursive alliances 
are formed between these artists.
These arrays develop because writers who set themselves 
against institutionalized literary tradition promote this 
antogonism by stylistically marking their texts as "outside" 
of literary convention; consequently, these stylistic 
innovators risk isolation and alienation, so these 
innovators develop a kind of communal support through a 
sharing of image strategies to promote a common discourse. 
These strategies are often fairly subtle; for example, D. M.
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Thomas' novel The White Hotel features a protagonist whose 
"neurotic" symptoms are actually prophetic signs of personal 
doom in a story with a deia vu temporal structure. Freud 
and institutional psychology deny the possibility of any 
"prophetic" sign, but Kafka produces images that are 
prophetic of personal doom (with respect to The 
Met amoroho sis and The Trial. see below), so Thomas' 
innovation is arrayed, or allied with, Kafka's. Both 
innovations extend the possibilities of literary 
representation, but both also deny naturalistic conventions, 
and both imply a discourse opposed to traditional 
assumptions. This common image strategy of Kafka and of 
Thomas ameliorates the isolation of either author; their 
alienation merges into a common cause. These discursive 
arrays undercut assumptions of authorial originality, the 
means by which texts are invested with an "aura," and imply 
that common attitudes and discourses emerge from writing 
itself.
Kafka and the "Kafka Affect"
Kafka's style is characterized by paradox, particularly 
with regard to the clash it exhibits between naturalistic 
and expressionistic elements. Precise realism in Kafka is 
mixed with unreal gestures in such a way that each maintains 
a separate presence, and this has led to controversies among
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Kafka's readers. Both Benjamin and Corngold discuss the
varieties of interpretation and misprision attributed to
critics of Kafka. A powerful illustration of such
controversies occurs when Todorov's definition of the
fantastic is applied to Kafka's writing.
Brooke-Rose discusses how Todorov cannot consider Kafka
as a writer of the fantastic even though Kafka's writing
contains fantastic elements:
we are in the marvellous, since a supernatural 
event is introduced at the start [of The 
Metamorphosis1, yet it is accepted at once and 
provokes no hesitation. The event is nevertheless 
shocking, impossible, yet becomes paradoxically 
possible, so that in this sense we are in the 
uncanny. And Todorov simply concludes that 
Kafka's narratives "relate both to the marvellous 
and to the uncanny; they are the coincidence of 
two apparently incompatible genres" (66).
Brooke-Rose suggests that Todorov requires a paradoxical
formulation ("the coincidence of two apparently incompatible
genres") to distinguish Kafka's writing from fantastic
writing.
Todorov's genre of the fantastic, here quoted by Hans 
Ternes, "is defined as that 'hesitation experienced by a 
person who knows only the laws of nature, confronting an 
apparently supernatural event'" (221). For Brooke-Rose, 
Todorov's fantastic depended upon a hesitation in the reader 
(produced by an ambiguous text) between natural ("uncanny" 
or real) and supernatural ("marvellous" or unreal) 
explanations of apparently supernatural events sustained to 
the end of the story (63). Apparently, there is an
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ambiguity of translation as to whether "person" represents 
"reader" or "character," for Ternes believes Todorov's 
definition of the fantastic applies to Kafka if that 
definition is extended to include the reader: "the essential 
element of the traditional fantastic is shifted from the 
narrator/protagonist to the actual reader" (222) . Brooke- 
Rose 's objection to Todorov's assessment of Kafka only works 
with regard to a person in the narrative, but direct 
consultation with Todorov may have led to her modification 
of Todorov's definition.
Allowing for some imprecision, there is some agreement 
that in Kafka real and unreal elements are distinct, but 
they cohabit in his text. Moreover, there is agreement that 
Kafka's use of real and unreal elements increase the burden 
on Kafka's readers by creating difficulties with 
traditionally distinct forms of imagery. Consequently, the 
problem of the fantastic in Kafka leads to the recognition 
that in Kafka's hands the fantastic is an expressionistic 
provocation, bedeviling readers through a conflation of 
distinct modes.
Benjamin warns Kafka's readers: "there are two ways to 
miss the point of Kafka's works. One is to interpret them 
naturally, the other is the supernatural interpretation" 
("Franz Kafka" 127). Ternes attempts to sort Kafka's works 
according to Todorov's distinctions, uncanny, marvelous, and 
fantastic, combined with another definition of the
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fantastic, from Sartre, of "'stifling immanence7" (225).
Ternes concludes:
that the fantastic is connected with Kafka's basic 
vision of the world . . . its function is one of
unsettling and shattering the readers' complacent 
view of the world by confronting them with a 
reality that is presented both as absolutely true 
as well as unbearably oppressive (228).
Ternes attemps to follow Benjamin's implication that only a
broad, integrative reading of these diverse elements
encompasses Kafka's writing, but Ternes' reading tends
toward gloom; he seems to miss satirical humor. Moreover,
Ternes' recognition of Kafka's archetypal qualities seems
unnecessarily constrained as "experiential knowledge of
general validity based on Kafka's own subjective experience
but projected onto a universal level" (227).
Todorov's historical genre of the pure fantastic
appeared contemporarily to the gothic novel (Brooke-Rose
62). In fact, Todorov's fantastic is complementary to the
gothic "because the Gothic supernatural experience is
structurally cognate with the Todorovian moment of
hesitation" (Voller 197). Nevertheless, Benjamin's
suggestion differs from Todorov's "hesitation" somewhat in
that Todorov's fantastic reader seeks an explanation of
events in terms available from the gothic while Benjamin's
reader of Kafka is warned that such terms are misleading.
Indeed, Voller agrees with "scholars of the fantastic" who
question Todorov's "extreme narrowness of its central genre,
the dualistic assumptions of its structuralism, and its
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inability (or refusal) to account for twentieth-century 
fantasy" (197). Voller's conclusion sheds light on why 
Todorov's discussion of the fantastic, with its connection 
to the gothic, is so often applied to Kafka, for he finds 
"the Gothic as a literature of spiritual disquiet," and this 
broad chord is roundly sounded by Kafka (204).
Kafka's juxtaposition of real and unreal images 
expressionistically calls attention to the poles of reality 
and unreality as strategies of writing. Kafka presents a 
progression from the gothic and its complement of the 
fantastic (as defined within Todorov's limits) wherein the 
real and the unreal compete as mimetic formulas. Kafka 
recognizes this competition, and he juxtaposes these 
opposing strategies to shift his writing from reality-based 
formulas to imaginative strategies, creating a text of 
images where real and unreal representations clash, each 
vying for recognition.
Reading Kafka as a producer of dream texts provides a 
broader, more sufficient conception of the fantastic in 
which realism has its place, just as in dreams, but the 
representation of dreams takes place in a subjective 
context. While there is little doubt that relations exist 
between subjectivity and objectivity, the representation of 
subjectivity is fundamentally opposed to the imitation of 
objective reality. Kafka provides much evidence that a 
broader, more unreal universe encloses his written
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"parables." Kafka develops an oneiric representational 
context, and his writing emphasizes dreams to show how 
writing is reactive.
Kafka's portrayal of Poseidon as an overworked 
bureaucrat not only blends the mundane with the unreal but, 
ultimately, provides this mixture as an unreal situation in 
itself, one in which a reactive gesture of mixing the 
mundane with the unreal broadens the scope of the unreal to 
include the mundane. In Amerika, Karl Rossmann gazes at the 
Statue of Liberty contemplating how "the arm with the sword 
rose up as if newly stretched aloft" (3). Of course, this 
statue bears a torch, not a sword, and Kafka's substitution 
replaces a symbol of hope with one of division. Does Karl 
dream this sword, or is this sword a realistic, satirical 
detail, or is this sword image an expressionistic device 
which invites comparison with other swords, perhaps that of 
the expulsion from Eden? Kafka provides no clarification, 
so this sword image partakes of all these possibilities, 
mixing the subjective, the mundane, and the expressionistic 
in one representation. Todorov's distinct categories 
(uncanny, marvellous, fantastic) for Kafka become a broad, 
inclusive dreamspace, an oneiric representational field.
Harold Bloom has presented a collection of essays on 
Kafka's The Castle which seek to portray Kafka as a 
Kabbalistic writer, producing a "Negative, his hidden and 
subversive New Kabbalah," one which fails (Bloom 21-2).
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Here the line of interpretation proceeds fruitfully from the 
unreal, but failure seems more a problem of the system 
itself in that the Kabbalah would create a system for the 
unreal, to render it into intelligibility, and one wonders 
if this was ever Kafka's goal. Kafka provides much insight 
through his writing, and this insight may give rise to the 
expectation of an elaborated and closed system, but it 
remains unclear that Kafka strove to provide such a system. 
Such "intentional" conclusions should not be justified.
However many systems have been applied to dream 
analysis, all have fallen short of complete elaboration. 
There is a sense of the opaque at the core of Kafka's 
representational fiat. Again, a paradox arises in that the 
insight provided by Kafka promotes the expectation of an 
answer, but Kafka does not provide this answer. Kafka's 
representation approaches indeterminacy, and his use of the 
indefinite material image makes clear how important 
indeterminacy is in Kafka's style, for this indeterminacy 
contributes to his paradoxical effects.
As Bloom finds Kafka's writing a magnificent failure, 
Deleuze and Guattari seem to find it a magnificent 
experiment: "we believe only in a Kafka experimentation that 
is without interpretation and rests only on tests of 
experience" (Kafka 7). Their designation of his work as an 
experiment seems to undercut their evaluation of its 
success. Perhaps this occurs because their evaluation of
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Kafka's writing as politically subversive also requires a 
powerful naturalistic effect as in a political alternative 
(which ought to be clearly defined), yet Kafka's writing, as 
they suggest above, resists interpretation.
Kafka's direction of subversion arrives at its 
destination only insofar as it resists orthodox 
interpretation. Indeed, for Kafka, this indeterminacy may 
have been a fully sufficient literary goal. Now paradox is 
piled upon paradox, because if for Bloom Kafka cannot 
enclose the unreal universe, for Deleuze and Guattari Kafka 
cannot enclose the political world, although both studies 
grant him a considerable degree of success.
How is so much offered by Kafka in both real and unreal 
spheres ultimately seen as insufficient? Benjamin's warning 
that these spheres are insufficient develops into a strict 
opposition: either these spheres are unworkable as regards 
Kafka, or else Kafka is seen as failing these gothic 
standards. As Kafka provides substance, he seems also to 
provide hope, but Kafka's lack of provision of hope seems to 
cause his readers to denigrate to varying degrees the 
substance which they find in Kafka, another paradox.
Benjamin reports: "as Kafka puts it, there is an infinite 
amount of hope, but not for us" ("Some Reflections on Kafka" 
144). Kafka imbues his style with paradox, but, often, 
critics have been unwilling to accept a paradoxical 
indeterminacy at the heart of Kafka's work. This is exactly
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the paradox of dream which promises an answer and which 
conceals this answer within a subjective symbolism.
Ultimately, the problem of the dream is equivalent to 
the problem of writing, and Kafka merges both in his 
expressionistic image of the writing machine from "In The 
Penal Colony." This execution machine that inscribes its 
message into the flesh of its victim, repeatedly, is a dream 
image emphatically incarnating the mortality of language, 
suggesting that writing is mired in the opacity of death. A 
precedent to this image occurs in Amerika in Karl's 
"American writing-desk": "by turning a handle you could 
produce the most complicated combinations and permutations 
of the compartments to please yourself" (41).4 *2 These 
various formations of this desk are analogous to logical 
structures in language: when logical assumptions change, so 
do the configuarations of the system alter to accommodate 
such change.
Kafka's description of Karl's desk is accompanied by a 
Christmas reverie from Karl's childhood comparing this desk 
to a mechanical "Christmas panorama." Again, the sense of 
inevitability in this mechanical system through which the 
players move in predestined arcs is associated to the 
configurations of this desk. Also, such devices anticipate 
cinematic presentation, with their predestined character 
analogous to the limits of cinematic montage: once images 
have been chosen, these images work together to constrain
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discourse in particular directions. As with the execution 
machine, this desk suggests the inevitability of a 
mechanical language, a system constraining writing to 
predestined, mortal fates.
Though these images, Kafka expresses his resistance to 
language systems constrained by tradition and mortality. 
Writing, like the dream, becomes an end in itself, one that 
reveals as it also conceals, as Heidegger describes the 
technology of writing, a paradoxical technology. Kafka's 
paradoxical style is well suited to this paradoxical 
technology; in essence, Kafka makes transparent writing's 
inherent contraints. Kafka's writing is subversive in that 
he rejects traditional forms with predestined ends, causing 
these forms to clash, perhaps even to collapse, in his 
attempt to represent the complex mystery of imagination.4 *3
Stanley Corngold's discussion of The Metamorphosis 
moves in this direction with his recognition that Kafka's 
writing is a mode in which "writing reflects itself, in the 
mode of allegory, as metamorphosis, literality, death, play, 
and reduction —  the whole in a negative and embattled form" 
(The Commentators' Despair 35). Corngold uses the term 
allegory in Benjamin's sense as "nonpresence," and the 
appropriateness of this kind of allegorical approach to 
Kafka indirectly suggests that Kafka's writing may have 
helped Benjamin develop this conception of allegory.
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Kafka's work suggests that there is a problem with
writing, that through its mixture of presence and
nonpresence, it seems on the verge of its own extinction as
a technology, that it has reached its end, that it cannot
meet the expectations which it has itself created. These
manifestations of mortality represent effects that Benjamin
referred to as the radical withering of the aura, the
dissociation of writing and tradition, and the universal
equality of effect of art within the technology of
reproduction ("Work of Art" 221-23).
This principle underlies much of Kafka's writing and is
itself often an explicit theme, as in "Poseidon" where a god
is seen as an overworked bureaucrat:
one is tempted to say: once he was certain of 
eventual failure, everything worked out for him en 
route as in a dream. There is nothing more 
memorable than the fervor with which Kafka 
emphasized his failure" (Benjamin, "Some 
Reflections on Kafka" 145).
Such "failure" opens potentials in writing by suggesting
possibilities, while denying their realizations. Kafka
juxtaposes real and unreal as competing potentials that
cannot be realized since each potential denies the
realization of the other, a mutual cancellation of
traditional effects. Ultimately, this paradoxical
"nonpresence" or indeterminacy provokes the "Kafka affect."
Kafka's textual effect is closely bound to affect,
through his emphasis on the powerful emotions of his
characters. This emotional intensity imbues the opacity of
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his confrontational style with a psychic charge. Kafka's 
readers are participating in this dream text through their 
continual interpolations, occasioned by his indeterminacy, 
but this participation is augmented by an intense emotional 
ambience. In his work Invisible Cities. Italo Calvino 
writes:
with cities, it is as with dreams: everything 
imaginable can be dreamed, but even the most 
unexpected dream is a rebus that conceals a desire 
or, its reverse, a fear (44).
Calvino provides an implicit dream text; this results in
readers being drawn closely to the impressions of his
characters who represent archetypes (here Kublai Khan,
emperor, and Marco Polo, explorer).
In Kafka, anger and fear are common and, often, violent
emotions. This sort of emotional explosion comes up
regularly in Kafka: the father's sudden fury and his son's
reactive panic in "The Judgment," K's angry fits in The
Trial. Uncle Jacob's imperious dismissal of his nephew Karl
in Amerika. Such outbursts are typical, and this emotional
instability suggests an unconscious immanence, flooded with
the emotional power of Jung's shadow archetype.4,4 Kafka's
dream text preserves emotional intensity as, Freud shows,
dreams also preserve it.
Kafka's reader may feel sympathy for K's predicament in
The Trial, but the reader ought to recognize K's pettiness,
arrogance, and selfishness, qualities that suggest K is
"anti-heroic.11 Such unattractive qualities, of which the
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subject remains unaware, participate in the formation of the 
personal shadow. K's confrontation with a generalized sense 
of personal guilt in the image of unspecified charges 
against him represents a confrontation with his shadow. 
Moreover, one may read the guard before the door of the law 
as a figuration of this shadow barring the door to the 
unconscious; this is suggested by the series of guards:
"from hall to hall, keepers stand at every door, one more 
powerful than the other" (The Trial 213). In effect, these 
guards are all one, indicating the dominance of the shadow 
over the protagonist and leaving him only with the response 
of frustrated affect: the man is afraid of the guard, and 
the guard is quick to anger.
Amerika provides an image of how Kafka's reader can be 
inscribed into the writing itself. When Karl receives the 
note of his dismissal from his Uncle Jacob, "a man of 
principle," his uncle suggests that "I would pick you up, of 
all people, with these two arms that are now holding this 
paper" (94). Presumably, Karl holds this note in his two 
arms to read this, while Green holds up a candle. This 
emphasis on the image of the writer and of the reader 
holding the text serves to emphasize to the reader of the 
novel that the reader is also holding this text. The 
reader's act of holding is reflected in the text by acts of 
holding ascribed to Uncle Jacob and to Karl.
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The imperious dismissal contained in this note is 
analogous to the dismissal of the guard before the door to 
the law, more so because Uncle Jacob is a senator: "Against 
my wishes you decided this evening to leave me; stick, then, 
to that decision all your life (94-5). The intense anger of 
the senator is diffused somewhat, distanced by its 
containment in the note that Karl is reading, just as the 
reader of this novel holds at a distance this text with its 
explosive emotions. A similar narrative device in The Trial 
joins the reader's perspective with that of K's (see below). 
These image devices, which inscribe the reader into the text 
by calling attention to the act of reading, link textual 
effects with emotional affects, provoking affect in the 
reader through the expressionistic device of imaging the 
reader in the text. Kafka's texts bring out unconscious 
elements and implicate the reader in this unconscious field.
Kafka enhances "realism" with his use of powerful 
emotions associated with the immanence of the shadow. Image 
devices which inscribe the reader into the text dissolve the 
boundary between reader and character: the character is in 
the act of reading or of being read, paralleling the action 
of the reader, and both reader and character share in this 
representation of immanence. To this extent, readers 
participate in the characters' confrontation with the 
destabilized, difficult, and paradoxical forces of the 
shadow, the alter-ego which forms a common link to readers
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themselves. Kafka's text unfolds in the zone of contact 
with unconscious immanence, indeterminate and malicious. 
This moral battleground informs Kafka's context, and it is 
hardly surprising that readers often respond with dismay and 
disappointment. Few see the humor in Kafka, though he is 
fond of jokes, for to them the foolishness of many scenes is 
clouded by unrelenting gloom.
Kafka's dark satire provokes an unrelenting 
ambivalence. Does it seem appropriate to laugh when the 
officer in the penal colony dies? The image device of the 
writing machine operating on this character mirrors the 
contact between the reader and Kafka's writing; the 
officer's faith in the machine parallels readers' 
expectations of insight and order through writing's 
subordination of language. Instead, the reader is 
confronted with an agressive, ambivalent text which turns 
writing back upon an instinctual dreamspace. Nonetheless, 
this dark immanence is implicated as a formative power in 
the development of language and discourse. Kafka's 
representation of the chaos which writing seeks to order 
undercuts and ironizes formulas for truth, such as that 
represented by the officer, executed by his own device. By 
extension, this destabilization can erode readers' 
confidence in intrepretation itself. Interpretation takes 
place within an ambivalent, immanent context. The "Kafka 
affect" represents an attempt to elaborate the major factors
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contributing to this disturbing, paradoxical context 
informing Kafka's writing.
The aspects of the "Kafka affect" may be described as 
follows. First, disorientation or shock results from the 
encounter with the dream text; second, fright, or the 
connection of violence with the familiar is brought out by 
Kafka's investing real structures with unconscious 
immanence; third, dread, proximity to death, or morbidity 
serve to emphasize the hopelessness of Kafka's dream worlds; 
fourth, mystification, actually a demystification, is 
exemplified by Kafka's radical transformation of traditional 
sources. Each of these will be discussed individually and 
then in relation to Kafka's definite material image 
strategies.
Shock
Kafka's development of an oneiric, representational 
context provokes shock in that traditional formulas for 
interpretation are displaced by their juxtaposition in an 
ambivalent, subjective mode of writing. Kafka's mixture of 
realism and fantasy confuses these opposing forms of 
literary order and requires the reader to recognize this 
expressionistic recombination in order to participate in the 
broader, interpretative context of his dream text. The 
shifting complexity of Kafka's dream images are analogous to
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film montage, which also produces a shock effect. Benjamin
explains this aspect of cinema in "The Work of Art in the
Age of Mechanical Reproduction":
the spectator's process of association in view of 
these images is indeed interrupted by their 
constant, sudden change. This constitutes the 
shock effect of the film, which, like all shocks, 
should be cushioned by heightened presence of 
mind.
In a note to this statement, Benjamin discusses "man's need 
to expose himself to shock effects" as an "adjustment to the 
dangers threatening him" (238, 250).
Kafka's prose reacts to both physical and psychological 
dangers in the modern world through their representation as 
dream images, just as cinema represents through montage. To 
this extent, Kafka's writing coheres with this basic 
parameter of cinematic production: dream juxtapositions 
correspond to cinematic montage, and both require intense 
attention by audiences who participate through their 
associations.
One may find in Gregor's transformation a withdrawal 
from life's dangerous complexity incarnated in a dream image 
of a bug. This develops a lycanthropy or "becoming animal" 
which Deleuze and Guattari insist "lets nothing remain of 
the duality of a subject of enunciation and a subject of the 
statement; rather, it constitutes a single process, a unique 
method that replaces subjectivity" (Kafka 36). Within the 
dream context, such animalism incarnates subjectivity; it 
replaces demarcations of objective and subjective narrative
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space with a deeply subjective perspective. Freud showed 
how animals, from vermin to monsters, represent libidinal 
qualities in dreams; Kafka's coup involves his location of 
subjectivity within this animal representation, rather than 
the usual dream-subjectivity recognition of an animal as 
representative of the complexing of erotic desire and 
guilt.4 •5
This displacement of narrative space is rather subtle, 
but this progression is clear with respect to narrative 
conventions. Although the explanation is involved, the 
recognition of this displacement is crucial to an 
understanding of Kafka's narrative representation. In 
naturalistic mimesis, there is a clear distinction between 
objective and subjective narrative space, and a dream is 
designated as a dream in the text. Something of this 
distinction carries over into dream representation itself, 
in that the dreamer may consider his own self­
representation in a dream as a corresponding subjectivity, 
while the dreamer perceives other dream elements as outside 
of his dream-self, as relatively objective phenomena. The 
traditional objective-subjective polarity is thus displaced 
onto the subjective dream-text.
This distinction structures the experience of the 
dream: for example, "I was surrounded by wolves" is a 
narrative statement inherently neither objective nor 
subjective, but if it is designated as a dream statement,
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then "I" is a relatively subjective, narrative space, and 
"wolves" is relatively objective to "I." On interpretation, 
the dreamer may seek to understand the significance of 
"wolves" while assuming "I" to represent the dreamer's own 
subjective self. Of course, this is a temptation to the 
misprision of the dream material, since all representations 
in dreams are structured by subjective relations, and this 
misprision results precisely from disregarding this prime 
directive of dream interpretation and interpreting the dream 
as if it were a naturalistic story where "wolves" are an 
objective threat to a subjective "I."
An interpretation that respects the subjective ordering 
of the dream experience recognizes the complex of "I" and 
"wolves" as a single, subjective representation with a more 
accurate result: "I am a wolf" or "I am very often wolfish." 
In this case, one reads the dream itself, without imposing a 
false distinction between the dream subject and relatively 
objective threats to this subject. The distinction between 
these two readings in which one may evade the identity of 
the dreamer and the wolves while the other accepts this 
identity is described by Freud as a censoring facility that 
incarnates resistance to the dream vision so that one may 
through misprision reject the dream vision's identity 
between the dreamer and the wolves and, instead, displace 
the wolves onto an objective "projection": "just as I were 
surrounded by wolves" suggests some "they" are "wolves," not
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the dreaming "I" (note the punning relation with "eye'1 which 
sees outward rather than inward).4,6
Taking this narrative progression one step further 
sheds light on Kafka's narrative space. For if one defeats- 
resistance to the dream vision and recognizes the 
interpretation "I am a wolf," then there is no need for the 
resistance mechanism, and the dreamer may dream of being a 
wolf (please forgive some oversimplification here to make 
this point). Consequently, the dreamer's subjectivity will 
be taken up with "wolfishness," and the dreamer's 
subjectivity coalesces into a dream of being a wolf where 
there is no distinction between "I" and "wolves"; instead 
"I" and "wolf" are a subjective identity. This is an 
altogether different kind of dream; in fact, it is totemic 
or archetypal, and different rules of interpretation apply.
Jung developed his system of dream interpretation for 
understanding archetypal dreams. One cannot but be 
impressed by the way in which Kafka's representations accord 
with mechanisms described by Freud, as does Ternes: "the 
laws of psychology, especially Freudian psychology, can 
provide rational answers to the mysterious phenomena [in 
Kafka's writing]" (225-26). Nevertheless, those who object 
to Freudian readings of Kafka have a point in that Kafka's 
representations surpass those of typical Freudian dreams, 
since Kafka represents on an archetypal level.
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This progression of the dreaming consciousness into a 
more purely subjective, narrative space parallels a 
development of individuation wherein the individual 
overcomes ego resistance and perceives the alter-ego, 
opening the perceptual door to the shadow archetype. As 
this study progresses, it will become clearer that this is, 
at least partially, Kafka's significance of the "door of the 
law."
From the perspective of narrative space, this 
progression of individuated consciousness engenders a 
progression of dream representation itself wherein all dream 
elements are recognized as constituting a subjective whole, 
with interpretation operating within this context.
Archetypal dreams are characterized by their vivid clarity, 
but this clarity itself can be opaque: "why am I a wolf?" is 
a difficult question because many psychic elements 
contribute to this deceptively simple statement.
Nonetheless, "I am a wolf" is inherently less deceptive than 
"I am surrounded by wolves," and the recognition of this 
identity prepares the way for a meditation on the psychic 
image of "wolf" as a form of archetype.
This stage of subjective, narrative space characterizes 
the movement by which Kafka carries the representation of 
subjectivity even deeper into the subjective realm, endowing 
hitherto representative creatures with the point of view and 
kind of intelligence that it is thought they represent,
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making them into totems or archetypes. Kafka 
expressionistically portrays the representational tension 
between the false "objective subjectivity" of the resistant 
dreamer and the denser subjectivity of the archetypal vision 
in his story "The Burrow" where the subject alternates 
between a projected human subjectivity and a lycanthropic 
subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari recognize the power of 
this representational fiat. Such fantastic structures in 
Kafka serve to emphasize how deeply the real is enmeshed in 
its own subjective projection and, through shock, to enforce 
this recognition of illusory representation upon the reader.
Fright
Second, fright, or the connection of violence and the 
familiar is brought out by Kafka's investing real structures 
with unconscious immanence. In dreams ordinary objects are 
vehicles of representational power; in this way, dreams 
disguise their own significance. Sometimes, as in "Cares of 
a Family Man," Kafka uses the indefinite material image to 
suggest this power in the ordinary, for Odradek is guite 
ordinary for all its elusiveness. More often, though, the 
natural qualities of the ordinary are invested with terror 
by surreal juxtaposition, so a lumber-room door opens on to 
"The Whipper" (The Trial 83), and the intricate, deadly
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"apparatus" of the penal colony rests upon mere sand (The 
Complete Stories 140).
Kafka uses juxtaposition to bring this immanence into 
closer contact with the familiar: Mrs. Wese feels 
"reassured" by the sound of a doorbell an instant before her 
husband is murdered (The Complete Stories 403). The 
equivalence Girard discovers between "sacrifice" and 
"justice" is dramatically, and humorously, rendered by Kafka 
"In the Penal Colony" (Violence and the Sacred 16-22).
Girard reminds us that "as soon as the judicial system gains 
supremacy, its machinery disappears from sight" (22).
Kafka's narratives force this machinery into view, and the 
reader must witness the carnage, even when the reader has 
been drawn into a close subjective relation to the victim of 
this apparatus of justice as in The Trial.
Dread
Third, dread, morbidity, or the sense of proximity to 
death serves to emphasize the hopelessness of Kafka's dream 
worlds. Graphic violence and graphic deaths are common in 
Kafka. In fact, the very excess of violence which comes at 
the end of "In the Penal Colony" is an important clue to the 
reader's recognition of a satirical process at work, and the 
reader may recognize how the machine's slaughter of the 
officer and its own self-destruction provide the components
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of a joyous liberation from petty tyranny. If one reads the 
penal colony as psychic space, where all pleasure is 
punished, and reads the explorer as incarnating a sense of 
self-awareness, then this "parable" or fable provides an 
illustration of the ease with which one might free oneself 
from shame, for the explorer figure suggests a psychic 
awareness willing to overcome ego resistance, represented by 
the officer and the machine.
One may read this story as a description of a moment of 
psychic liberation with the various characters portraying 
types of psychic self-conflict, analogous to structures 
described by Freud. Granted, such a comic effect cannot be 
realized if the reader is daunted by all this blood, but 
such blood accurately represents the ongoing destruction of 
the psyche at war with itself. Sandbank here provides an 
example of a reader derailed by blood and by linearity when 
he asserts:
the murderous machine in Kafka's story must kill 
the officer, its most fanatic adherent, in order 
to assert itself against the new liberalism . . . 
[continued in note] It murders the officer as he 
tries to make it inscribe the new liberal concept 
of justice on his body. (140, 174, n.6).
Sandbank misses the point and the joke involved with the
machine's self-destruction, a gestalt which includes the
officer, who is only an extension of this "murderous"
machine itself. It is a joke to consider that any message
might "liberalize" this deadly apparatus, set to terminate
life with any inscription whatsoever.
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Kafka's sense of morbidity parallels the gestures of 
torture common in the work of Sade, for Sade's work provides 
a suffocating morbidity that enforces satirical and 
political effects. Thus, in Sade one discovers another of 
Kafka's precursors. The multitudinous death-endings in 
Kafka do not usually suggest joy, but they do provide a 
sense of relief, as the oppresssion of existence stops. 
Moreover, this gesture expressionistically portrays the end 
of the process of writing; this paradoxical process in which 
the only relief from the conflict of personal and social 
forces comes with the end of portrayal, with the "death" of 
writing, contributes to this sense of an end. Indeed, Kafka 
leaves behind the linear text of writing; instead, he 
develops a text of archetypal images. This represents a 
technological progression: writing continues, still rooted 
in the visual, but the visual element progresses from linear 
deciferment of words to the holistic perception of 
psychically charged images.
Deleuze and Guattari recognize "there is something of 
Dracula in Kafka, a Dracula who works by letters, letters 
that are like bats" (Kafka 29-30). For Dracula, his undead 
existence unfolds on the level of the soul; his soul is 
thirsty for the experience of other souls, an indefatigable 
pleasure in an almost unbounded existence, but for mere 
humans, to whom death constitutes a constant boundary, the 
promise of an undead existence powerfully seduces. Bram
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Stoker's novel plays with the relation of pleasure to 
spirituality while attacking naive social restrictions which 
reflect death's vigil over existence. Death is welcome 
indeed to Dracula's female victims who are also the victims 
of social institutions. Kafka universalizes this 
institutional kingdom of death., His characters propel 
themselves towards a confrontation with death, and if this 
confrontation is not triumphant, at least it provides the 
relief of an end to struggle.
This melancholy theme of morbidity effects an 
intensification of text, one recognized by Deleuze and 
Guattari as "thresholds of intensities" (Kafka 41). In Jean 
Cocteau's film Orpheus, when Orpheus enters the kingdom of 
the dead, he enters Kafka's world where sober bureaucrats 
dole out fates through agents, of whom some are beginning to 
revolt. The woman who is the death of Orpheus and whom 
Orpheus loves passionately eventually kills Orpheus in the 
kingdom of death in order to make him immortal, a gesture of 
defiance to those who administer death's kingdom. This 
woman goes to her own judgment in a paradoxical state of 
hopeless exultation.
What is valuable about Cocteau's use of Kafka's motifs 
is that Cocteau through these motifs provides a reading of 
Kafka, whose novel The Trial produces a strange image of 
Orpheus (see below). While these motifs provide for the 
spectator elements recognizable as Kafka's, Cocteau's themes
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of spiritual revolt, of the identification of evil with 
death, and of habitual inertia provide a realization that 
these themes are also Kafka's, but they have all too often 
gone unrecognized by Kafka's readers. Cocteau's fable deals 
explicitly with these themes, which are in many ways far 
removed from the mythic source (this is explained in more 
detail under the next section "Mystification"). Cocteau's 
presentation employs a minimum of blood, so the humor and 
the paradoxical logic of this film are closer to its 
surface. In Kafka, these lighter qualities share his text 
with shocking, frightful, and dreadful motifs, and, 
apparently, readers are often sufficiently overwhelmed by 
some elements so that they overlook others.
Mystification
A fourth element of the "Kafka affect" is 
mystification, actually a demystification, exemplified by 
misreadings that develop from radical transformations of 
traditional sources. While for much of literature, 
especially naturalistic literature, tradition is a reservoir 
of "truth" and authority, the reactive, expressionistic 
Kafka cannot faithfully transmit traditional, authoritarian 
presentations of the real. For Kafka, dust and dirt, petty 
lusts for power and sex, and omnipresent death and decay are 
the transmissions of the ages. Poseidon labors at his
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cluttered desk. Kafka exemplifies Benjamin's "liquidation 
of the traditional value of the cultural heritage" ("The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" 221).
Some examples of this rift with traditional formulas 
follow. The Trial witnesses a "process" of fate from which 
even the most obscure operations of anything like justice 
are eradicated. The exquisite machine of the penal colony 
expresses a paradoxical desire for its own dismantling; 
thus, the inanimate is so outraged by the uses to which it 
has been put that it yearns to murder its caretaker. Of 
course, the machine is a cipher for living processes, 
including mimetic naturalism, and its inanimism suggests the 
triumph of death, but the revolt of this machine represents 
a triumph of life over death. In The Metamorphosis. the 
protagonist is replaced by the metaphor, and the shape of 
the metaphor only announces that a deadly fate is at hand 
(more on this below). Traditional elements appear in a new 
context, a reactive dream field of indeterminacy where 
tradition is exhausted in the face of the unknown.
Just as Kafka exposes the sham of justice by forcing 
the reader to view its mechanisms and carnage, so too does 
Kafka show the impotence of tradition to explain 
indeterminacy. The parable "Before the Law" does little to 
explain K's situation, except insofar as it provides a 
vehicle for traditional thought, and the reader sees how the 
presentation of tradition provides no help to K. Perhaps
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this is Kafka's way of showing how writing is no longer as
capable of transmitting tradition as it was once thought to
be. This is also a problem in writing as shown by Girard.
Girard's discussion of the transformation from the myth of
Oedipus to the drama of Sophocles shows how writing revises
its sources:
one cannot persevere in bringing to light the 
symmetrical quality of tragedy —  as we are now 
doing —  without contradicting the fundamental 
implications of the myth" (72).
The implication of successive revisions, some of which 
contradict mythic sources, that provide the foundation for 
art in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is that 
tradition persists as a state of confusion. For Kafka to 
demystify tradition by portraying it as confusion ("Before 
the Law") or as machines of fate (The Trial. The 
Metamorphosis) reverses the naturalistic ruse of faith in 
which tradition clarifies but nonetheless, remains 
mysterious. Such a reversal naturally upsets readers' 
expectations when readers expect an efficient, though 
mysterious, transmission of tradition through the text, and 
a disorientation results.
Kafka's disorientation is really a recognition of 
traditional disorientation which has been named "rightness" 
through an act of faith. While faith can name what it 
cannot comprehend, Kafka names an oppressive materialism: 
dirt is dirt and lies are lies. In Kafka, this radical 
reorientation to the material world sets the stage for
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spiritual potential. It is as if the sky has fallen, but 
the stars still twinkle within the debris. One may not be 
quick to realize how such hopelessness is appropriate to a 
spiritual inquiry, unless one is made to feel it. Since 
this reorientation which looks like confusion repudiates 
confusion which looks like assurance, Kafka is able to open 
a spiritual potential within his writing, and, to this 
extent, Kafka's writing is like a sacred text which also 
effects such a potential. For Kafka, wisdom is the 
recognition of this potential.
To return to Cocteau, the crimes against death in 
Orpheus represent a working out of this spiritual potential 
as it may be read in Kafka, and the challenge to death's 
sovereignity provided by Cocteau's protagonists is 
astonishing in its disregard for death's powerful immanence 
and the tradition of death's inevitability. The fable of 
death, a genre to which Cocteau himself contributed, is 
marked by death's powerful immanence, so the "revolt on the 
other side" motif of his film marks a displacement away from 
death's power as shown by the traditional genre of fables 
like Cocteau's or Chaucer's "The Pardoner's Tale."4 *7
Kafka and Cocteau share a desire for art that can break 
through the inertia of tradition; such an art is visionary 
in that it creates the conditions for vision, but any 
particular vision remains an incomplete, rhetorical 
concretization of this visionary potential. This
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multifaceted but indefinite visionary potential is what 
postmodernist writing is capable of transmitting, a virtual 
image materialized as an image fragment. Cocteau invites 
comparison with Kafka by designing his realm of death after 
The Trial. Their "cinematic" styles pursue similar 
discursive strategies distinguishable by their intensely 
radical displacements from traditional sources, here the 
myth of Orpheus, but also by their resistance to closure.
Kafka and the Definite Material Image
The elements of the "Kafka affect," shock, fright, 
dread, and mystification, are textual effects provided by 
Kafka's use of the definite material image. This definite 
material image allows the reader to recognize the direction 
of Kafka's discourse. This recognition, however, is 
complicated by Kafka's use of the indefinite material image 
which tends either to heighten the effects of ambivalent 
immanence or to destabilize further the structures of 
material definiteness into a more indeterminate mimetic 
field, really an oneiric field of representation.
In many ways, the reader participates in the text by 
choosing to read either the effect of "heavy immanence" or 
of "satirical destabilization" in Kafka's writing, leading 
alternately to humorless or humorous evaluations. 
Nevertheless, both readings contribute to Kafka's
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characteristic, ambivalent, immanence. The indefinite 
material image constitutes a self-reflexive textual strategy 
which hampers faith in mimetic imitation. Such a device 
occurs regularly in satiric or parodic writing: usually, 
parody or satire is characterized by this destabilization 
when the distinction is made that one form is "negative"
(for example "parody") and the other "constructive" (for 
example "satire"), or vice-versa. Such generic confusions 
are indicative of systems that assign values to genres based 
upon mimetic naturalism, so that one form is called more 
"real" than another by reason of appeal to some imitation of 
normality, with that less "real" being considered as 
"failed" writing. Self-reflexive satire undermines its own 
normative assumptions so that it lacks the quality of 
"reform," and this lack is commonly cited as the criterion 
of "failed" satire.
This study applies the "satiric" term and recognizes in 
Kafka a strong satiric impulse not unlike Swift's use of 
satire in the last book of Gulliver's Travels. Swift's 
style in this portion of his text also has a dreamlike 
quality in that there remains an indeterminacy as to whether 
there are intelligent horses or merely dream projections of 
them, and this indeterminacy undermines the "normative" 
quality expected of conventional satire, since Swift's 
"normality" here is indistinguishable from an indeterminate 
vision. H. W. Desai has suggested other correspondences
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between Swift's novel and Kafka's The Castle including: "a 
keen awareness of language in use creating meaning, a model 
that repudiates the previously prevalent referential view of 
language" (33).
The recognition of the oneiric field of representation 
and the recognition of self-reflexive satire in Kafka's 
writing provide the basis for the recognition of another 
textual effect in Kafka, humor. This humor, in turn, may 
contribute a "laughter affect" to the catalogue above, but 
it also allows a more precise generic assignation of Kafka's 
writing to a black humor/black fantasy continuum; real and 
unreal image qualities correlate to this spectrum, so that a 
story like "The Judgment," with its largely "natural" 
imagery, is considered black humor, while the unreal 
transformation at the heart of The Metamorphosis is 
considered black fantasy. This generic discussion will be 
developed at more length below. With these remarks to 
establish a context, an understanding of Kafka's use of the 
definite material image should be more accessible.
The concept of the "Kafka affect" is particularly 
useful as a means of identifying and correlating important 
motifs in Kafka's writing by considering that certain motifs 
tend to provoke similar effects. These similarities, in 
turn, indicate the common discourses related through these 
motifs, discourses connected with particular images. The 
commentaries on Kafka by Benjamin select particular motifs,
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working toward a refinement of the discourse implied by 
them, and Deleuze and Guattari's study provides a selective 
systemization and further refinement of motifs, many of 
which were originally raised by Benjamin. Benjamin takes 
Kafka at his word when he reports: "he regarded his efforts 
as failures" ("Franz Kafka" 129). Consequently, Benjamin 
also finds in his work an experimental quality in that Kafka 
does not provide a clear political vision. A similar 
discursive conclusion emerges from Deleuze and Guattari as 
well.
One political motif raised by Benjamin and one read by 
Deleuze and Guattari is the motif of China, particularly 
"The Great Wall of China" and "An Imperial Message" (only 
the latter was published during Kafka's lifetime). The 
"China motif" in Kafka provides a definite material image 
which functions in a political way as a descriptive 
discourse. For Benjamin, the most material form of what he 
calls in Kafka a definition of "organization as destiny" 
comes about in "The Great Wall of China"; the immanent 
hierarchies of The Trail and The Castle arrive at a kind of 
crystallization in this material motif of "China" ("Franz 
Kafka" 123). Borges reads Zeno's temporal paradox against 
movement as the "formula of this famous problem [which] is, 
exactly, that of The Castle" ("Kafka and His Precursers"
106), but Kafka presents the problem of Zeno's paradox most 
explicitly in "An Imperial Message." Although "the emperor"
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and "the imperial sun" may not directly name China, the very 
multitudinousness of the courts and the great city through 
which the messenger must continually travel tend to suggest 
China where the "imperial sun" is an important symbol.
Although Borges avoids a connection of Kafka to China 
in the context of Zeno's paradox, one of Borges' cited 
passages which he feels is related to Kafka's "voice" is a 
Chinese text by Han Yu about the inability of humankind to 
recognize a unicorn, and this results in the death of this 
supernatural animal of good omen (106-07; Jung, Psychology 
and Alchemy 464-5). Implicitly, then, this destruction of 
the ideal characterizes a material attitude, one born out in 
Borges' own story "The Garden of Forking Paths," a 
consummate execution of this China motif within a modern 
political context. Borges and Benjamin both recognize the 
significance of this China motif with respect to Kafka: this 
image of China functions as a material representation of 
political organization with the negative overtones of the 
futility of Zeno's paradox, a discontinuity which separates 
desire and action.
Karl Marx may be Kafka's source for this China motif in 
that Marx accuses Hegel of misprision by identifying the 
"Mongolian kingdom" as "'ecclesiastical'" and as a 
"'spiritual, religious kingdom' —  in contrast to the 
worldly empire of the Chinese" which for Marx is an 
appropriate representation regarding the history of the
216
"Mongolian kingdom" (Marx 114). All of this suggests both
the appropriateness of the China motif as a political
archetype and that Kafka's representation of the political
state is closely bound with his use of the "China motif."
Apparently, China for Kafka represents political immanence
and political organization; the doomed destiny of this
organization, its hopelessness, is focused in the problem of
Zeno's paradox, an absolute discontinuity. If Kafka reads
this discontinuity as an abyss between political will and
the fulfillment of political action, then the discourse of
this archetype of the China motif is specific to the extent
that it shows humankind to be incapable of a successful
political organization, hardly a comforting idea, but one
with a visionary potential.
Sandbank discusses Brecht's assessment of Kafka's
political vision:
"We find in him," Brecht once wrote of Kafka,
"strange disguises prefiguring many things that 
were, at the same time when his books appeared, 
plain to very few people. The fascist 
dictatorship was, so to speak, in the very bones 
of bourgeois democracies, and Kafka described with 
wonderful imaginative power the future 
concentration camps, the future instability of the 
law, the future absolutism of the state apparat, 
the paralysed, inadequately motivated, floundering 
lives of the many individual people; everything 
appeared as in a nightmare and with the confusion 
and inadequacy of a nightmare" (113).
Brecht characterizes Kafka's political sense as a prophetic
nightmare, a vision which delineated the negative potential
of political organization, one which, soon enough, became
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actuality. Sandbank also discusses Muir's characterization 
of Kafka as an archetypal writer, but "to Muir's Marxist 
contemporaries this ahistoricism was anathema" (114). Even 
for Deleuze and Guattari, "The Trial is the dismantling of 
all transcendental justifications" (51).
Kafka's renunciation of political formulas earns him 
the charge of a lack of political vision, but perhaps it is 
history itself which is so well exemplified in the corrupted 
image of China. Kafka's use of this material image in the 
political sphere promotes a discourse of organizational 
hopelessness, and this realization of something close to 
political nihilism at the heart of Kafka's writing 
contributes to Kafka's "shock effect." The material image 
of China in Kafka promotes an effect of shock by 
disenfranchising political formulas as so much decay; 
perhaps, as Benjamin suggests, the kernel of Kafka's 
political alternative resides in "The Wish to Be a Red 
Indian" ("Franz Kafka" 119) . Many other motifs in Kafka 
function as material images which contribute to the various 
facets of the "Kafka affect."
Shock and the Definite Material Image
Some other instances of Kafka's use of the definite 
material image to provide the shock effect or "affect" are 
Gregor's animal mask of possession in "The Metamorphosis,"
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certain elements of "A Fratricide" (particularly its 
intensely sensual descriptions), lycanthropy, sexuality, and 
machines (particularly the one in the penal colony). Of 
these, probably the most difficult is Gregor Samsa's insect 
transformation in that it promotes several versions of a 
definite quality, while competition among these versions 
contributes a quality of indefiniteness. Thus, the image of 
Gregor as insect is most particularly indicative of Kafka's 
stylistic image play where definite and indefinite qualities 
are synthesized into a single image, one in which several 
particular images coexist.
Corngold's expressionistic designation of insect as 
metaphor has already been mentioned, and the lack of 
agreement concerning any definite description of this insect 
is strong evidence that the linguistic and metaphoric 
meaning of "insect" is pronounced in this text, rightly 
considered an expressionistic one on that basis. Nabokov's 
close reading produces drawings based on meticulous 
correlation of textual descriptions of a "beetle with human 
eyes" (Lectures on Literature 258 [editor's note]). The 
surreal qualities of this construction accord well with the 
intricate machine of the penal colony resting on sand.
The merging of human and insect qualities read by 
Nabokov lend support to a neurotic or even psychotic reading 
of Gregor's transformation since this image promotes a 
quality of utter alienation, a line of difference, or an
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abyss, which separates Gregor from all other human contact. 
In fact, the tripartite division of The Metamorphosis easily 
reads as a progession in terms of this alienation: in "I" 
Gregor is outwardly transformed, but inwardly he still tries 
to deal with the world in human terms; in "II" Gregor 
acquires an understanding of his insect abilities and needs; 
finally, in "III" Gregor dies an insect death, becoming as 
inconsequential as any other bug carcass swept out with the 
trash (Ternes reads these similarly 22 6).
William Burroughs has proliferated insect metamorphoses 
throughout his writings, and there is little doubt of Kafka 
being the source.4 *8 Also, this sense of alienation is 
appropriate to Burroughs in that human figures become 
revealed as aliens: when their "human" quality becomes 
suspect, they dissolve into their "true" insect forms. One 
may follow in this continuity from Kafka to Burroughs a 
discourse of avariciousness, the insect image as a satirical 
device indicating petty ambitions unworthy of more "human" 
aspirations. Both Gregor Samsa and K. in The Trial exhibit 
a wealth of petty ambitions.
Still another image variant is identified by Nabokov 
when "the old charwoman calls him Mistkafer. a 'dung 
beetle'" (260). Although Nabokov foolishly dismisses this 
appellation as inconsistent with his own careful 
reconstruction, its presence in this text as a "name" 
applied to Gregor by an old woman connects the "dung beetle"
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to the archetypal image of the "scarab." Budge's The 
Egyptian Book of the Dead reproduces "the scene from the 
sarcophagus of Seti I" in which the goddess Nut receives the 
disk of the sun from the outstretched mandibles of a scarab 
(cii-civ). This scarab recurs in Cirlot's description of 
"The Moon," the "eighteenth enigma of the Tarot" which "has 
as its function that of devouring what is transitory"; the 
associations of the Tarot with the Kabbala are well known, 
and "The Moon" is widely connected to ideas of intiation and 
witchcraft. Likely, Kafka's old charwoman pronounces these 
connections with her "dung beetle" address, for this beetle 
is widely considered the natural form or model for the 
scarab. The discourse of this image of the scarab signifies 
the "fated" quality of Gregor's transformation. In other 
words, Gregor's transformation into the form of the scarab 
already implies his death, the loss of his transitory mortal 
form.
Benjamin has noted the importance of the idea of fate 
in Kafka: "the transgression in the sense of the law is not 
accidental but fated, a destiny which appears [in The Trial! 
in all its ambiguity" (114). Deleuze and Guattari call 
attention to "the fragment of The Trial published under the 
title 'A Dream'" in which a painter inscribes a "J" upon a 
tombstone, and the figure of the painter provides for them 
evidence that this is a "fragment" of the novel. Welles 
also may have noticed this connection (this is discussed
221
further below), but its significance with respect to the 
novel is its presentation of a prophetic dream of doom, an 
image that provides evidence that K.'s death in The Trial is 
fated.
The fragment "A Dream" and the scarab are specific 
images indicating the fated qualities of these stories. 
Further, each image is connected to the other by the image 
of a "dream": Gregor awakes from "uneasy dreams" to discover 
his transformation into an insect (The Complete Stories 89). 
Such dreams also indicate that the whole matter of 
representation in Kafka refers to an oneiric field, for the 
explicit introduction of dreams clues the reader to their 
implicit presence elsewhere, and stories like "The Judgment" 
and "In The Penal Colony" present dream motifs without 
stating so, while those that mention dreams introduce the 
possibility that there is no awakening from them (i.e.
Gregor never really awakens, he just dreams he awakes or 
moves into a state of lucid dreaming). This is always a 
possible variant interpretation in Kafka's stories; for 
example, Ternes uses Freudian projections as evidence of the 
uncanny in Kafka's writing, without considering that such 
projections only occur in dreams (of whatever type —  224- 
26). Clearly, the image of the "dung beetle" provides a 
wealth of discourse and serves to reveal the importance of 
fate in The Metamorphosis. The equivalence of this to "A 
Dream" shows how Gregor and K. (in The Trial) are related.
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Finally, there is the popular image of Gregor as 
"cockroach" which, while not precisely favored by the text 
(Nabokov feels commentators who use this do not "make sense" 
258), is nevertheless instructive in that the cockroach is a 
familiar form of vermin. If commentators call Gregor a 
cockroach, this appellation arises out of their experience 
of vermin more than out of their experience of this text. 
This image of "cockroach" provides evidence of the Kafka 
affect of shock such that the transformation is shocking to 
commentators who look to their own experience rather than 
the text for a name. Moreover, this "cockroach" image shows 
creative participation in the text by these commentators who 
seem to instinctively or intuitively "know" that Gregor has 
become a cockroach because cockroaches are a common insect.
These forms of the central image of Gregor, of 
cockroach, of dream, of scarab, of surreal insect, and of 
metaphor each indicate definite and particular forms of 
discourse appropriate to their images; dream and metaphor 
seem capable of containing the other variants as a dream- 
archetype, but this archetype does not easily yield the 
variant discourses appropriate to each specific image. 
Nonetheless, somehow the text itself supplies these variants 
with their correlative discourses. Consequently, a unified 
interpretation is only possible by considering the aggregate 
of these images, but the discursive variety of these 
variants enforces a sense of indeterminacy.
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In one sense or another, each variant is traceable to 
the text, but the discourses of these variants cannot be 
refined into a single view; rather the image of Gregor's 
transformation contains or juxtaposes several discursive 
indications which all cohabit in this image. This is 
precisely the way in which the reader is confronted with the 
opacity of an archetype. The reader focuses on one only by 
risking the loss of the others, for all have their relevance 
to the text. No wonder enough interpretive furor has arisen 
over Gregor Samsa to give rise to a "commentators' despair." 
This confusion provides ample testimony to the shock of 
Gregor's transformation.
This discussion of how the definite material image in 
Kafka contributes to "shock" concludes with the 
consideration of the equivalence of lycanthropic devices and 
machines in that both these image categories designate 
subjective animisms. Lycanthropy in Kafka presents animal 
subjects, and, more or less gradually, human characteristics 
become recognizable within these animal subjects. The 
Metamorphosis dramatically exemplifies this process since 
the whole first part of the novella is taken up with 
Gregor's resistance to his new animal form. This 
essentially surreal gesture is repeated to varying degrees 
in the animal stories, and readers become confronted with a 
material and sensual consciousness embodied by this 
animal/human juxtaposition. Such a representation of
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consciousness as an animal existence is appropriate to the 
representation of dreams in which consciousness is often 
fragmented into several individual forms corresponding 
roughly to particular psychic concerns or mechanisms.
These dream representations are often subjected to 
graphic violence which dramatically portrays, through injury 
or even death of dream figures, nothing more than emphatic 
personal or linguistic psychic movements. The best example 
of this without animal or mechanistic images is the story of 
"The Judgment," in which the immanence of the father and the 
son's suicide indicate in dream language a form of father 
and son estrangement. The drowned son may quickly resurrect 
in some other dream since these dream effects are transitory 
and reactive. That critics do not read this story as a 
dream motif seems particularly naive when Kafka explicitly 
involves himself with dream processes eleswhere, and just 
because Kafka does not say that this story is a dream in no 
way prevents the application of principles of dream 
interpretation to this story.
Evidently, the "natural" qualities of this story serve 
to distract readers from the recognition of dream immanence, 
but "naturalism" also has its place in the dream process. 
There is a realistic effect of estrangement in this story 
which can be read either as "real" or as "dream," so this 
effect is overdetermined. However, the somewhat spectacular 
dream effect of the son's suicide is much less drastic than
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the violence of an "actual" suicide, although it is possible 
that what occurs in dreams may also occur in life. 
Ultimately, the psychic concern of parental estrangement is 
the story's subject, but the investment of subjectivity into 
the completion of the suicide creates an effect of 
overwhelming parental power, which is not particularly 
realistic at all. This effect is appropriate to the dream 
which portrays parental power as an "affect," which Freud 
insists is often undiluted in dream form. The 
"overwhelming" power of the father in this dream indicates 
the powerful desire of the son for parental love and the 
sense that the father's withholding of such love will be 
harmful to the son. Such a dramatic effect as suicide, if 
realistic, would indicate a very disturbed personality, but 
such a dramatic affect in dreams is relatively commonplace, 
although one may find in this dream message an emphatic 
warning. The raw power of psychic elements as they are 
portrayed in dreams is intense since dream affect is often 
undiluted, but this is typical of dream representation.
Clearly, the reactive language of the dream seeks to 
shock the dreamer into comprehension, a comprehension which 
for the dreamer is always close at hand, but this 
representation in text without the sign that qualifies "this 
is a dream" is certainly shocking in itself. So it also 
goes with animal representations in Kafka, where these 
elements embody subjective or psychic components. As shown
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above, a resistant dreamer may typically "see" an animal 
representation in a dream as a manifestation outside of the 
"dreaming" self. Kafka portrays this animal figure as a 
focus of subjectivity, and this results in the animal 
subject being consumed by undiluted affect, an undeniable 
intensification over the ordinary dream state.
Kafka quite successfully "adapts" the dream language of 
undiluted affect into the written language of text by 
eliminating any distance between the subject and the affect, 
so the reader "feels" the power of these psychic forces in a 
tactile fashion. The resolution of these powerful forces 
lies not in the literal text so much as in the contextual 
recognition that this is a dream text, and the elimination 
of distance between subject and affect is appropriate to the 
representation of dream consciousness which the reader 
encounters in these stories. Thus, mimetic "distortion" 
becomes appropriate when one recognizes that these stories 
are about psychic life portrayed in the language of dreams. 
Of course, without such a recognition, the pure affect 
portrayed in these stories is experienced by the reader as 
shock, and the reader is tempted to say that Kafka is 
exaggerating, that these stories are overly drastic, unreal, 
and so on, when the problem of interpretation resides in the 
mistaken choice of a mimetic standard of judgment being 
applied to stories that have an oneiric character. 
Nevertheless, these psychic representations remain relevant
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to the mimetic field as well in that they do portray 
possible courses of real action, so this portrayal of 
psychic immanence contributes to a mimetic ambivalence as 
well.
Benjamin locates all of Kafka's writing within a "world 
theatre": " [t]he stage on which this drama takes place is 
the World Theater which opens up toward heaven" (121). The 
recognition of the oneiric field of representation is a more 
accurate contextual adjustment equivalent to Benjamin's 
contextual adjustment of world theatre which allowed him to 
explain the transparent qualities and undiluted affects (for 
Benjamin, "gestus") of Kafka's writing, in which "each 
gesture is an event —  one might even say, a drama —  in 
itself." Benjamin's qestus coheres with Deleuze and 
Guattari's "thresholds of intensities." This common 
recognition implies an expressionistic intensififcation in 
Kafka's writing, one clearly developed from the language of 
dreams.
What is appropriate to animal representation in some 
stories is also appropriate to machine representation in 
others, and the telling example is Kafka's story "In The 
Penal Colony" in which one finds qualities of self- 
animation in the terrible machine of execution. The 
machine's lust for destruction of the officer and its 
operation and self-dismantling out of all proportion to its 
careful programming links the animal with the mechanical.
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If the animal stories demonstrate an animal/human surreal 
juxtaposition, then this story provides a
machine/animal/human surreal complex which, when recognized, 
allows the significance of this story to be more accessible.
This story may be read as a dream of personality change 
with the elements and characters roughly corresponding to 
psychic structures. The intricate punishment machine, the 
officer, and the old commandant relate as an image structure 
suggestive of something like Freud's "censoring" faculty, a 
guilt impulse, death wish, whatever. The condemned man (a 
pleasurable desire) is aligned with the new commandant and 
explorer suggesting a hedonistic new order. The explorer 
particularly suggests a faculty of psychic self-awareness. 
This machine of guilt can no longer function once the 
explorer refuses his approbation of its function. One may 
say the machine only too obligingly slaughters its caretaker 
and dismantles itself in an emphatic demonstration of 
psychic synchronicity: the will to change is copresent with 
these images of destruction. This dream story is a numinous 
image realization of a part of the individuation process, a 
way of assimilating the shadow archetype; there are 
overtones of liberation and laughter as well as the sadness 
of how humans inflict pain on themselves.
These image motifs produce a psychic portrait of a 
dramatic moment in psychic life; as such, they produce a 
subliminal text because story elements resonate to psychic
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structures believed to be part of the unconscious. These 
images describe psychic interaction in a metaphorical or 
allegorical way (through Hillman's sense of metaphor or 
Benjamin's sense of allegory, respectively). Direct or 
symbolic correspondences to the individual dream elements 
are not readily apparent, but an interpretative precision is 
overdetermined by the image play. A reader may not be aware 
immediately that this text is designed as a subliminal one, 
so the reader may react to this text on very different terms 
than on a recognition of this subliminal quality. The 
reader who does not make this recognition will likely be 
shocked by the story's graphic elements which convey dream 
affect.
This image of the penal-colony machine's self- 
destruction is another motif that figures prominently in 
Burrough's writing; one of his routines features a computer 
that runs the world, and his persona feeds in a subliminal 
command to dismantle itself.4,9 Again, this image signals a 
liberation as the old order collapses. Burroughs not only 
incorporates Kafka's images of insect metamorphosis and 
machine-gone-mad, but he also adopts a similar discourse to 
Kafka in regard to these images, since he does not present 
any positive descriptions of political alternatives.
Much of the shock effect in Kafka derives from his 
subliminal textuality, an account of psychic life told with 
definite images that function on the personally archetypal
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level of the shadow, on the threshhold of the unconscious, 
in the language of dreams. Images of organizational desire 
more than political ones, images of erotic desire rather 
than erotic interludes, images from the "blind side" of 
human consciousness reveal the hidden, ambivalent, and 
immanent structures that underlie civilization.
Fright and the Definite Material Image
Dreams of violent immanence as presentations of psychic 
affect also contribute to the fright "effect." A guilty 
terror of the father portrayed as nightmare in "The 
Judgment," K's inevitable death in The Trial. the portrait 
of the murderer Schmar, and a state of immanent gloom 
pervading The Castle provide some examples of how the use of 
the material image promotes fright. A childlike fear of the 
father is the undiluted affect in "The Judgment." The sense 
of deadly imminence that inhabits The Trial and that is 
supported by episodes like "The Whipper" dulls any sense of 
surprise for the reader when K. is finally executed, without 
even having been informed of specific charges against him.
This sense of imminent doom lends a dramatic quality to 
this novel even more severe than the dire fates of Greek 
classical tragedy where protagonists are granted choices 
that may lead out of their dire circumstances. This 
congruence to tragedy probably contributed to the desire to
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adapt The Trial to other medial forms: Welles' film is
discussed at length below, and Andre Gide also developed a 
dramatic adaptation (along with J.- L. Barrault) of the 
novel into a two-act play.
K. in The Trial never really seems to have a satisfying 
encounter with anyone in the novel, and from one dismal 
meeting to the next the sense of gloom grows stronger, until 
his alienation is so complete that it almost justifies his 
murder. This attitude is also developed in The Castle. 
Despite its more sociable ambience, this novel nonetheless 
manages to maintain an atmosphere of powerful immanence, and 
K. dies without having closed the distance between himself 
and this powerful edifice. When Kafka presents his portrait 
of Schmar in "A Fratricide," one finds the murderer in a 
state of possession: "he felt no cold; besides he was moving 
about all the time": here the intense description of 
Schmar's behavior provides the sense of imminence, a figure 
of jealous rage, irrevocably bent on murder (The Complete 
Stories 402). Kafka's portrayal of isolation and alienation 
with their excessive emotions yields numerous "frightful" 
images, contributing a disturbing quality to his subliminal 
texts.
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Dread and the Definite Material Image
Two related ways in which Kafka promotes a sense of
dread through the use of the definite material image
include: 1) the development of the shadow archetype which
connects to unconscious thresholds in the reader (discussed
above) and 2) a participatory identification in which the
reader is inscribed as voyeur, often to death scenes. An
instance of this from Amerika was mentioned earlier; a
discussion of other instances follows. One instance is
unusual for Kafka. In "An Imperial Message" the message is
sent to "you": the direct address to the reader as the
destination of this message shows how Kafka was concerned
with bringing the reader into a closer contact.
The discursive themes of responsibility and guilt are
marked in other texts through the concretized image of the
watcher or witness. One frames the narrative in The Trial:
K. waited for a little while longer, watching from 
his pillow the old lady opposite, who seemed to be 
peering at him with a curiousity unusual even for 
her [and] his [K.'s] glance fell on the top story 
of the house adjoining the quarry [in which he 
will die] . . . the casements of a window there
suddenly flew open; a human figure, faint and 
insubstantial at that distance and at that height, 
leaned abruptly far forward and stretched both 
arms still farther (1, 228).
These "witnesses" are clearly described by the narrator as
outside of K., but their function of watching remains a
function within K.'s subjectivity; he is continually watched
throughout the story, although the reader is presented only
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with these framing watchers. More strikingly, K.'s 
subjectivity is extended to the reader who is also watching 
K. in this text. In fact, watching opposite and looking 
down are two visual orientations of a reader to any text. 
This kind of orientation is made even more explicit in 
Karl's reading of the note in Amerika.
Kafka treats his witnesses more directly elsewhere, and 
this motif is familiar from his explicit treatment of it in 
"A Fratricide." "Why did Pallas, the private citizen who 
was watching it all from his window nearby in the second 
storey, permit it to happen? Unriddle the mysteries of 
human nature!"; later, this witness named for the goddess of 
wisdom, "choking on the poison in his body," calls to the 
murderer, "Schmar! Schmar! I saw it all, I missed nothing" 
(The Complete Stories 402, 404). The emphasis Kafka places 
here on the strange complicity between the witness and the 
criminal has in The Trial been worked out as a subjective 
motif (K. is aware of being watched), but the reader is 
drawn into this web of complicity, because the reader is 
continually presented with K.'s subjective ruminations and 
because at the beginning and end of the process (the arrest 
and the execution) an indefinite figure is inscribed into 
the text "watching," who is equivalent to the reader. Both 
the watchers and the readers share in the complicity of 
Pallas. This subtle discursive device does not allow the
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reader to be detached from the text since the reader is a 
literal part of the text in this chain of subjectivity.
In this way, it becomes possible to know that K.'s 
world is our world, and this is a disturbing realization 
that cannot be dismissed by calling Kafka's novel a fiction, 
for Kafka has penetrated the psychic reality of our world 
and brought forth its image with its value, a mirror-image 
of connection to the evil in the world. That the message 
for "you" is unlikely to arrive represents a form of evil, 
an abyss between desire and action. This abyss is 
incarnated by the reading "witnesses" of murders, who will 
be jarred by their proximity to the graphic killings in "A 
Fratricide" and in The Trial. Kafka compounds a sense of 
dread from the activity of watching and from the activity 
that is watched, here murder. Kafka's texts operate on a 
kind of principle of psychic contagion; his focus on 
intensely intimate dreams connects to the reader's dreaming 
faculties and unconscious thresholds. This engagement of 
psychic faculties is unsettling, particularly with regard to 
death.
Mystification and the Definite Material Image
The final quality of the "Kafka affect" to be 
considered here is mystification, actually demystification. 
Kafka's use of the material image facilitates a literary
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analysis of mythic displacement: the comparability of 
definite images shows the progression of displacement.
Kafka effects a radical dissociation between his images and 
their traditional sources, but he also often includes those 
sources in his text. The image of Poseidon sitting at his 
cluttered desk embodies this incongruity in a comic fashion. 
If one is not quick to take up Gregor's transformation as 
metaphor, then one reads this change as a divine 
intervention, one not easily justifiable through traditional 
formulas.
A particularly illuminating instance of this
demystifing process occurs when K. visits Titorelli, who is
working on a portait of a judge with pastels. K.'s
attention is drawn to an emblematic figure that the painter
develops before him:
that brightness brought the figure sweeping right 
into the foreground and it no longer suggested the 
goddess of Justice, or even the goddess of 
Victory, but looked exactly like a goddess of the 
hunt in full cry (147).
This image from the painter, an image which directly
foreshadows K.'s death, operates almost in a cinematic
manner of dissolving from the justifying images of "Justice"
and (more ambivalent) "Victory" into an image of malevolent
power. Here Kafka expressionistically reveals the stages of
mythic displacement.
The human "Pallas" of "A Fratricide" chokes on the
poison of murder, but this name suggestive of Pallas Athena,
like Artemis, is also connected with hunting. The 
traditional association of Athena with wisdom creates for 
the reader of "A Fratricide" a dilemma since the association 
with wisdom conflicts with the complicity of witnessing this 
murder. Kafka strips away the labels of justication to 
reveal the blind self-aggrandizement of power. The motifs 
of sacrifice described by Girard recur throughout Kafka's 
writing. Corngold remarks that Kafka's word for Gregor's 
transformed state derives from "the unclean animal not 
suited for sacrifice," but, nevertheless, Gregor's situation 
helps to unify his family, if only against him (10).
Gregor, like Schmar, is shown through image to be possessed, 
and such possession precedes "sacrifice." The infernal 
machine of the penal colony becomes possessed, and with its 
final possession heralds the coming of freedom. Over and 
over Kafka's stories show the blood demanded by the powerful 
to work their political will, just as Girard's study of 
religion develops this conclusion, but Kafka will not 
preserve the sacred words which traditionally justify this 
exercise, except to place them in incongruous relief.
Again, as with the image of "China," a political discourse 
goes along with these demystifying images, but it is only 
the discourse of the powerful demanding their blood tribute.
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Kafka and the Indefinite Material Image
Kafka's uses of the definite material image show how 
many of his motifs carry numinous or immanent qualities 
resulting in a subliminal text since the archetypal 
qualities of these images engage unconscious psychological 
structures in the mind of the reader. Kafka's definite 
images are less imitative of the natural world than they are 
reflective of dream motifs and unconscious structures 
described in psychoanalysis. Kafka also employs indefinite 
images, and these indefinite images enhance the immanent and 
satirical qualities in his writing. Moreover, this 
indefinite quality reflects the process of writing itself, 
because the indefinite images are composed of definite 
components, just as in writing faith in details is meant to 
rhetorically support a more total vision which, in fact, 
writing cannot supply.
Just as the definite image implies indefinite 
qualities, so the indefinite image focuses attention on 
definite qualities as sources of indeterminacy or as 
rudiments of discourse. It has already been shown how this 
dynamic works in the instance of Gregor's insect 
transformation, so one may recognize how the "bug” of this 
novella is an indefinite image structure composed of 
definite components each of which contributes discursive 
insights into the larger structure, but none of these
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individual elements alone is really sufficient to 
characterize the whole structure, which remains partly 
indeterminate. There are some other examples of indefinite 
motifs in Kafka which contribute to the ways in which 
writing comes to be viewed as a mediation of unconscious 
structures. In other words, the indeterminate qualities of 
writing are foregrounded, recalling the indefinite qualities 
of cognition itself.
Odradek
Odradek in "The Cares of a Family Man," possesses a 
"wooden" appearance, but it also has some kind of voice (The 
Complete Stories 428). This recalls the mechanical/animal 
surreal motif. The beginning of the description of this 
creature denotes the controversy surrounding its origins. 
This description begins on a note of indeterminacy and 
continues in an indeterminate way (427). A definite view of 
"Odradek" is given: "it looks like a flat star-shaped spool 
for thread" with a couple of rods connected to it so that 
"the whole thing can stand upright as if on two legs" (428) . 
Thus standing and speaking are two organic qualities 
described, but saying it looks "like" a spool of thread only 
provides description through a mechanical metaphor, as does 
its wooden appearance; this is reminiscent of the bug 
metaphor applied to Gregor Samsa. Odradek relates to
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domestic discourse; its appearances suggest a demonic 
quality ("extraordinarily nimble and can never be laid hold 
of"), and its locations possess threatening, Freudian 
overtones ("rolling down the stairs" 429, "leaning . . .
against the banisters" 428). Odradek's standing upright 
mimics the erection, and its presence on the stairs 
implicates it in a Freudian symbol for copulation (Freud 
3 90). The suggestion of its presence "right before the feet 
of my children" and "the idea that he is likely to survive 
me" (something children do) direct this creature's implicit 
threat against the children, the product of the sexual union 
(429). Perhaps Odradek might choke them, as "ordinary" 
household objects can do; indeed, its unobtrusive but 
disconcerting presence is analogous to ordinary objects 
which can cause fatal accidents. Odradek remains a cipher, 
but one connected through textual innuendo to sexual guilt 
and family responsibilities, the Oedipal "crucible" of 
immanence.
"Before the Law"
"Before the Law" as parable, as part of The Trial. and 
as dream in Orson Welles' film of the novel provides an 
example of indefinite discourse based on an indefinite 
image. The explicit story is a cipher, and each suggested 
interpretation is negated, although the commentary also
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points out specific qualities which bear upon its 
interpretation. This parable paradoxically presents its own 
meaning in an indefinite way. One may suggest 
interpretations which are not found in the commentary; for 
example, a violent overthrow of the guard seems to accord 
well with the presentation of the law in the novel as an 
instrument of violent power. When K complains of 
mistreatment he is rewarded with the whipping of the 
"mistreater.11 Even though the guard warns against violence, 
this may only be a bluff, or, alternatively, there may be 
some other way to deal with the other guards.
This threat of the guard that other, more powerful 
guards stand behind him is like Heracles' confrontation with 
the "hydra": when one head is removed, two more take its 
place, yet Heracles found a solution to the threat of the 
Hydra's physical power. Actually, this image of the Hydra 
is particularly appropriate to the description of the 
pernicious qualities of psychological complexes, and it is 
possible that the image of the Hydra survives as an 
archetype in dreams. Following this analogy of the Hydra 
suggests that Kafka may be using the term "the Law" in an 
ambivalent way in that the structure of the law is widely 
recognized as a social institution, and the definite 
qualities called up by the term suggest courts, judges, and 
so on, but Kafka uses the law to indicate unconscious 
structures or archetypes.
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Kafka's involvement with the shadow archetype suggests 
this kind of unconscious immanence, for the shadow does 
intimidate its subject, and, further, the intimidating power 
of the shadow derives from the subject's own power. This 
accords with the story's insistence that the door which 
stands before the man is his own door to the law. If this 
first level of unconscious "initiation" involves the problem 
of intimidation, then other levels may also appear to 
partake of this same quality because they represent further 
encroachments into the unconscious projected by this vision 
which has not yet solved the problem of intimidation. In 
other words, the other "guards" may not be guards at all, 
but they all are multiplications of the original guard so 
long as the man fears the guard before the door to the law. 
This line of reasoning alerts the reader to the religious 
sense of the term "the Law" as indicative of essential 
qualities of human experience. Perhaps this involves the 
conflict of the "spirit" and the "flesh" or the precession 
of archetypal psychic structures, but the text will not 
confirm any interpretation, even as the story directs the 
reader's attention to such ideas.
Girard's study makes clear the connections between 
religious institutions and the political system of the law; 
it is also a well known tenet of Mandeville and of Trotsky 
that religious structures have a political nature. Thus, 
the institution of "justice" suggested by the term "the Law"
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nevertheless portrays an appropriate correlate to both 
unconscious and religious structures. Kafka's use of the 
term "the Law" is an exquisite example of the material 
image: its surface is clear, but opaque. Its archetypal 
significance involves more than its surface, and these 
levels of meaning are all supported by the text, which in 
the novel is presented by a priest. "The Law" swallows the 
world, as in the biblical fall. Its indefinite quality is 
enhanced by the independent, though related, levels of 
significance which the term embraces. Different meanings 
are suggested by the vain expositions given to the story.
There is still another definite quality which 
contributes to the total effect of indefinition, and this is 
the possibility of a real solution to this parable. One may 
suggest the solution of violence out of frustration with 
this text which itself portrays violence. However, one may 
reject this theme of violence as insufficient to disclose 
the meaning of "Before the Law." Although the text itself 
does not provide an answer and although its ingenious 
commentaries provide the intimation that there may not be an 
answer, this text nevertheless constitutes an invitation to 
find an answer. This text does not directly indicate that 
there is no answer; consequently, there may be an answer to 
the dilemma of "the Law." Such an elucidation is beyond the 
scope of this study, but this apocryphal parable may indeed 
contain some solution. If an answer were discovered, then
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"the law" would become a more definite image structure. 
Nonetheless, "finding" a solution and "proving" its 
exactitude may remain a difficult matter; that is, it may 
only contribute another definite quality to the indefinite 
composite. The possibility of an answer contributes to the 
indefinite quality of this image, just as the indefinite 
quality of this image hinders a definite interpretation.
Kafka's work is a paradoxical writing based on 
paradoxical structures, but these structures do not prohibit 
the elucidation of valid interpretations. Instead, these 
structures provide a context which situates the depth and 
complexity of the problem of descriptive writing. Kafka's 
paradoxes deny the naivete demanded of readers by 
naturalistic writers; insofar as these structures are 
accurate in their depiction of the problems of 
representational writing they are expressionistic. Kafka 
implies a "germ" of truth enclosed within apparent 
contradictions, a revelation and a concealment, an 
exposition of the technology of writing.
Orpheus and The Trial
An additional, if controversial, use of the indefinite 
image in Kafka involves allusions, indefinite allusions. 
Kafka's use of the definite material image radically 
transforms traditional images as in "Poseidon," but there
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may also be a correlate to this radical transformation in 
his use of the indefinite image as well.
Probably the strongest indication of such a strategy 
occurs in The Trial where the curious relation between K and 
the women of this novel suggests an "invisible" Bacchae.
This gesture is recapitulated in other texts related to The 
Trial (Welles, Moravia, Bertolucci) in that all these 
portray three sexually charged encounters with women 
(exceptions are familial: K.'s niece in The Trial [novel and 
film] and Marcello's wife in The Conformist [novel and 
film]), suggesting that women, or the desire for them, may 
be the agency of K's destruction, as in the Greek tragedy. 
Emphasis is provided in The Trial by the figure of the 
goddess of the hunt and by the crowd of ravenous girls at 
Titorelli's studio. Should one take the figure of the 
apparently homosexual painter surrounded by young girls as 
Kafka's representation of Orpheus, "originator of homosexual 
passion," who was torn apart by Thracian women at a 
Dionysiac orgy (Rose 255)? Further, this identification 
with Orpheus may extend to K. himself, since Titorelli 
represents a concentration of motifs in which K. has been 
implicated (see below).
Cocteau may have read Titorelli in this way, signalling 
this recognition in his film by connecting the bureaucratic 
motifs of Kafka with his transformation of the Orpheus 
legend in which a group of women called the Bacchantes
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threaten the poet Orpheus. There are several indications 
that Cocteau's film provides a reading of Kafka, since the 
revolt of the agents of death parallels K.'s revolt against 
the agents of the law and since Kafka's use of "the Law" to 
indicate a realm of deadly unconscious impulses parallels 
Cocteau's recreation of the realm of death (which is reached 
through mirrors) in his film.
Todorov's problem in considering Kafka as a writer of 
the fantastic arose because Todorov read either uncanny or 
marvelous structures in Kafka's writing, but the subtle 
participation of mythological forces as references in this 
indefinite way invalidates Todorov's denial of the 
copresence of the uncanny and the marvellous in Kafka's 
writing. At least with regard to The Trial, there appears 
to be a group of dionysiac references providing a mythic 
undercurrent to this novel's fairly mundane events.
Kafka's focus upon women reveals a strategy of male 
appropriation in a homosocial society in which these women 
are held by the courts. Also, Titorelli's figure of the 
goddess of the hunt is supposed to be a representation of a 
judge. A more detailed discussion of the relation of The 
Bacchae to The Trial is given below, but indications are 
this play and the Orpheus legend become indefinite mythic 
components of the novel and represent yet another form of 
Kafka's strategy of mythic transformation and displacement.
Kafka's texts
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In conclusion, there are several ways in which the 
indefinite material image operates in Kafka's writing. 
First, there is the indeterminacy that arises with respect 
to apparently definite material images (Gregor). Second, 
there are indefinite modes of description of which definite 
components yield discursive clues, but which remain 
indeterminate (Odradek). Third, there is the presentation 
of indeterminate, parabolic discourse ("Before the Law"). 
Fourth, Kafka's allusiveness can also take an indefinite 
form (Orpheus). Finally, to these ought to be added the 
presentation of an indefinite text, particularly with 
respect to Kafka's novels since these novels were not put 
into final form by Kafka himself.
The Trial is not only a text about corruption, but is 
itself a corrupt text. Further, its status as a corrupt 
text places it in a structural line of descent with other 
precurser texts to The Trial. notably Petronius' The 
Satvricon (an earlier novel developing the theme of 
innocence and guilt as well as the presentation of dream) 
and Swift's Gulliver's Travels (apparently gutted in places 
by printers to delete direct criticism of the British 
government). Thus, there arises the possibility that 
Kafka's injunction to destroy these writings is actually a 
self-reflexive production of the indefinite text, one left
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to chances of publication or destruction. Whether he wished 
to do so cannot really be determined, but these texts 
remain, and they remain in this company of other texts to 
which they bear thematic and structural relations.
Taken together, all these strategies of indefiniteness 
in Kafka's writing indicate how great a part indeterminacy 
played in his idea of literary representation, and how this 
indeterminacy is an essential quality of writing itself. It 
is now possible to see more clearly how the effect of 
paradoxical ambivalence at the heart of Kafka's writing has 
been achieved. Kafka's expressionistic use of definite and 
indefinite images emphasizes the imperfection inherent in 
writing to represent human existence. Kafka represents the 
wish to order existence as an indeterminate dream, and he 
creates a correlation between the technologies of dream and 
of writing. Just as Freudian dreams are structured by 
wishes, Kafka's reactive writing invests his texts with an 
archetypal substance, but, paradoxically, the very 
complexity of this substance produces an opaque ambivalence. 
Nevertheless, Kafka expressionistically shows how writing 
and dream are equivalent technologies, distilling thought 
into provocative image complexes.
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The Novel and the Film of Kafka's The Trial
Expressionistic literature poses special problems for 
the adaptation of literature into film. A naturalistic 
novel seems to move more easily into cinematic portrayal 
because the story element lends itself to direct 
reproduction, but actually the mode of expressionism in 
writing has more in common with the particular qualities of 
cinematic representation. Expressionistic writing and film 
are well suited to each other at the formal level of the 
ways in which these media structure perception for their 
audiences. The problems of expressionistic adaptation force 
directors to make a more comprehensive use of the film 
medium in these portrayals. Many of these problems arise 
from the powerful tradition of naturalistic mimesis in film; 
consequently, directors must work against this aesthetic 
inertia to discover more effective means of cinematic 
representation. This naturalistic "habit of reception" of 
film audiences is overcome when film is required to do more 
than to simply convey a story. These strategies of 
expressionistic adaptation instruct the audience about 
particular qualities of signification in film.
Orson Welles' adaptation of Franz Kafka's The Trial 
makes use of a variety of cinematic capabilities to render 
not only the story but also the sense of defamiliarization 
imparted by the novel to its readers. Although Welles' film
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was not widely shown and, even today, remains fairly 
obscure, its production in 1962 coincides with early "new 
wave" films that were also concerned with expressionist 
writing including Godard's Contempt (1962 —  Alberto 
Moravia's A Ghost At Noon) and Resnais' Last Year At 
Marienbad (1960 —  screenplay by Robbe-Grillet). Kafka's 
The Trial influenced Alberto Moravia's novel The Conformist, 
which explores a situation thematically related to Kafka's 
story and which also employs a motif of three sexually 
charged encounters during the course of its telling (three 
different women), which marks its connection to Kafka's 
novel.
Similarly, Welles' film The Trial makes use of images 
of statuary (a yard full of statues, a shrouded statue that 
K. is led past on his way to be executed) and so does 
Bertolucci's The Conformist (1969 —  at the ministry giant 
busts are carried through the hall, a bust of Mussolini is 
dragged on a chain through the street by a partisan 
motorcyclist), and these startling images of statuary, as 
opposed to the naturalistic photographing of a statue which 
occurs in many films, suggest an additional intertextual 
relation between these films, besides the link between 
Moravia and Kafka carried through in these adaptations.
Welles' use of statuary emphasizes the oppressive 
ambience of Kafka's world: the yard full of statues is an 
image correlate to the rooms full of petitioners to the law,
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a metaphor of people turned to stone, while the shrouded 
statue ironically "covers" the ideals statues are used to 
represent, and K.'s execution is made more arbitrary by this 
mark of removal of ideal justifications. Bertolucci's 
development of statuary is oppositional to Welles': where 
Welles indicates a long-standing oppression, Bertolucci uses 
a rise-and-fall motif. As the fascists take over, they 
erect statues to their achievement, but these statues are 
torn down when the fascists are defeated. These two 
approaches are connected by a common discourse of vain 
pride. Welles' disused statuary correlates to the ironic, 
temporary quality of Bertolucci's statuary: both suggest the 
lack of value that the material of stone is supposed to 
preserve. Taken together, The Trial and The Conformist both 
as novels and as films form a significant core that portrays 
the expressionistic approach to the naturalistic genre of 
the historical novel, an approach with a strong satirical 
component. The Trial as novel and as film participates both 
through thematics and through intertextuality in a number of 
expressionistic projects that portray, and often satirize, 
the nature of our political existence.
The Trial presents one of Kafka's approaches to an 
expressionistic treatment of the historical novel, a form 
often thought to have originated with Scott's Ivanhoe. This 
partly explains K.'s encounters with the three women in The 
Trial who all seem, at one time or another, to be hopeful
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that K. might be helpful to them, only to face an ultimate 
disappointment. K.'s inability to "rescue" these women from 
their predicaments satirizes those literary heroes who 
easily effect such "rescues" and confuses the identification 
with respect to K. of whether he is one of the oppressed or 
one of the oppressors. This is a problem of the shadow 
archetype which is cast as a menacing presence, especially 
in the parable "Before the Law."
K.'s agonizing over his "guilt" or "innocence" becomes 
heightened during these sexually charged encounters, and 
this "neurotic" ambivalence leads to his isolation from 
these women. These encounters point out K.'s personal and, 
consequently, social ambivalence leading to the important 
discursive theme of political responsibility in this novel. 
The "paranoia" of K.'s mindset and of the world he inhabits 
are ultimately interchangeable, and there seems to be no way 
out of this predicament; K. is led to his death. It is both 
satirically amusing and instructive that all K.'s agony and 
its futile course allow him to live more fully with an 
increased intensity and awareness that, no doubt, was 
unavailable to him during his humdrum existence before his 
arrest. This is evident in the text from his remarks and 
attempts early on to regain his normal routine in spite of 
his arrest, especially in the scenes at the bank.
This discursive theme of responsibility, with all its 
guilty vacillations, is marked in the text through the
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concretized image of the watcher or witness that frames the 
narrative. As discussed above, K. is definitely the object 
of scrutiny within the narrative, but the witnesses of the 
novel also indefinitely suggest the readers of this novel 
who also scrutinize K. These spectator images invite the 
adaptation of this novel into film, since the novel is 
constructed around similar parameters to those which are 
basic to cinematic expression.
The adaptive process of bringing expressionistic 
writing into expressionistic cinema should be characterized 
as the intermedial transposition of discourse. In other 
words, since discourse rather than story is the more crucial 
quality of expressionistic writing, the challenge of 
adapting expressionistic writing to cinema involves choosing 
cinematic devices appropriate to the verbal devices which 
convey the discourse of an expressionistic text. With 
regard to expressionism, the chief function of story 
involves the identification of the text, and the movement 
from one medium into another is initially accomplished 
through the transference of story elements: the story of the 
novel becomes the story of the film, more or less, and 
changes in plotting may indicate discursive strategies of 
adaptation. However, although the transference of story 
elements is basic to expressionistic adaptation, the 
justification remains discursive in that these story 
elements contain discursive elements which ought to be
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preserved to preserve the discourse. In an extreme case, 
one may substitute story elements so long as they convey a 
discourse similar to the one promoted by the source text. 
Thus, the expressionistic adaptation could conceivably 
portray a different story than the source text, but any 
differences would need to preserve the discursive elements 
present in the source text so that, ultimately, a 
"different" story would not be so different that it would 
prevent the recognition of its source text.
With respect to Welles' adaptation, Kafka's discursive 
device of inscribing the reader into the text is 
significant, and a fitting cinematic presentation of The 
Trial ought not to overlook this fundamental discursive 
strategy. Indeed, Welles seeks to overdetermine this device 
of Kafka's inscription of his reader by developing forms of 
audience participation in his film.
In the first place, the story element, or literality, 
of the image of the watcher is portrayed in the film, which 
shows the old lady watching K. as well as the more 
surreptitious watching of K.'s landlady and fellow employees 
during the arrest sequence. Of course, the film audience 
cannot help but be spectators, and Welles 
expressionistically reduces the distance between the 
audience and characters by his use of many close-up shots, 
reflecting the expressionistic concern with portraiture.
The final image of the watcher (the figure in the upper
254
story) is omitted because Welles has so overdetermined the 
strategy of the watcher in the film, that the final 
execution sequence is presented more or less directly to the 
audience (the knife is passed back and forth, but not the 
actual death, accomplished by dynamite in the film).
For The Trial. Welles brought out his own 
expressionistic trademark: the 18.5 mm "deep focus" lens 
that approximates, by both mimicking and distorting, the 
field of human vision and that had produced the memorable 
image of Kane's dying lips ("Rosebud"). This lens was also 
used in Touch of Evil. and although both Griffith and Renoir 
had explored its use, Jacobs remarks that Welles' use of it 
may have been the most spectacular (268). So the film 
audience would view The Trial in a way closely resembling 
the way they viewed the outside world. That this lens 
constitutes an expressionistic device becomes clear in the 
context that naturalistic convention had situated the image 
differently with other lenses, so the ultra-natural approach 
of deep focus here breaks with the cinematic convention of 
situating the image through other means, means that might be 
considered as ways of enhancing distance between the film 
and its audience, means of investing film with an "aura." 
Welles' use of deep focus destroys this aura and reduces the 
distance between audience and film, allowing the subjective 
connection of Kafka's prose to function within this visual 
context.
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Perhaps Welles' most telling discursive device to 
enhance the connection of the audience's subjectivity to 
that of K. may be derived from the short piece called "A 
Dream" which appears to be an excised segment of The Trial 
(discussed above). This involves the use of the dream, of 
an actually subjective, oneiric representation. Especially 
startling is Welles' textual innovation (there are several) 
in which K. shows himself to be particularly aware of a 
certain dream, one which frames Welles' film within a deja 
vu narrative structure. The nightmare of K.'s in which a 
painter inscribes a "J" upon a tombstone, implying that the 
grave is for "Joseph K.," is replaced by Welles with a dream 
sequence of "Before the Law." The initial sequence in the 
film uses a "pin screen" animation technique to illustrate 
Welles' abbreviated version of "Before the Law," the parable 
of The Trial that is related to K. by the priest shortly 
before K.'s execution. The visual difference of the "pin 
screen" sufficiently suggests a dream encounter, and Welles 
remarks in his voiceover narration that the logic of this 
story has been called "the logic of a dream —  a nightmare" 
(Brecht's remarks on Kafka, mentioned above, may also have 
contributed to this term). At this point in the film, 
Anthony Perkins, who plays K . , opens his eyes, presumably 
awakening from this dream, and the arrest sequence begins.
Welles invests the entire film with this oneiric 
quality through his deia vu narrative structure. The effect
256
of an absolutely oneiric presentation is usually credited to 
Bergman's Persona which appeared four years later (two years 
before The Trial. Resnais' Last Year at Marienbad presented 
fairly demarcated sequences of objective, though 
expressionistic, mimesis and subjective fantasy; some might 
consider this closer to Welles' approach). The narrative 
time of the novel is given explicitly; "am I to show now 
that not even a year's trial has taught me anything?" (226). 
However, Welles compresses both time and space so that day 
and night divisions and spatial relationships suggest an 
immediate unfolding —  perhaps two or three days or a single 
dream. Kafka's treatment of space emphasizes hallways, 
thresholds, and rooms both very small and very large; Welles 
closely follows this representation except that he minimizes 
spatial distances so that all places seem to be in nearly 
the same location, an effect varied in Kafka between 
distance and closeness.
There is some difference in emphasis between the 
approaches of the novel and of the film: Kafka allows 
objective effects more of a part in his basically subjective 
approach, as discussed above (and for this reason, Kafka's 
prose is often considered as realism), but Welles through 
the dream mode puts more emphasis on the totality of 
subjective presentation. One can hardly accuse Welles of 
being heavy-handed when so many have missed the thoroughly 
subjective context of Kafka's presentation. This dream
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device in Welles represents a strong reading of Kafka's
text, and it allows the audience a broader recognition of
this extremely subtle quality in Kafka.
When the story has progressed to the cathedral
sequence, antecedent to K.'s execution in the film, this
deia vu structure of Welles becomes revealed. In the novel,
the chaplain tells K. the parable:
you are deluding yourself about the Court . . .  in
the writings which preface the Law that particular 
delusion is described thus: before the Law stands 
a doorkeeper . . ." (213).
In the film, Welles, who plays Hassler the barrister, shows
up at the cathedral after K. arrives saying, "I have left my
sickbed," and he procedes to relate the parable to K.
During this relation, the "pin screen" animation of "Before
the Law" is projected upon both Perkins and Welles. When
Welles as Hassler asks K. if he knows the story, K. replies
with a contemptuous air that he does; the animation
projection continues anyway with Hassler laying particular
emphasis on the doorkeeper's final words, referring to the
door to the law: "and now I am going to shut it!" Hassler
identifies himself with the guard. Here K.'s knowledge of
the story indicates his remembrance of the dream in which
the parable was related to him. K. has remembered the
dream, which he seems to have found distasteful, and the
event of this remembrance is situated in the context of a
dream itself, of Welles' oneiric presentation. Welles
himself has remarked that his introduction of the story at
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the outset solved "the technical problem" of waiting too 
long before introducing this parable, but his expertise with 
the integration of this element develops a powerful 
structure discursively coherent with Kafka's own (Fry 10).
The film portrays the parable as a dream within a 
dream, and this parable represents a deia vu event. Freud 
in his The Interpretation of Dreams discusses the dream 
within a dream and concludes that the material of the dream 
within (the dream that the dreamer dreams he is dreaming) is 
a true representation, the affirmation of the reality of 
this event (374). There is an implicit assertion in Welles' 
film that deia vu should also be considered a form of lucid 
dreaming, particularly insofar as the deia vu dream is one 
capable of "coming true," of being manifested as fact. 
Welles' dream context as a cinematic device confirms both 
Kafka's overall subjective situation of his narrative and 
Welles' recognition of Kafka's narrative context. Moreover, 
Welles' situation of this parable at the very beginning of 
the film quickly brings his audience into contact with this 
significant element from the novel.
This is not the first time the dream-within-a-dream, 
deia vu device appears in film, for it figures importantly 
in Cavalcanti's Dead of Night (1945 —  Katz, 218).4 *10 This 
film is a ghost story anthology that is framed within a deia 
vu narrative context, and it seems to have been the source 
of numerous Twilight Zone tales and of feature films which
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have told the story of the murderous ventriloquist dummy
(Maaic), which Katz indicates was directed by Cavalcanti.
It is likely that Welles was familiar with this film, a
British production, since he worked there.
Altogether, Welles overdetermines the expressionist
discursive strategy of the subjective world view by the
careful adoption of Kafka's literal imagery into his film,
by the technical devices of the deep-focus lens and repeated
close-ups, and by a dreamlike presentation, a presentation
nonetheless firmly grounded in Kafka's writing. This
produces an effective discursive fitting of the novel to the
film. This subjective aspect of the adaptation also helps
to explain such inaccurate characterizations of Welles' The
Trial as this by Cook:
The Trial (1962) became the only one of his films since 
Kane over which Welles exercised total control. His 
customary visual complexity notwithstanding, the 
results are disappointing. Shot in black-and-white in 
the streets of Zagreb, Yugoslavia, and in the fantastic 
Gare d'Orsay in Paris, the film finally fails to evoke 
the antiseptic modern hell of Kafka's novel, perhaps 
because of some disparity between the world-views of 
the two artists (374).
If "antiseptic" cannot be applied to Welles' film, neither
can it be applied to Kafka's writings, for Kafka seldom
shrinks from the portrayal of dirt and general tawdriness
(compare with the final sequence of The Metamorphosis).
This word "antiseptic" which connotes hospital fright
functions as a mark of subjective contact operating in both
the film and the novel from the consideration of a
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"paranoid" character in the presentation, ultimately
incorrect. While it is true that Welles remarked on "his
own 'lack of profound sympathy for Kafka'" and that the
choice of this novel was more the producers' than his
preference, it seems that the aesthetic sympathies of Welles
and Kafka were more congruent (Learning 561).
In fact, in a Cahiers interview, Welles explains why he
considers K. to be "guilty":
He belongs to something which represents evil and 
which is a part of him at the same time. He is
not guilty of what he's accused of, but he's
guilty all the same: he belongs to a guilty 
society, he collaborates with it. But I'm not a 
Kafka analyst (Fry 9).
Although Welles is willing to concede some distance between
himself and Kafka, one should not take the impression that
he was unhappy with his subject: "say what you like, but The
Trial is the best film I have ever made . . .  I have never
been so happy as when I was making that film" (Fry 10).
Obviously, both Kafka and Welles possessed an understanding
of the expressionist mode. Whether by design, instinct, or
accident, Welles used appropriate discusive strategies to
adapt this novel into cinema. A second, and final,
discursive strategy in the adaptation will help to bear out
this expressionist accord.
Recall Benjamin's remarks concerning the withering of
aura and the expressionist equality of images; these are
echoed by Hillman in one of his essays in Facing the Gods:
"necessity has no image because it works in each and every
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image . . . the archetype is wholly immanent in the image 
itself" (10) . In Hillman's archetypal psychology, all 
psychic images are considered equal. Hillman's idealistic 
study approximates Benjamin's radical, materialistic 
formulation. As discussed above, Kafka's writings exhibit a 
form of mythical play that radically detaches the archetype 
from its traditional significance. In The Trial. this 
detachment functions through two particular devices: 1) the 
apparition of "Artemis" during the interview with Titorelli, 
the painter, and 2) the sexual encounters with the three 
women. Ultimately (2) is related to (1), but this relation 
is subtle and is representative of a radical revision of 
mythic sources.
When K. visits Titorelli, who is working with pastels 
on a portrait of a judge, K.'s attention is drawn to an 
emblematic figure that the painter develops before him: that 
brightness brought the figure sweeping right into the 
foreground and it no longer suggested the goddess of 
Justice, or even the goddess of Victory, but looked exactly 
like a goddess of the Hunt in full cry (147).
Here there is a double transformation and one suggestive of 
a cinematic movement. First, the figure of a presumably 
male judge becomes transformed into a feminine figure: this 
is suggested by the portrayal of the judges as male in the 
novel and satirically enhanced by the suggestion of 
Titorelli's homosexuality —  K. seems to be obtaining
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paintings in lieu of a seduction. Second, the background 
emblem of the figure of Justice or of Victory is transformed 
into the vision of the huntress, now occupying the forground 
and characterizing the judge.
These transformations are an indication of the 
appropriation of the feminine by the masculine judges and of 
the metamorphoses of already strong feminine archetypes into 
bloodthirsty ones (of course, justice and victory already 
mark some degree of male appropriation). For convenience, a 
reference to this huntress as "Artemis" accords with Kafka's 
repeated uses of Greek archetypes in his writings. Recall, 
again, Pallas from "A Fratricide" connected with another 
male figure and associated with Athena. Rose reports an 
obscure story in which Athena, in self defense, kills her 
playmate Pallas (a girl), but that the origins of the 
connection of the name Pallas to Athena are quite obscure 
(112). However, Hillman's essay explicity discusses Athena 
as representative of social norms and normality and as 
opposed to Dionysus (29-31). Both Artemis and Athena are 
associated with weapons and with virginity, or, in the 
specific terms of The Trial, with innocence. Unfortunately, 
it is a cruel innocence indeed with which K. is confronted, 
for in both the novel and in the film the recognition by K. 
of this image foreshadows his execution, not only to the 
audience but to K. himself, and after this interview K. 
appears grimly to expect his death.
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In the film, Welles has K. report the image 
transformation to the audience. After K.'s recognition, 
Welles somewhat alters Kafka's narrative sequence, making 
K's execution more imminent from this event, and we see K. 
leaving Titorelli's place through a slatted wooden tunnel, 
resembling a cattle run, and on through a stone tunnel, 
resembling catacombs, until he arrives in the street before 
the cathedral where the penultimate sequence to his death 
takes place, with the priest and Hassler presenting "Before 
the Law" (discussed above). Here Welles' adaptive technique 
can be described as the use of concision, dramatization, and 
expressionistic concentration of the novel, all leading to a 
heightened emphasis while preserving important elements of 
the literal text. Indeed, the only authority of the text's 
sequence is Max Brod's, so little more need be said on this 
matter. The whole significance of the image transformation 
devolves from the oppositional play of these images, of men 
portrayed as bloodthirsty virgins. Such transformations are 
radical, not progressive; the images are not altered, but, 
instead, are portrayed as their opposites, and this 
effectively detaches them from their traditional 
justifications. "Justice" becomes a cruel ruse, a joke, 
both literal and satirical.
The encounters with the three women relate to the above 
images in that these women are not virgins, but victims of 
male appropriation; in all three cases their functions are
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to service men, usually men connected with the law. Their 
lack of innocence promotes their apparent, sexually 
aggressive desire for K., who desires them, but something 
always seems to interfere with any consummation, usually 
related to their service functions: one is tired, another 
cannot free herself for more than a moment from the law 
student who supervises her, and Leni always has to run to 
fulfill the lawyer's whims. These women certainly function 
as emblems of a Freudian identification which Girard has 
shown functions as the source of rivalries (173). Like K.,
they are portrayed as victims of the law. If they are
considered in their emblematic function, they represent the 
rivalry that K. always loses, and, further, they serve to 
intensify K.'s personal agonizing over his own innocence or 
guilt by intensifying K.'s sexual desires.
It is important to remember that when K. becomes angry 
(and unconcerned with sex) the system seems to accommodate 
him in small ways: for example, K. complains that one of his 
arresting officers stole from him, and the officer is
whipped; in the film, K. fires his lawyer, and the lawyer
leaves his sickbed, apparently seeking a reconciliation 
until K.'s continued contempt drives the lawyer to dismiss 
him to his execution. Such angry intimidation of the forces 
of the "law" has an antecedent in Poe's tale "William 
Wilson."4,11 Within this context, the women may be seen as 
functioning to keep K. in a tranquil, but frustrated state,
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much like the women themselves who are calm, but always 
seeking something from K., and the women then seem to 
function as either unwitting, de facto agents of the court 
or as deceptive, malicious counterparts to K.'s male 
persecutors. In the sense that they can be viewed as 
contributing to K.'s ultimate destruction, they are like the 
women in The Bacchae. In this case, there is another 
oppositional transformation, for these women remain calm, 
but they figure in K.'s destruction. There is also a 
correlation to the image of Titorelli as Orpheus, surrounded 
by ravenous young girls (suggested above). K.'s visit to 
Titorelli foreshadows his execution, and this image of 
Titorelli likely concentrates, in a more literal crowd of 
women, K.'s own encounters with these women, which have been 
diffused throughout the novel.
K. is only executed after he has essentially lost his 
will to resist: he does not fight for his life, even if he 
will not take it himself, refusing the proffered knife of 
his executioners (this much resistance remains). If The 
Bacchae represents the unseen mythic image that drives The 
Trial. an image that is suggested through a linear and 
oppositional transformation of women who apparently would be 
kind to K., then this bloodthirsty image of the women of The 
Bacchae merges with that of the bloodthirsty "Artemis" in 
Titorelli's drawing. It follows that the significance of 
virginity which connects in an oppositional way the women
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with the drawing no longer possesses any force, and the
image of virginity is radically detached from its
traditional justification. It also follows that the
feminine images of violence are masks for a masculine
violence that has appropriated, perhaps indeed invented
them, another radical detachment of these images from their
traditional meanings.
When the Dionysiac images of The Bacchae become merged
with the Athenian theme of normality, when these ideas that
can only function as differentiated ideas are overlaid on
each other, the order or pantheon collapses into itself, and
all these are detached from their traditional meanings. The
image that results becomes some dark archetype of a
destroying mother ("meter" —  Hillman 27), a Kali, the image
of pure fright inhabiting the flesh.
What scared you all into time? Into body? Into shit? I 
will tell you: "the word." Alien Word "the.11 "The" word 
of Alien Enemy imprisons "thee" in Time. In Body. In 
Shit. Prisoner, come out. The great skies are open. 
(Nova Express 12)
This passage from the opening of William Burrough's novel
illustrates a version of this dark image, similar to the
image nexus of The Trial above. These writings represent a
kind of convergence of expressionist writing, a material
image underlying the systems of justification that becomes
visible when these systems are detached from their
traditional significations. Thesis IX in Benjamin's "Theses
on the Philosopy of History" on "Angelus Novus" strikes a
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similar chord (257-58). Diverse voices are warning of 
political and cultural disaster. Perhaps Kafka was the 
first to bring forth this image with its dark message, but 
he certainly is not alone.
How does Welles handle the transition of these images 
into his film? He accomplishes this largely through the 
discursive strategy of respecting Kafka's text, and although 
he does make a few changes, these are in no way dissonant 
with Kafka's images. Welles does change Kafka's plot 
sequence by having Leni give K. the name of Titorelli for a 
contact, instead of the Assistant Manager at the bank. This 
suggests that Welles is connecting the women more explicitly 
to K.'s destruction, since the visit to the painter provides 
the foreshadowing image of K.'s death. Leni's intention 
seems to be helpful, but it is a short trip in the film from 
Titorelli to K.'s death.
Welles also explicitly connects Freud to Kafka's story 
through the use of a Freudian slip during the arrest 
sequence. The police inquire of K. his connection with 
pornography since K. has brought it up by accident when they 
are looking through his drawers [pun]; then, they search his 
record player which K. hastily refers to as his 
"pornograph." Coming early in the film, this reference 
suggests the difficulties that will arise with respect to 
the issue of identification, which, as was shown above, is a 
legitimate Freudian concern in The Trial. Naturally, all of
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K.'s guilty vacillations which are beginning with this 
remark become associated with the guilt complex, and this 
association is somewhat controversial. Nabokov would have 
all interpretation of Kafka purged of Freudian connections 
(256). Ternes disagrees, and careful attention reveals, as 
discussed above, how some of these connections are valid.
The actual dialogue in the film does not seem to violate 
Kafka's discourse by directing the audience to Freud's 
writings as well as Kafka's (225-26).
Another innovation of Welles is the introduction of a 
computer sequence, the mechanical image of systematization, 
but this is equivalent to Kafka's machine of execution from 
"In the Penal Colony"; in fact, the "designer" part of this 
machine is a computer of sorts. At the time of the film's 
production, computer systems provide a useful material image 
analogue for the system of law with all its touted 
efficiency and with all its failures. Of course, the 
computer in this film can provide no answer. Evidently, 
Welles found in computers a fine image of systematization 
equivalent to the mechanicality of the system of the law 
with its associated gender and culture deceptions.
Welles' adaptation of Kafka's novel demonstrates how 
important discursive qualities are in the adaptation and 
production of expressionism. Although Welles probably did 
not read well the satirical elements in Kafka, it is likely 
that his own appreciation for satire helped him to recognize
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Kafka's writing as an appropriate place for satirical 
gesture.4-12 The hundreds of candles that Welles uses in 
his set for Hassler's apartment is one instance of satirical 
exaggeration which finds an echo in Bertolucci's film where 
an office is littered with hundreds of walnuts. There are 
enough "echos" in Bertolucci's film to suggest that he 
studied Welles' film with some care.4-13
The so-called decadence of subjectivist textuality is 
ameliorated by expressionistic concern with textual 
discourse, and it is through discourse that apparently 
isolated expressionistic works take on the connections of a 
broad cultural movement. Welles' film of Kafka's novel 
works well, but the "cinematic" motifs of Kafka also occur 
in Bertolucci's film and in Cocteau's as well. Cocteau's 
Orpheus (1950) may have provided an additional model for 
Welles and Bertolucci. In an earlier discussion elsewhere 
are detailed the discursive image correlates which connect 
Kafka's novel to Moravia's The Conformist; Burroughs' 
"cinematic" prose develops motifs from Kafka, and part of 
Nova Express excerpts a passage from The Trial. just as the 
passage quoted above seems appropriate to Kafka's novel; 
Bataille's novel Blue of Noon features an animated sculpture 
of Minerva which pursues the protagonist in a dream ("'The 
Drum': Postmodernity and Textuality'" 74-77). These images 
serve as discursive connections which array Kafka's The 
Trial with Moravia's novel The Conformist, with Burroughs'
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novel Nova Express, and with Bataille's novel Blue of Noon: 
to this array of novels are added the films by Welles, 
Bertolucci, and Cocteau. Kafka's novel is no longer 
isolated or unique, for a significant group of works are now 
connected to his novel, and this textual array is reflective 
of a social array which subjects the authoritative genre of 
the historical novel to satirical treatments which expose 
the faulty foundations of historical writing.
Some Conclusions on Kafka
First, the uses of the definite material image provide 
textual effects in Kafka that produce the apparent affects 
implied by misinterpretations. Kafka's writing is affective 
because of his contextualization within dream spatial- 
temporality, an oneiric representational field, and within 
this context effect tends to coincide with affect.
Second, the uses of the indefinite material image in 
Kafka tend to reinforce his definite effects/affects. This 
discourse of the indefinite image draws readers more deeply 
into the complexity of the psychic unconscious. Kafka's 
castle is equivalent to Poe's school in "William Wilson," 
and Poe's theme coincides with that of The Trial, in the 
sense of innocence and guilt, but Poe's school is 
significant as an image of the unconscious, the indefinite 
quality of the conscious sensorium.4 •14 This indefinite
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quality heralds the movement away from an imitative mimesis 
toward an oneiric representational field.
Too much emphasis on the interminability of the legal 
process and of the castle leads to an emphasis on infinite 
structures and into the trap of the critical sublime. Of 
what use is the infinite as opposed to "many," when Kafka 
simply refuses to say "how many"? This emphasis on infinite 
structures is a problem for Deleuze and Guattari's study of 
Kafka, and it is indicative of their attempt to portray 
Kafka as a naturalistic writer in order to justify Kafka's 
political discourse. This seems unnecessary in light of the 
current discussion. Kafka's texts provide political 
discourse in their subliminal presentations which require 
the recognition of dream structures.
Kafka's precise development of unconscious structures 
opposes the refuge of the sublime while carrying the reader 
into this unfamiliar psychic territory. The "womb" is 
filled with intruders and instructions; its terrain has 
become the body, but it looks like a city street. No wonder 
readers find this unsettling, but they cannot escape this 
vertigo by designating Kafka's prose as an "experiment," for 
these pieces are very carefully constructed and as 
"finished" as necessary. Few writers so well exemplify 
Wilde's dictum "when critics disagree the artist is in 
accord with himself" ("Preface" to The Picture of Dorian 
Gray 17).
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Third, Kafka's stylistic integrity invites a response 
appropriate to the vastness and complexity of his vision. 
When the reader has been reduced to helplessness by Kafka's 
levering of the world into one's head, forcing the 
recognition of a personal responsibilty for all that this 
world contains/ one is left without recourse but to play 
Kafka's game along with him. One learns to appreciate the 
paradoxical nuances of K's personalities/ indeed, to 
empathize with them. One learns to see the humor of it, to 
laugh along with Kafka; even if such laughter is uncertain, 
there is a healing quality in coming to self-knowledge. If 
discoveries are ugly, then all the more need to laugh in 
accepting them. If death is a teacher, Kafka invites the 
reader to a long lesson of history, and laughter allays the 
sense of futility, for Kafka transforms futility into a 
fertile field, full of insight, an imaginative crucible 
promising rareties. Kafka reveals the technology of writing 
as a paradoxical revelation and concealment, a game with 
uncertain but instructive goals.
Finally, the recognition of Kafka's comic gesture 
(perhaps tragicomic or seriocomic) has significant literary 
consequences. Kafka redefines social interdependence as a 
common participation in dreamplay. The reader either must 
renounce Kafka's diabolisms or learn to heal the traumas 
through laughter. Acceptance is not necessarily 
condemnation; like K in The Trial, one can die laughing, as
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Welles portrays in his film, but one can also try to go on 
(Beckett's famous saying from The Unnamable) to some other 
possibility. In fact, such potentials can only open up when 
one has shed one's delusions. Kafka records the grim duel 
between life and death to discover life in the penal colony 
and beauty in inharmonius music.
This gesture typifies the postmodern genres of 
satirical darkness, including surrealism, tragicomedy, black 
humor, and black fantasy. Black humor and black fantasy 
here refer to the expressionistic approach to a temporality 
of dreams with mundane images designating black humor and 
unreal images indicating black fantasy, as black is the 
common color of outer and inner space. Kafka's involvement 
with an unreal temporality sets his work somewhat apart from 
surrealism and tragicomedy which rely on real temporality 
for their effects, although it is easy to locate surreal and 
tragicomic effects in Kafka. One recent writer who also 
develops a dream temporality is Monique Wittig, and the 
oneiric utopia of Les Guerrilleres recalls Kafka's intensity 
of affect, although she develops a political alternative 
which Kafka withholds. It is the pervasiveness of dream 
time in Kafka which conveys the cinematic quality of his 
writing, for dreams, like film, are unrestricted in their 
manipulation of images. A final word, although Kafka's 
novels can be deeply instructive of Kafka's narrative 
strategies, Kafka's authorized works present a largely
sufficient oeuvre for readers to follow his methods. His 




Samuel Beckett remains one of the most consummate and 
complex stylists the literary world has yet witnessed. Like 
Borges, and like their common precursor Kafka, Beckett's 
writing reveals and problematizes the very structures by 
which meaning is created. As a producer of the text of 
images, he shows how images, like words, lack any inherent 
closure by insisting on the abyss between systems of 
signification and the world of reference. For Beckett, all 
perception devolves to representation without ultimate 
reference; nevertheless, his representational play is full 
of conceptual innovation, using language to create 
representational structures where none existed before. The 
most major obstacle to reading Beckett is the reader's own 
linear assumptions about language and reference. Beckett's 
writing deforms mimetic conventions, but at the same time it 
creates new conceptual representations. In this sense, 
Beckett's writing is theoretical, not like this study which 
seeks to name the complex movements of literary posturing, 
but in the sense of constant, metatextual comment.
Although one may find fictional structures in Beckett; 
ultimately, his writing is not fiction. Beckett's use of 
literal word and cinematic image exposes the distinction 
between truth and fiction as the thinnest of arbitrary
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ruses. Corngold's comments on the "negative and embattled
form" of Kafka's writing (see the previous chapter) apply
also to Beckett, but with an even more vengeful intensity.
Beckett's omnipresent negativity still promises conceptual
rewards for persistent readers, and a prominent example can
be found in the echoes of Beckettian discourse in Ursula Le
Guin's superlative story "The Ones Who Walk Away From
Ornelas" (1975). Beckett's negative style has its precursors
as well, but none have developed negativity to such powerful
conclusions as has Beckett.
H.P. Lovecraft wrote a horror story called "The
Unnamable," an expressionistic tale in which he discusses
his own "negative" style as a response to the monstrous
hypocrisies of Puritanism. Lovecraft's trademark
"negativity" appears to be developed from an aspect of Poe's
style in which vague words harness the reader's imagination
to a particular effect (for example, "thus" in Poe's
"William Wilson"), but Lovecraft's defense of his own use of
negative style in this story anticipates elements of Samuel
Beckett's novel of the same title.5 *1 For Lovecraft, "the
Puritan Age in Massachusetts" of which "so little is known"
is defined in negative terms:
there was no beauty: no freedom —  we can see that 
from the architectural and household remains, and 
the poisonous sermons of the cramped divines. And 
inside . . . lurked gibbering hideousness, 
perversion, and diabolism. Here, truly was the 
apotheosis of the unnamable (102).
Ill
Beckett's narrative "voice" may be better characterized as
an "attitude" than as a "character," an attitude which
disputes any version or foundation of truth, including its
own —  an attitude against representation itself.
Lovecraft's narrator questions:
what coherent representation could express or 
portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulosity as 
the specter of a malign, chaotic perversion, 
itself a morbid blasphemy against nature? Molded 
by the dead brain of a hybrid nightmare, would not 
such a vaporous terror constitute in all loathsome 
truth the exquisitely, the shriekingly unnamable?
(104) ;
but Lovecraft's consideration of the attempt to represent a
spirit projected from such emptiness, an attempt laced with
satiric innuendo, runs parallel to Beckett's satiric
debunking of Cartesian intellectualism. At least one critic
notes similar terms:
the Unnamable's "I, say I. Unbelieving" (3) 
signals a long futile search for the I. Outside 
of time, space and memory, are we not nothing? 
Descartes' final assurance comes through a God who 
is incapable of Deception . . . However, in the
case of the Beckettian "naked I" trying to grasp 
itself and feeling nothing but the time-space 
ghost, the ghost of beginning and end, in its role 
of memory and words, the distance toward either 
the deceitful or the undeceiving God is equally 
far (Schulz 36).
Lovecraft's blend of horror and satire in his exhibition of
the palpable "unnamable," this "spectre" of spiritual
emptiness (one of his more indeterminate monstrous
presences), anticipates Beckett's similar blend of styles in
his horrific realm of the unnamable, a spectral voice
stranded in an "afterlife" (Hutchings 100). Moreover, Frye
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attributes Coleridge's metaphor of "nightmare life in death"
to his overview of Beckett's work, indicating
in The Unnamable we come as near to the core of 
the onion as it is possible to come . . . [to 
find] the tired, tireless, hypnotic voice, 
muttering like a disembodied spirit at a seance, 
or like our own subconscious if we acquire the 
trick of listening to it (33).
Frye compares this voice to "the brothel scene of Ulysses"
("Circe") in its indeterminacy (32) . Like Lovecraft's
monster, this unnamable voice partakes of an essentially
indefinite quality, resisting attempts to concretize its
representation.
Viewing a popular writer like Lovecraft as parallel to
Beckett helps to ameliorate the experimental isolation often
attributed to Beckett, and it helps to show Beckett's
connection to "lower," popular styles often cited as
constituents in his writing ("burlesque" is one widely
employed term). Hutchings has explored this angle before
with respect to The Unnamable.5 •2 Some have recognized (as
does this study) common factors of widely divergent, though
accomplished, literary styles. Franco Fanizza cites
Boisdeffre on Beckett:
here many ages of accusation against the world 
reach an end: man's humiliation, which, from 
Rousseau to Kafka, paralyzes so many writers, 
culminates here in a world of abjection and 
ignominy (79).5,3
Fanizza himself sums up Beckett criticism:
all attempts to "find" a meaning in his work have 
failed, because his work is an accusation against 
culture rather than a cultural datum; rather than
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taking pleasure in expression, it puts the problem 
of expression at the crossroads of words and 
silence (72-73).
Deleuze and Guattari compare Kafka with Beckett and Joyce in
their habitation "within the genial conditions of a minor
literature," although they mark off Kafka's accomplishments
from Beckett's and Joyce's, which are also viewed as
markedly different (19). Schulz explains that although
critical accord finds in Beckett and Proust a common
"concern with memory," Beckett's attitude toward memory is
oppostional to Proust's, suggesting in Beckett "caricatures
. . . of 'involuntary memory'" (42, 34). Such comparisons
seek to specify the particular accomplishments of these
writers, but they also view these writers within a common
field, a field generally demarcated from traditional
naturalism. This important recognition balances views of
literary dialogue in which particular writers are examined
as isolated challengers to a hegemonic canonicity by finding
the aggregations of "experimental" writers to be indicative
of alternative movements within the literature and
culture.5 •4
Beckett's method in The Unnamable comes closest to 
Kafka's indeterminate temporality in perhaps the "blackest" 
fantasy of them all. If Beckett does eclipse Kafka's dream 
universe through his "voice's" most indefinite of 
discourses, Fanizza's recognition of the "crossroads of word 
and silence" in Beckett calls attention not only to words
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and the spaces between them (where something like reality 
lurks) but also to the framed images surrounded by blackness 
which are the film medium's equivalent to words and white 
space. The Unnamable provides a catalogue of images, many 
indefinite ones, images that surge out of the blackness of 
this "voice's” habitation, images which inhabit the verge of 
recognition before returning to this "astral" darkness.
These images nonetheless contain the essential elements of 
cinematic style, a style in which concrete images which 
belie their own indefinite qualities are brought together 
from isolation, stitched into an apparent whole by the 
regularities of a black emulsion, pulses of visual "silence" 
which frame snippets of a dream.
In The Unnamable the curtailment of freedom provides a
justification for unrelenting resistance and subsequent 
stalemate, a vocal stasis. Perhaps paradoxically, this 
attitude of resistance provides a subversive method against 
controlling discourses ("an accusation against culture"), 
but in the direct presentation of this attitude Beckett 
provides what was hard won in the study of Kafka. This 
resistance is also found in the Cocteau film where death's 
agents revolt against the "system" of death [Orpheus 1950],
and Grove's copyright of 1958 for The Unnamable suggests
Cocteau as another precursor to this stylistic strategy. As 
in Kafka, the "voice" considers all this indetermination as 
a possible dream, creating a dream text:
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perhaps it's a dream, all a dream, that would 
surprise me, I'll wake, in the silence, and never 
sleep again, it will be I, or dream, dream again, 
dream of a silence, a dream silence, full of 
murmurs, I don't know, that's all words, never 
wake, all words, there's nothing else (414).
Here Beckett clearly develops Kafka's "nightmare" from the
inference of dream in Kafka to an ultimate and explicit
conflation of dream and text with the satirical, reversed
rhetoric of "surprise," reminiscent of Kafka's "hope." As
Frye compared this piece to "Circe," it should also be
recognized how this passage, coming at the end of this text,
echoes Molly's independent attitude in "Penelope" with
"sleep" and "silence" reproducing the sibilant effect of
Joyce's "yes." Also, this concern with dream mimics
Propero's famous epilogue in Shakespeare's The Tempest.
This apparently simple, yet highly indeterminate prose
passage, nevertheless contains the determinate, allusive
images of texts from Shakepeare to Kafka to Joyce. Densely
allusive while maintaining an almost monosyllabic
simplicity, Beckett suggests how much significance rests
within the white space between words and within the black
space between images. Beckett makes equivalent the
signifying power of words and images with their limitations
marked off in white or black space. Through his use of
negativity, his language is full of indefinite
constructions; these incomplete images approximate blank
space in their resistance to interpretation, yet their very
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incompletion is formed from definite images, often allusive 
and highly suggestive.
Beckett and the Definite Material image
Beckett is intensely involved with "contact"; his work 
covers a wide range of genres and media: poetry, novels, 
stories, theatre, film, radio, and he adapts his images to 
these different forms. Beckett's writing is often allusive, 
although such allusions are more often picked out by 
scholars than are immediately apparent in his texts. This 
effect has been commented on (see below), and it likely 
derives from Beckett's emphatic prose and from his constant 
challenges to his reader, so there is a distraction away 
from allusion as a primary concern. Beckett does not use 
allusion as a device to enhance the authority of his style, 
as do Milton and Eliot, but neither does he write in a 
vacuum, and close attention reveals his relations to 
previous expressions. The gods are gone, yet their memory 
is fresh, and he creates archetypes out of minimal and 
indefinite psychic structures. Also, Beckett focuses on 
social relationships in an absurdist manner, often working 
in real-time genres, in terms of this study, as a black 
humorist.
Exploring Beckett's use of the definite material image 
exemplifies the paradoxical qualities of this concept, a
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concept helpful to appreciate his highly paradoxical 
writing. Certainly, this image functions in Film in which 
the formal qualities of this project demonstrate Beckett's 
understanding of fundamental issues in cinema, issues that 
also contribute to an understanding of Beckett's prose (see 
below). Other cases of specific, highly developed images 
turn out to be not what they seem, as in logical 
permutations in Watt and narrative unreliability in 
Murphy.5•5 There are also Beckett's allusions to the Bible, 
myths, philosophers, and other writers, particularly Joyce, 
Eliot and Proust, and the definite qualities of these 
allusions is somewhat undermined by the way in which they 
subtly inhabit the text, often beneath the surface. The 
informal monologue of the passage from The Unnamable (above) 
tends to mask its allusions through chat: the reader may get 
used to the flow of words without recognizing how they 
engage in intertextual comment.
Often, what is definite in Beckett's images is also 
minimal. Beckett's use of the minimal calls attention to 
his use of negative writing, for in the minimal not enough 
comes through to provide naturalistic fullness. The minimal 
is related to the negative through a kind of residue of 
description. In the minimal this residue is presented 
positively; paradoxically, a positive lack. In negative 
style, a residue remains after the "discount" of negation is 
taken into account. In Watt when one discounts the false or
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redundant "logical permutations," one is left with a 
situation characterizable by such permutations, just as 
narrative unreliability reduces to a skeletal credibility. 
The minimal and the negative are inversely related in that 
less writing is required to present the minimal, while more 
writing is required to present the negative, but this 
quantification of words, of fewer for minimal and more for 
negative, in each case reduces to a verbal residue, a 
definite but limited image, which invites imaginative 
participation and much interpretation.
Beckett's writing tells its audience about writing, 
particularly about the audience's desire to find meaning in 
writing, an audience historically steeped in naturalistic 
writing.5,6 Beckett's curtailed definite images confront 
the audience's desire for fullness and closure, and the 
audience attempts to provide such closure on its own by 
participating in the creation of meaning. Moreover, the 
audience recognizes this need to participate, hopefully, 
realizing how writing stimulates the desire for meaning by, 
paradoxically, not providing meaning itself. This problem 
is often glossed over by the film image, a form of definite 
image which replicates the real, overpowering its own lack 
of closure with a plentitude of natural detail, just as 
complex descriptive passages in naturalistic writing use 
detail to cover what is inevitably missed. Beckett's 
writing provides a plenitude of discourse, of dialogue with
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its audience, by showing the limitations of writing and by 
provoking the audience with both minimally definite and 
indefinite, indeterminate images.
Part of the definite quality of Beckett's prose 
involves its structure, and strong critical readings note 
the importance of structure to interpretation. Beckett's 
literal, expressionistic style often cannot be taken too 
literally, just as his "reliable" narrative style sometimes 
proves to be unreliable. The voice of The Unnamable has an 
"aim . . . to reach a final silence through its own excess 
of speaking" that is realized in this text by the final 
words "I'll go on" (Kennedy 139, Three Novels 414). There 
is a definite allusion to the final affirmation of Molly's 
"Yes," the last word in Joyce's Ulvsses (see the quoted 
passage above), but how much more paradoxically is this 
affirmation situated in Beckett's text than it is in 
Joyce's! Does this voice finally attain its "aim" at the 
moment of its final affirmation or should readers merely 
agree that this point, of beginning again, is appropriate 
for Beckett to end this novel? One may take the ending of 
Malone Dies as evidence to the "silence achieved" version: 
"never anything/ there/ any more" because this 
expressionistic ending is clearly forcing the end to the 
tale, implying the end of Malone (Three Novels 288). If the 
voice of The Unnamable were to mirror Joyce's Molly, who may 
be falling into sleep or unconsciousness through orgasm with
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her final, affirmative syllable, this voice would have 
achieved its own silence. In fact, this voice's quest for 
silence itself suggests how one may "read" Molly's ending as 
a falling into sleep or silence through orgasm, with Beckett 
echoing Joyce.
As for the other version, it is a manifest fact of all 
texts that they do come to an end, and if this end does not 
necessarily provide "closure" it certainly does mark the end 
of its writing. Because the voice of Beckett's novel 
continually says it will stop and continually goes on, one 
recognizes a structure of return and continuation, a 
structure which the text may not have the power to end, a 
structure persistent beyond its textual finish insofar as it 
suggests a quality of existence or "consciousness." This 
structure persists in the interpretation or commentary on 
Beckett's text; for example Schulz gives "an 'eternity of 
reflection'," noting that for this voice "true rest 
therefore remains unattainable" (106, 107). Schulz places 
"eternity" in quotes in his careful analysis to mark the 
finite nature of the text which opposes its seemingly 
infinite structure. This repetitive structure invokes a 
narrative "present tense," for Schulz an "'instant without 
bounds'," for Kawin: "it is always present —  the time of 
consciousness" (106, Kawin 141).5 *7 It is this "presence" 
which may persist beyond the text since it may be this 
text's referent or context, and, paradoxically, the final
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"I'll go on" remains a literal continuance even though this 
text has ended.
So this allusive, definite image of this final 
utterance "I'll go on" is also an indefinite image composed 
of ambivalent alternatives. Either this utterance is 
paradoxically stopped by this voice's realization of the 
achievement of silence at last, or this continuing structure 
paradoxically persists beyond its text since its continual 
repetition within this text suggests the context of a 
conscious continuance. The definite allusion to "Penelope" 
implies alternate versions either of an echo or an 
intensified self-referentiality or both as Beckett's 
possible attitudes towards Joyce's initial device of final 
affirmation in Ulvsses; it is fair to say that Beckett 
presents a progressed form of this affirmation.
The only resolution of the two "voices" comes through 
reference to context. The first version voice finally stops 
because it believes it can and because it believes that it 
could stop unexpectedly, in mid-affirmation as it were. Its 
self-referentiality becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy 
indicating a contextual existence of a true silence as this 
text's referent, and, indeed, this text comes to an end in 
silence (as all do). The second version voice persists only 
in its referentiality since this text comes to an end, and 
persistence beyond the text is possible only if its 
continuance is truly an existent context, that is, if
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consciousness always continues as "presence." At this point 
these two versions diverge with one claiming silence and the 
other claiming continuance. However, when the assertion of 
silence in the first version, which has a strong claim, is 
added to the assertion of continuance in the second version, 
the definite structure of this text, then the referential 
aggregate of continuance and silence, however paradoxical, 
constitutes the context of this novel. This is to say that 
this novel suggests that consciousness is continuance which 
may cease, but this cessation is specified as silence, a 
silence which may or may not be death. At this referential 
level, the divergence of these two versions can be 
reconciled, but only by a paradoxical formulation; its 
"truth" expresses the real as a paradox of continuing and of 
ending, where each term of this paradox denies the other. 
What astonishes here is that this paradox does not allow 
death its traditionally final end to consciousness, for the 
realm of silence may be outside of death altogether.
Readers who feel that Beckett portrays an "afterlife" 
implicitly assert Beckett's "voice" to be already dead, 
suggesting death itself does not necessarily end 
consciousness.
This definite material image, of textual structure as 
reflected in the final phrase, therefore, infers an 
ambivalent indefinite material image or the definite image 
of a paradoxical dialectic of consciousness between
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continuance and silence. In either case, an indefinite 
context is referenced by this image which contains a 
definite quality of indefinite reference. The Unnamable is 
crucial to an understanding of Beckett's writing. This 
novel problematizes writing since the definite dissolves 
into an indeterminate indefinite, and this is the definite 
character of writing which fears a discontinuity between 
language and life, and, so, produces an illusion, ultimately 
transparent, to deny such a discontinuity. This novel is a 
fecund source of indefinite images, but it is sustained by a 
definite though negative and minimal structure.
This interpretation of this novel whose subject is 
writing indicates how the definite is isolated by its 
identification of the indeterminate. Words and images can 
only refer to a context which is more indefinite than the 
words or images portray. The art of cinema creates 
statements by combining images into increasing, definite 
aggregates which can only suggest the complexity of their 
contexts, but which provide an illusive profusion of detail. 
The Unnamable expresses the problem of meaning in cinema as 
a problem already inherent in writing. Expressionistic 
writing may support a discourse, however speculative, if it 
does not pretend to didactic description. Schulz says that 
Beckett uses "a language that is ultrasensitive to its 
contradictions," and that his novels "answer Hegel's 
description of the metaphysical background of romantic (i.e.
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modern) art and of its plight," but although this may not 
achieve "Hegel's . . . final art of the mind, of speculative 
thinking" it certainly provokes speculation on the 
metaphysics of subjectivity, just as it provokes Schulz's 
conclusions (95, 96). For expressionistic writing, form is 
not derived from content so much as it is itself emphasized 
throughout content. Beckett's definite content references 
an indefinite context, producing a representation of the 
limits of language itself. This discussion of the definite 
image now considers Beckett's image assemblage in Film.
Film
Beckett's half-hour film illustrates the correlation of 
cinematic representation to his writing, for the entire 
venture is based on a paradoxical principle, one which 
challenges the acquisition of meaning through writing and 
through cinematic representation. Film is a particularly 
abstract, formal production concerned with the 
"inescapability of self-perception" (Film 11). In this 
sense it fulfills one of Benjamin's formal qualities of film 
in which "the audience takes the position of the camera; its 
approach is that of testing" ("Work of Art" 228-29).
Beckett uses the camera "as a relentless, omnipresent 
perceiver" (Gontarski 134). He tests the idealistic axiom 
"esse est percipi" (to be is to be perceived) to which "no
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truth value attaches" (Film 11). Nonetheless, the
literality of this axiom masks a problematic confusion of
perception and representation and invokes the Cartesian
problem of self-perception, a problem refuted by Beckett
throughout his novels.5 *8 Beckett uses film to explore
these problems, but in this exploration the literality of
the film image is a trap which uses the definite quality of
its representation more to undercut the definite quality of
perception than to assert self-perception, although
Gontarski reads this otherwise: "the lack of self-perception
is merely an illusion" (134).
Again, the definite image of cinematic representation
lacks closure but encloses illusion. Anne Friedberg in her
current exploration of "cinema and the postmodern condition"
considers Benjamin's "'unconscious optics'" which produce
"'entirely new formations of the subject'" as yielding a
"postmodern" condition where a "cinematic apparatus provides
a desired psychosis in its mechanically reproducible
construction of another place and time" (419, 427).5,9 Her
analysis follows from Jean-Louis Baudry's description of
film's illusory power based on
'this wish [for "the illusion of a present as well 
as of a different, absent time"] which prepares 
the long history of cinema: the wish to construct 
a simulation machine capable of offering the 
subject perceptions which are really 
representations mistaken for perceptions' (427).
This wish correlates to that of Beckett's subject in Film
who seeks to escape from self-perception, who can only avoid
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anxiety while the camera (the pursuing subject and audience) 
remains "within this 'angle of immunity,' "not exceeding 
forty-five degrees" (11). The culmination of Beckett's plot 
involves the ultimate violation of this angle, and subject E 
(eye and camera) faces subject O (the "escapee") in mutual 
recognition. E and O are identical.
This mutual recognition is reminiscent of the final 
recognition of identity in Poe's story "William Wilson," 
(although Beckett does not describe a murder); instead, E 
fixes O with a stare of "acute intentness" while 0 covers 
his eyes to deny this stare. O's gesture is a self- 
deceptive one, his last resort to illusion, but the audience 
which once shared the perspective of E is now confronted by 
E's stare, so the violation of the "angle of immunity" 
becomes twofold: both 0 and the audience are "violated." 
Thus, O's obvious self-deception reflects the audience's 
open-eyed self-deception, because of the long-standing 
identity of E's point of view with that of the audience's. 
Beckett uses this device to force the audience's recognition 
of its own escape into illusion.
The audience's illusion, however, remains paradoxical 
in that its own open-eyed viewing is both a recapitualation 
of O's desire to escape E's stare and a recognition of this 
representation of O's desire to escape into illusion. If 
"to be is to perceived," does the audience's recognition of 
this representation of retreat from self-recognition of the
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subject O imply the perception by the audience of its own 
retreat from self-recognition via the illusion of the film 
subject? The problem here is the insufficiency of this 
distinction between "perception" and "representation," less 
of a problem for Berkeley than for Beckett (Gontarski 130). 
This distinction is glossed over by Baudry for whom a filmic 
representation is obviously different from a sensual 
perception of reality. Beckett forces this issue. How 
different is a perception from a representation?
In the sense that E and O are one "split" subject, with 
one "perceiving" and the other "perceived" only so long as 
this subject continues to escape from the "perception" of 
his "perceiver," the intense "instant" of mutual recognition 
is framed in cinema as a representation, a representation 
into which the audience is implicated. The audience is 
pressed by Beckett into perceiving a representation of its 
own escape into illusion, but this perception is itself 
illusory, for "we and the camera perceive him [0] even when 
he is 'safely' within what Beckett calls the 'angle of 
immunity'" (Gontarski 134). Beckett uses film to transform 
"inescapable" self-perception into representation, and 
representation as such calls into question the validity of 
perception itself in that it problematizes the description 
of any perception that is not already mere representation.
Descartes' cocrito ergo sum also loses its cogent power 
in this context since "coqito" is reduced to mere words, not
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thought but representations of thought. Beckett's works, 
particularly The Unnamable. drive toward the realization 
that perception is only valid if nothing is perceived; the 
only valid thought is silence, all else is representation. 
The cost of maintaining a difference between perception and 
representation is that for perception both perceiver and 
perception only come into being as nothing and silence, as 
non-being. Otherwise only a representation is apprehended, 
and, further, only a representation apprehends a 
representation. For Beckett's idealism, if one can call 
this destruction of ideal principles idealism, perceiver and 
perception are indistinguishable within nothing and silence. 
Pragmatically, if such silence is not achieved, then all 
reception is representation, reception of consciousness as 
well as art, with the receiver remaining a representation. 
Metaphysics is undone insofar as each succeeding level 
represents the preceding level, a continuing recursiveness, 
and idealism is supported by nothing, validated only by 
silence, since non-existence only can provide the basis for 
a difference to justify the perceptual distinctions of 
idealism. The perception of the unrepresentable is no 
perception at all. Here not to be is to be perceived, and 
within such a context the concept of perception itself 
unravels into non-existence as do all representations.
The definite image in Beckett's film reveals the limits 
of this image as representation at the same time that it
295
implicates everyone within this constriction of 
representation. The complexities of this argument are 
formidable, but they were all worked out by Beckett through 
the course of his novels which preceded Film.
Beckett effectively reformulates Berkeley's principle 
into something like "to be is to be represented" with 
reception of representation focused into the mirror-image or 
"doppelganger"; as with Poe, the horror of the double 
derives from a lack of precedence since neither double, 
ultimately, can establish authority by being original.
"Self-perception" is self-representation with the subject 
fundamentally split, turning on this symmetry of self- 
representation/self-reception. For Beckett the subject 
lacks authority, and this lack extends Benjamin's axiom of 
the lack of aura in art to the lack of aura in the subject. 
This extension is rigorous, if unsettling, since art is 
considered a displaced subject as a reflection of subject or 
as subjectivity displaced into an object or product.
Gontarski finds some formidable problems with Film: 
"Beckett seems, at almost every stage of the creative 
process, to have been engaged in a battle with his medium" 
(135). Gontarski's essay details the history and outcome of 
Beckett's project very closely, but his criticisms appear to 
follow from taking Beckett too literally; for example, he 
sees the illusion of a lack of self-perception as 
problematic when it may be the virtue of this project that
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the recognition of continual self-perception leads to the 
comic, stylized games of escape and avoidance. Beckett's 
presentation of these rituals of self-representation are a 
dynamic both of his subjects and of his audience: O always 
"knows" E is pursuing, watching, just as the audience is 
implicated in these evasive games. The audience's 
recognition of this implication is crucial, and this is 
established through the use of the camera; if it does go 
"unrecognized" the audience is, paradoxically, even more 
implicated in its sharing of the illusory, self-evasive 
strategies of the subject O. It may very well be that film 
technology can improve in its presentation of Beckett's 
project, but this project works out aspects of cinematic 
spectation from a highly developed representation of writing 
itself.
In Understanding Media McLuhan explains the different 
impacts of film on illiterate cultures who "have to learn to 
'see' photographs or film just as much as we have to learn 
our letters" and literate cultures who are "accustomed to 
following printed imagery line by line without questioning 
the logic of lineality, [and who] will accept film sequence 
without protest" (250). Beckett continually challenges 
linear logic through his ongoing destructions of his own 
image constructions, thereby exposing fundamental limits of 
writing and language. McLuhan points out that Bergson 
"created a sensation by associating the thought process with
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the form of the movie [1911, Creative Evolution]" and 
remarks:
just at the extreme point of mechanization 
represented by the factory, the film, and the 
press, men seemed by the stream of consciousness, 
or interior film to obtain release into a world of 
spontaneity, of dreams, and of unique personal 
experience (258).
This comparison of film with stream of consciousness
writing, of montage with the flow of images, reaches a kind
of culmination in Beckett's expressionistic stream of
consciousness style. Unlike his predecessors Kafka and
Joyce, who construct consciousnesses out of writing, Beckett
constructs a consciousness of writing which both constructs
consciousness and critiques its constructions more or less
simultaneously. This progressed stylistic form reflects the
inherent chaos of language, exposing its orderly assumptions
as illusory, at the same time that it brings its audience
closer to a recognition of language's imaginative source, a
desire or dream of order.
The problem of writing naturalistically becomes exposed
as untenable by Kafka, Cocteau, and Beckett, but each offers
a progressed form of representation of the "unreal" which
more than compensates for this loss by freeing language from
its natural referentiality and placing it within a
representational context. Dream representation progresses
to astral representation. In Kafka, one glimpses this
astral world from within the dream; Cocteau structures a
universe where the natural and astral worlds meet in the
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mirror. Beckett in Film shows how this mirror is an image 
of representation; he uses language and writing to develop 
worlds within this mirror of representation. This process 
develops perspectives from which philosophical and religious 
ideas can be intently examined: this astral world is the 
habitat of the soul, and this soul is "perfectly" manifest 
in silence, but it also inhabits language and writes through 
paradoxes of representation. This progression of 
representation has a generic impact in that it shows how 
expressionistic forms build upon other expressionistic 
forms. The delineation in Kafka of black fantasy progresses 
to a more expressionistic black fantasy in Beckett's astral 
novels.
If there seems to be a severe nihilism implicit in 
Film, it is somewhat balanced by its own wealth of 
complexity of representation. Beckett extends the 
representational capacity of language even while he severely 
draws attention to its limits. Film is exemplary in its 
demonstrable connections between language and cinema, and if 
the audience is somehow convicted of self-delusion, it is 
also invited into new territories of representation. 
Cocteau's Orpheus provides an expressionistic image of such 
a territory when Orpheus and death's agents travel through 
mirrors into death's realm, a realm of ruins and of 
Kafkaesgue functionaries. These sinister functionaries 
derive from Kafka's The Trial as dream projections of the
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shadow archetype, reflections of the sense of shame which is 
the theme of this novel. K's resistance, maintained until 
his death, in this dreamworld is echoed by the resistance of 
the death of Orpheus and her assistant in Cocteau's film 
where the dreamworld of Kafka has been transformed into the 
astral world of death's realm, a progressed territorial 
representation where death itself is resisted and witnessed 
by Orpheus' return to life from death, a literal 
resurrection achieved by the murder of Orpheus within 
death's realm. This representational progression continues 
in Beckett who clearly situates at least two novels, The 
Unnamable and How It Is, completely within an astral realm, 
variously referred to as "hell" or "afterlife" in critics' 
attempts to describe these "unnatural" settings. Cocteau's 
representational movement between the realms of life and 
death are recapitulated variously in Beckett's novels Watt 
and Malone Dies.
Beckett's Film is not only a minimal nominative of "a 
film," but it is also a conceptual explication of cinematic 
form itself; in this sense it is all film. Beckett achieves 
this through his writing which broadly draws his lines of 
representation, but too much attention to the details of 
representation enmesh the audience within the very illusion 
that the film invites its audience to recognize. Poe's 
"William Wilson" uses the device of the double, the personal 
archetype of the shadow, as a vehicle for the reader's
ultimate recognition of the collective shadow, Jung's 
trickster archetype, focused in the image of the devil 
(Crumb 40). In The Trial, K. as an individual battles this 
collective shadow focused in the image of the law, and the 
reader may recognize how this spiritual problem cannot be 
explained away by figuration, how one's very thoughts are 
shadows. Cocteau's Orpheus portrays the doubled 
constituents of human personality as inhabiting primarily 
either the naturalistic world or the astral realm of death, 
but the poet, Orpheus, comes to live in both, and the 
audience may recognize the complexity of this 
representational universe, a descriptive space capable of 
rendering concepts beyond mundane naturalism. Beckett's 
Film is a conceptual door to this representational universe; 
like Cocteau's mirror it invites its audience to recognize 
their own limited illusions of linear representation and 
provokes the discovery of more constructive conceptual 
illusions through this paradoxical insight into the double 
essence of all representation. Cinematic expression(ism) is 
a progressed form of writing where the imagination inhabits 
a sea of images, images which provoke through their futility 
the desire for silence, for the realm of non-existence where 
the soul abides in self-sufficiency. Writing uses language 
to create representation, and Beckett recreates numerous 
paths to the paradoxical realization of expressionism. This 
realization is that writing ultimately represents nothing
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but itself and that language represents existence out of 
non-existence, from silence.
Literary Allusions
This paradoxical realization of expressionism, that 
writing only represents itself, may seem tautological, but 
just as this realization destabilizes the axioms of 
naturalistic representation, it also creates new questions 
which writing can explore. If the essence of soul is 
silence, does soul exist in an individual form or does it 
contain existence itself? Where is this astral world? In 
dreams? Is death a necessary quality of this astral life or 
a mere metaphor of soul? Is life possible beyond such a 
universal metaphor? Is this metaphor of death the fruit of 
the knowledge of that edenic tree? Beckett uses the 
definite image in his writing to provoke such questions, and 
his allusive richness reaches intertextually to other 
literary and philosophical formulations of these questions.
The use of the term "invitation" with respect to the 
audience of Film derives from Beckett's use of biblical 
allusion, such as the story of the two thieves in Waiting 
for Godot where one is saved and the other damned; this 
suggests the illusory quality of representation. The story 
of the thieves is part of the Crucifixion, and Kristin 
Morrison has worked out other references to the Crucifixion,
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one from That Time (the "phrase 'the passers pausing to 
gape'") and another from Endgame (noting that "'Mother Pegg' 
. . . and [its] subsequent connection with crucifixion is
faithfully repeated by most commentators"), but this widely 
recognized allusion in Endgame is not fully elaborated (91- 
94). Morrison works out the terms in this allusion to the 
parables in the New Testament "about the wise and foolish 
virgins" and "an allied parable, also about a marriage 
feast"; these terms include "oil, lamp, hell, darkness." 
Morrison explains how these parables "express in little the 
whole Christian message of salvation, here used for ironic 
contrast, to intensify the sense of hopelessness in Endgame" 
(94). An additional reference to the parable of the virgins 
is found in Waiting for Godot (95).
These allusions have an expressionistic value, 
particularly in Waiting for Godot and in Endgame. Both 
these plays contains allusions both to the Crucifixion and 
to the virgins. The parables of the virgins and the 
marriage feast are not prophetic, so these allusions 
themselves stand in ironic contrast to those allusions to 
the Crucifixion, which has come about from a lack of 
recognition of salvation (albeit one which was prophesied; 
Beckett here seems to echo Borges' discussion of Kafka in 
the previous chapter). This lack of recognition suggests an 
expressionistic indictment of representation itself, since 
salvation corresponds to meaning, and meaning represented by
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word is faulty. In fact, such representation is so faulty
that Beckett's use of these allusions tends to undermine the
very texts of "Word" from which they are taken. Within this
context, Beckett's allusions to the Crucifixion
expressionistically pun on "fiction." Beckett's irony with
respect to biblical allusion is thoroughgoing.
Schulz details a number of intensely ironic religious
images and allusions from the novels, for example, Molloy's
"'veritable calvary, with no limit to its stations and no
hope of cruxifiction' (105)" (101). For Schulz, Beckett's
narrators in the novels "have a double image of God, as they
have of themselves, as dead and as cruelly alive" (102).
One may take it that this "double" sense which inhabits
biblical prose and more ironically inhabits Beckett's prose
indicates how representation cannot generate meaning which
is also not empty. Beckett's biblical allusions themselves
have a transparent quality discussed by Morrison:
the same felicity that characterizes Beckett's 
prose style generally also governs his use of many 
biblical allusions. They merge perfectly and 
unobtrusively with his larger purpose, present 
often only as subtle verbal echoes, whispered 
reinforcements of moods, themes, ironies already 
established (96-7).
One may note the similarity of these remarks to the
discussion of literary allusions at the conclusion of The
Unnamable (above); this suggests how Beckett's allusive
method is generally quite subtle. Also, this study finds
Beckett's "larger purpose" includes a demystification of
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traditional sources, and his ironic use of expressionistic 
language indicates the problems of representation in the 
sources of his allusions at the same time that he uses 
allusions to emphasize these problems of representation.
Beckett's method of demystification differs somewhat 
from Kafka's method. Kafka displaces tradition through 
satirical emphasis: Poseidon is satirically juxtaposed to a 
typical bureaucracy; Titorelli's (Orpheus) homosexuality is 
emphasized, satirically suggesting the judge's appropriation 
of the feminine, and so on. Beckett's satire, on the other 
hand, attacks language and its representations themselves, 
so his method enforces the recognition of the limits of 
representation, and these limits are even more apparent in 
source texts for the allusions. Beckett's expressionistic 
satire is enormously funny not only because he satirizes his 
own language with all its failures but also because his 
language emphasizes the failures of tradition which has 
preceded him. Beckett's subtle incorporation of other texts 
makes those texts the butt of his jokes at the same time 
that his prose invites laughter at its own representational 
failure.
Mythic Allusions
Beckett's use of mythic allusions have become more 
extensively developed by scholars with conclusions that
recognize the demystification of his allusive method.5,10 
Burkman's introduction to her essay collection indicates 
that all "the authors share a sense of the complex ways in 
which myth and ritual operate in the plays as well as a 
sense of their interconnectedness" (14) . She concludes that 
these essays suggest "that Beckett's power as a playwright 
derives in large measure from a kind of mythic vision that 
informs his drama. Doll finds in Beckett a "mythopoetics, a 
poetics of myth" wherein "Beckett's work lends itself 
wonderfully to a mythopoetic method precisely because it 
breaks form . . . [allowing] us to see patterns . 
afresh" (5). She cites Rabinovitz, Gontarski, and Brienza 
who have characterized Beckett's style's "unstable 
structure" as a "repeating helix," a "musical structure," 
and a "mandala." Doll identifies several types of 
consciousness in Beckett focused through three myths: 
Narcissus and Echo, Cronus, and Demeter (6). Ultimately, 
for Doll Beckett's "great black pauses" mark a "radical 
proposal" and "mystery invades the moment" (7). Such a 
mystery functions as a demystification in that it reopens 
mythic space to reinvention by breaking down traditional 
mythic structures. This has generic consequences with 
respect to Beckett's extension of Kafka's strategy of 
oneiric representation wherein myths are deformed into 
demystif ication.
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Beckett's work sometimes develops an astral 
representation where his "archetypal return takes away 
labels," and reinvented myth constitutes a powerful, less 
definite, archetypal representation (Doll 7). Much of 
Beckett's work represents an unreal temporality of a black 
fantastic form, more than Kafka's, an extension of the genre 
of black fantasy into a relatively more expressionistic form 
than Kafka's more definite, oneiric (Jungian) form of black 
fantasy. Within the black fantasy genre, unreal spatial 
temporality develops through oneiric representation, which 
opens vision to astral space, and through astral 
representation, which produces vision from mythic 
reinvention. Paradoxically, astral representation is even 
more indefinite since its habitation is a minimally defined 
spatial temporality, more than the nightmare of history 
which provokes vision in many of Kafka's works.
The idea of writing as Heideggerian techne, one of the 
fundamental recognitions in this study, is specifically 
developed by Phyllis Carey with respect to Beckett's play 
Happy Days:
human techne stripped of centuries of distortion 
and exploitation finds its origins in the awe and 
terror expressed in ritual. To reawaken that awe 
and terror, Beckett's aesthetic ritual unmakes the 
metaphors that have become habitual or wishful 
ways of seeing (149).
Carey recognizes in several of Beckett's works the
exploration of "the complex relationship between human and
machine," finding that "Beckett suggests the potency of
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aesthetic ritual as an agent of revelation" (144). Of 
course, along with revelation there is a corresponding 
concealment within Heidegger's idea of techne. and this 
paradoxical combination spurs a participatory 
interpretation, a reinvention, since Beckett may provide 
clues, but he does not also provide confirmation, and this 
lack of didacticism provokes the speculative and indefinite 
form of interpretation with respect to his works.
The idea of the machine includes definite overtones. 
Claudia Clausius indicates that "the mechanical ritual of 
life is the prerequisite to awakening" from aesthetic 
illusionism in which "the sense of recognition we enjoy 
tempts us into a false belief in our real familiarity with 
the world (142). Thus, naturalism becomes exposed as a 
mechanical illusionism. Clausius' recognition that Waiting 
for Godot provokes "defamiliarization" and "demythification" 
with respect to the real suggests another generic direction 
taken by Beckett in his work.
Black humor and tragicomedy (Beckett's own 
characterization of this play) derive their power from a 
certain emphasis upon the natural, but this emphasis does 
not allow for didactic conclusion; thus, these genres are 
frequently considered "absurd" representations. Martin 
Esslin suggests Waiting for Godot represents a reaction in 
which Beckett presented "his rejection of what he has called 
'the grotesque fallacy of realistic art'" (29). Beckett
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uses naturalism to attack "realism" as "a great master of 
language as an artistic medium"; he "attacks the cheap and 
facile complacency of those who believe that to name a 
problem is to solve it, that the world can be mastered by 
neat classification and formulations" (88). Nothing can be 
determined with certainty from Beckett's "devalued language" 
except for the certainty of his devaluation, and this 
nothingness opposes mimetic didacticism. Nonetheless, forms 
of realistic representation enforce Beckett's paradoxical 
dialectic of representation.
The "tragicomic" quality of Waiting for Godot may be 
described as a realistic temporality in which nothing 
obtains as an object lesson; this impulse is oppositional to 
science fiction or utopian representation in which some 
aspect of reality is emphasized through a realistic future 
temporality, representing an object lesson. In this play 
realistic imagery serves to emphasize an equivalence between 
present and future time in which nothing obtains or will 
obtain except, for the audience, the recognition of 
illusion. The sense of "absurdity" derives a lack of 
"positivity," but there are different forms of absurdity.
The relatively simple naturalism of the imagery in 
Waiting for Godot stands in generic contrast to the black 
humor form exemplified by Beckett's Watt where the imagery 
remains naturalistic, but it is developed within an unreal 
temporal structure. Watt's arrival at Mr. Knott's house as
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a servant at the moment of the departure of a previous 
servant, anticipating the clockwork of Watt's own eventual 
departure, combines with the fantastic permutations of the 
furniture within Mr. Knott's room into the representation of 
an "impossible" sort of structure composed of natural 
events. Of course, there is no impossibility regarding 
representation; the impossibility emerges in the 
unlikelihood of this representation connecting to a real 
context, of representing natural events. The structure of 
Watt presents an unreal temporality which makes use of 
realistic images, but Waiting for Godot presents a real 
temporality with realistic images: these forms of the absurd 
are designated in the image-genre matrix as black humor and 
tragicomedy, respectively. These generic recognitions show 
how Beckett is able to develop his paradoxical program of 
representation into different representational permutations, 
different genres, with similar effects achieved in different 
forms of portrayal.
Philosophical Allusions
The definite forms of philosophical allusion in Beckett 
have received a good deal of study; Doll indicates that 
"Beckett's use of ideas such as rationalism, pessimism, or 
existentialism —  shaped according to their formalist, 
absurdist, or deconstructive molds —  has been well
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documented" (l).5 *11 A connection to Heidegger has been 
discussed above, and Schulz's discussion of Beckett's 
connection to Descartes and Hegel will receive more 
attention shortly.
One problem of philosophical allusion in Beckett 
derives generally from the difference between the definite 
appearance of philosophical propositions in Beckett (as in 
esse est percipi. above) and the interpretation of Beckett's 
language in terms of philosophical allusions. It is to 
Schulz's credit that he exercises great care with respect to 
the definition of philosophical ideas and their 
representation in Beckett's novels. For the purpose of 
discussing the definite image of philosophical allusion in 
Beckett, his poem "Whoroscope" will serve as an example of 
philosophical allusion to Descartes.
Beckett's prizewinning poem takes on the persona of 
Descartes himself and proceeds to satirize his 
philosophy.5 -12 Ellmann and 0'Clair note "its implied 
rejection of Descartes," resulting from its "criticism of 
Cartesian philosophy" and its "obscurity" which "outdoes The 
Waste Land" (710). Nonetheless, Beckett's obscure method 
allays elitism through his satirical tone which continously 
emphasizes Descartes' material concerns, and this stands in 
contrast to wide apprehension of Descartes being an idealist 
philosopher: "In the name of Bacon will you chicken me up 
that egg./ Shall I swallow cave-phantoms?" (713). Here the
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reference to Plato's shadows of the cave, an image of 
idealist perception, which bears a certain ancestry to 
Descarte's thought, is juxtaposed to images of food, 
including a double entendre on Bacon's name (bacon and eggs, 
a commonplace) and the use of the noun "chicken" as a verb 
"to stir" or "to prepare."5 *13 Zurbrugg recalls Beckett's 
warning that "'the danger is in the neatness of 
identifications'," and these expressionistic puns violate 
linguistic neatness as they prepare for the sixth line 
following this quote "Fallor, ergo sum," a pithy rejection 
of Descartes famous coqito with a derogatory emphasis on the 
preceeding "cave-shadows."5 •14 Beckett's repetitions 
concerning motion "That's not moving that's moving" and 
"Then I will rise and move moving" appear to refer to 
Descartes' physics where "the quantity that is conserved in 
his system is motion" (711, 714; Williams 352). Descartes' 
system yields erroneous results which Beckett appears to be 
emphasizing through this use of "motion doubletalk."
This dramatic monologue begins with Descartes 
inspecting eggs for his omelet, and his questions about the 
inside of each egg provide metaphorical instances for his 
universal inquiries; indeed, the egg itself has a history of 
symbolizing the universe. Beckett emphasizes this symbolism 
in his note: "'the shuttle of a ripening egg combs the warp 
of his days'" (711). The speculation "Two lashed ovaries 
with prostisciutto?" not only provides a double-language pun
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but also proffers a surreal image connecting human and 
animal flesh. As Descartes sought to radically distinguish 
human life and animal life, professing that animals did not 
possess consciousness, this surreal image emblematizes the 
persona's sense of disgust and of arrogance by connecting 
women with animals, just as this poem's title connects women 
with geometry, astronomy, and astrology (Williams 354).
This image also prepares the way for the images of material 
consumption discussed above. This surreal image itself 
provides a kind of microcosm of this poem in which the ideal 
and the material are blended into strange distortions, 
imaging the problem of epistemology itself wherein 
Descartes' development of certainty is certainly wrong by 
this poem's account.
Clearly, Beckett's definite allusion to Descartes' 
philosophy is hardly flattering, but it is probably 
undertaken to undermine the persistence of Cartesian notions 
in contemporary society. Beckett's poem moves in a parallel 
direction to Lovecraft's story (discussed earlier) in that 
Descartes' employment of the term "'natural light'" of 
reason is clearly connected to the light which informs 
puritanical interpretation (Williams 350). Thomas Reid 
noted that Berkeley (among others) remained within what "may 
still be called the Cartesian system" (rational and 
empirical orientations notwithstanding), and the discussion 
of the problems of representation (above) with respect to
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Berkeley in Beckett's Film probably derive ultimately from 
Descartes (Williams 354). Thus, the aesthetic form of 
"natural light," naturalistic representation, is 
problematized by Beckett from "Whoroscope" (193 0) to Film 
(1967) and beyond.
Those who characterize Beckett as a naturalist are 
missing a predominant thematic concern in his writing. A 
short poem of Beckett's reads: "what would I do without this 
world faceless incurious/ where to be lasts but an instant 
where every instant/ spills in the void the ignorance of 
having been" (715). This poetic question finds its answer 
in Beckett's novels where each one diminishes the world more 
than the previous one until in The Unnamable and in How It 
Is the natural world is virtually unrecognizable, largely 
yielding to an astral representation of soul.
The philosphical indirection of Beckett's definite and 
repeated attacks on Descartes still yields a positively 
definite quality in two ways. First, the attacks on 
Descartes call attention to his problematic metaphysics, and 
this in itself is a metaphysical objection insofar as it 
proposes to demonstrate the faults of such a metaphysics as 
Descartes' and insofar as it problematizes the very idea of 
metaphysics. For Schulz Beckett's "lamentations of a 
metaphysical hangover do not offer any tangible, positive 
suggestions" (95). This lack of metaphysical structure,
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however, still indicates certain philosophical directions
which ought to be recognized.
This second sense of philosophical definiteness
includes at least two other methods: those of Wittgenstein
and Hegel. There are likely others in that Marxist and
deconstructionist readings of Beckett obtain, but this study
will focus on these two philosphers. The appearance of
"Whoroscope" follows Wittgenstein's Tractatus. and there is
an implication that to deny Descartes may be to affirm
Wittgenstein and some of his contemporaries whose work was
"being aimed directly against what are still very powerful
Cartesian conceptions" (Williams 3 54). Esslin focuses on
Wittgenstein in his study:
the relativization, devaluation, and criticism of 
language are also the prevailing trends in 
contemporary philosophy, as exemplified by 
Wittgenstein's conviction, in the last phase of 
his thinking, that the philosopher must endeavor 
to disentangle thought from the conventions and 
rules of grammar, which have been mistaken for the 
rules of logic (408).
This statement is instructive in light of Beckett's
multitude of unreliable, logical permutations strewn
throughout the narrative in Watt. Often, semantic variation
poses as logical variation with the result that Watt's
permutations are incorrect, if not invalid, for they seldom
represent the appropriate number of permutations due to
forms of semantic repetition which confuse every issue.
Esslin goes on to cite Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations: "'a picture held us captive. And we could
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not get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably'" (408). Here is not 
only an analogue to Beckett's repeating narrative 
structures, but also an explanation for the need for 
indefinite image structures, structures pervasive in 
Beckett's writing. Beckett's mastery of language is most 
often exemplified in his ability to use language to withhold 
image while maintaining a complex discourse through 
language. This study identifies this as the indefinite 
image which is especially significant in its capability to 
diffuse all images, shattering the faith of the reader in 
mimetic imitation. The indefinite image will be discussed 
further shortly; here let it suffice that Beckett has 
developed written structures which answer Wittgenstein's 
objection.
The monograph by Schulz referred to several times 
above, entitled This Hell of Stories: A Hegelian Approach to 
the Novels of Samuel Beckett makes a strong case both for 
Beckett's rejection of Descartes and for a Hegelian reading 
of his novels. The author's belief in the corresponding 
dialectic quality of Hegel and Beckett is summed up in his 
preface:
this study of Beckett's novels does not attempt to 
"revolutionize" Beckett criticism but 
systematically to loosen up the prevailing rigid 
conception of Beckett as "absurdist." The 
"system" of the approach has been borrowed from 
Hegel whose own "rigidity" hides a dynamism that 
is as frequently overlooked as is Beckett's (7).
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In the discussion above, Beckett's participation in a number
of generic forms goes some distance in making more precise
the various expressionistic directions of Beckett's writing,
directions which would undoubtedly be lumped together under
the rubric of the absurd. Indeed, this generic matrix was
developed in order to allay parallel problems associated
with expressionism itself. Schulz's systematic matching of
Beckett's passages with Hegel's develops a strong case for
the consideration of Beckett as Hegelian dialectician,
albeit from a specially interpretative view of Hegel:
our rather radical reading of the Phenomenology in 
terms of the philosophical individual may disturb 
some of those whose understanding of the work is 
based entirely on an historical emphasis; its 
justification must come through our very approach 
to the Beckett heroes (61) .
Particularly throughout Beckett's novels, his protagonists
are nothing if not lonely or absolutely alone. Schulz
characterizes the dialectic quality of Beckett's prose
through the enumeration of fundamental paradoxes in
Beckett's writing, including "the paradox of language and
silence" and the "conscious paradox" (55, 40). Other
paradoxical formulations include "the illusion of death" and
"the grave of life" (64, 73). Regarding philosophical
aesthetics, Schulz concludes that "we find Beckett and Hegel
seemingly in agreement on the impossibility of a meaningful
art to exist in our time" (94). Schulz has produced a
strong case for the correlation of Beckett to his particular
understanding of Hegel, a case most valuable for its
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characterization of the dialectic quality in Beckett's 
novels.
In conclusion, as far as the definite quality of
philosophical allusion in Beckett is concerned, this quality
is most definite in its negative form. Beckett's rejection
of Cartesian formulations is most accessible in Beckett's
writing. Descartes' problematic equation of hearing and
believing in the consciousness, for example, is answered by
Beckett's protagonists' unshakable will to disbelieve, a
more emphatic form of skepticism.5,15 Descartes' idea of
the soul's perception through images focused in the pineal
gland ("a physical picture or representation was formed in
the brain, and it was this that the soul was conscious of"
[Williams 353]) seems particularly germane to questions of
literary analysis in that literature continues to develop
more intensive visual forms. Indeed, pineal perception
became another of Lovecraft's horrific visions in "From
Beyond" (1939):
you have heard of the pineal gland? . . . That 
gland is the great sense organ of organs —  X have 
found out. It is like sight in the end, and 
transmits visual pictures to the brain. If you 
are normal, that is the way you ought to get most 
of it ... I mean get most of the evidence from 
bevond (62).
For Lovecraft this beyond is a source of indeterminate 
monstrosities, but what for Lovecraft is horrific, Beckett 
makes humorous. Lovecraft's indefinite, horrific visions 
are paralleled by Beckett's thoroughgoing indefinite
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satires. Beckett's emphatic denial of visual closure, 
expressed through his artfully contrived non-visual 
representations is probably another way of discrediting 
Cartesian notions in which Wittgenstein may be a precursor. 
On the whole, the most definite philosophical allusion 
provided by Beckett is his negation of Cartesian thought. 
Again, Beckett's definite imagery is primarily negative.
Beckett's philosophical indirection leads to an 
interpretative emphasis by his readers on certain 
philosophers and their ideas. Strong cases can be made for 
Heidegger, Hegel, and Wittgenstein, as well as others 
including existentialists and deconstrutionists. Watt 
appears to provide an image of Wittgenstein's linguistic 
games (as noted above), but it is rare, such as in the cases 
of Descartes and of Berkeley, that Beckett definitely refers 
to particular philosophers, and that referral is negative. 
Nonetheless, the wealth of philosophical readings of Beckett 
attests to the definite philosophical quality in his 
writing. If Beckett is difficult to interpret, his 
interpreters often have recourse to philosophical methods, 
and this provides some evidence of the metatextual 
expressionism found in Beckett since interpretation of 
Beckett often leads to the examination of methods of 
interpretation itself.
In general, the definite image in Beckett's writing 
tends to delineate the limitations of definite signification
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itself. The examination of various forms of definite 
imagery continually lead to more indefinite forms. Finally, 
the value of the indefinite becomes more appreciable. If 
Beckett is at all didactic, it is in his promotion of 
distrust of formulistic, naturalistic forms that this 
didacticism may be found. His use of images leads this 
reader to the realization that if discourse precedes image, 
and, if discourse is contained in images as representations, 
then discourse itself is only representative of itself. 
Apparently for Beckett, true representation is not 
representation, only silence is true.
Beckett and the Indefinite Material Image
It should already be clear that the heuristic of 
definite and indefinite material images provides a useful 
base for comparison of discursive strategies. Since images 
convey discourses, definite images tend to convey more 
definite discourses, while indefinite images represent 
particularly complex images. Indefinite images proclaim 
their own lack of closure, and this proclamation also leads 
to the recognition of the opacity of more definite images. 
Particularly with regard to Beckett, both forms ultimately 
lead to a primacy of speculative or of participatory 
discourse. Beckett's use of the definite material image 
almost invariably leads to negation or to indeterminacy.
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Nevertheless, this indefinite quality in Beckett's writing 
yields an interpretive richness and provides the basis for 
insights into the problematic medium of writing as a 
technology for the presentation of meaning. Beckett 
expressionistically emphasizes this problematic through his 
widespread cultivation of indefinite image structures.
Beckett extends his expressionism into several generic 
directions, and this extension provides a basis for 
comparison of how discourse changes when spatial and 
temporal representation is varied in particular ways. 
Beckett's control of the writing medium through his 
indefinite strategies not only provides the basis for a 
variety of complex interpretations, but it also heightens 
appreciation of subtle differences in the process of 
representation. The value of expressionism is a heightened 
understanding of writing itself, an understanding which is 
not available when writers approach the problem of writing 
from the perspective that writing is largely a matter of 
conventions for naturalistic representation. The loss of 
conventional didacticism is more than compensated for by an 
illuminating originality which, as Zurbrugg indicates lies 
"in the differences between their pre-technological and 
part-technological verbalizations and dramatizations of 
complex "intersections" between different images of the 
self" (184). This formal originality retains an 
expressionistic focus on the Heideggerian techne of writing,
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that writing both reveals and conceals. Beckett's use of 
the indefinite image leads interpretation into new 
territories through minimalism, indefinite perspectives or 
points of view, the possibility of actual future tenses or 
genres, and the connections between astral and realistic 
representations.
Minimalism
There has already been some discussion of minimalism; 
in its broad outline minimalism is both a definite structure 
(insofar as it is a definite representation) and an 
indefinite one (since this definite presentation is 
characterized by a lack, hence, minimal). Minimalism has 
always been present in Beckett's works, and it deserves some 
emphasis since it has developed as a trend more in Beckett's 
more recent productions. Doll concludes: "that Beckett's 
recent minimalist pieces are fiction expresses an insistence 
that fiction and reality —  or myth and reality —  can no 
longer afford to be separate entities" (71). This study has 
worked toward demonstrating how expressionism erodes the 
boundaries between "nature" and "fiction," and this is the 
reason that the image-genre matrix takes little account of 
the truth claims of images as opposed to their discernible 
characteristics for the purpose of generic classification.
Beckett's versatility with respect to the 
representation of image has already been shown, but his 
frequent use of the indefinite image indicates a deep 
concern with more abstract discourse, a discourse not easily 
represented by conventional or even symbolic images, not 
that Beckett's images are particularly conventional. Doll 
also notes that "Hillman speaks the same language as Beckett 
. . . Both insist that the splitting-off of soul from an 
objective cosmos to a subjective 'I' is an egoistic error of 
dualistic thinking, embraced by Cartesianism, scientism, and 
positivism" (72). There is irony in this agreement, for it 
reverses the charges against expressionism as subjective 
decadence and discovers a subjectivist complicity in the 
organization of natural "objective" knowledge and its 
representations, of naturalism. Expressionism exposes this 
epistemological hypocrisy and, more honestly, takes a 
subjective orientation since, in fact, no other perspective 
exists apart from the perspective of the subject. Even 
Descartes' or Berkeley's methods of doubt ultimately devolve 
to a greater certainty in the subject, than to the world 
which is granted substance through this subject's self- 
belief, egoism, in short. The expressionistic writer 
explores the subjective perspective and accomplishes an 
understanding of this epistemological terrain. It has 
already been shown how Kafka represents deep structure in 
human existence, and Beckett, like Kafka, takes this
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direction and, perhaps, is committed to rendering even 
deeper structures.
The indefinite image, as minimal or as negative, is an 
appropriate strategy of representation of subjectivity as 
"soul." Hillman emphasizes the necessity of "soul" as "the 
primary metaphor of psychology" which "is a deliberately 
ambiguous concept resisting all definition" since "soul" is 
"a perspective rather than a substance, a viewpoint toward 
things rather than a thing itself" (16). Soul is a term of 
indefinite description analogous to the indefinite character 
of subjectivity itself of which soul is perspective. There 
is a strong structural coherence between an indefinite 
representational structure, the indefinite image, and the 
indefinite perspective of subjectivity within its 
epistemological limits which, nevertheless, also conscribe 
the "objective" world (for example, the necessary 
indeterminacy in quantum mechanics where knowledge is only 
possible relative to the position of the observer, or 
subject, and cannot be complete).
Beckett's Not I will provide some illustration of how 
minimal representation functions. Beckett exposes 
naturalism as a kind of Midas myth where all is solidly 
represented, but, ultimately, all this representation 
results in a sublime and intractable silence. According to 
Graves, Midas' wish that all he touched be turned into gold 
was granted by Dionysus who then took back this favor so
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that Midas would not starve (281-82). It is highly ironic 
that this wish for an ordering principle, transformation 
into gold, should be granted by the god most associated with 
disorder, and, moreover, that this wish should be renounced 
in favor of life, however disordered it may be. For Beckett 
the problem of representation always involves silence and, 
often, strives toward a representation of silence itself.
An emphasis falls on differing versions of representation 
punctuated by silence, as if representation were to be 
wrested from silence and not from other representations: 
this is an important dialectic in Beckett. The mouth as a 
minimal image juxtaposes speech and silence (its negative 
function as well as its potential), and this striking image 
involves the "mouth" and "auditor" figures in Not I. These 
minimal constructions yield an interpretive richness.
One of the problems in dealing with "Mouth" involves 
determining identity, usually described in naturalism, but 
"Mouth," nonetheless, provides a depth of personality. Mary 
Catanzaro finds in Not I "a kind of stunted violence of the 
soul" in which "the mouth is both a presence and an absence 
. . . Thus, it is the debris of life that we see" (47).
Catanzaro likens Beckett's play to a radical vision of 
theater as Artaud's, "a theatre without representation" in 
which "the female must identify herself with negativity"
(46, 41). Here, again, there is a coherence, though 
reversed, to the underlying structural continuities of
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Joyce's "Penelope" and Beckett's The Unnaxnable. For
Catanzano, Not I not only renders an aspect of personality,
but it provides an expressionistic representation of
abstract personality qualities that may only be inferred
from naturalistic drama. Her concern with gender, that is,
of "not I" as a representation of the feminine adds to Enoch
Brater's enumeration of "I's" in Not 1.
Brater notes Beckett's allusive parody of Eliot (done
earlier in "Whoroscope") as one expressionistic reading of
"Not I," one of distance between Beckett and Eliot (although
ironically in "Whoroscope" the effect is achieved through a
common "discontinuous form" and an "exuberant system of
footnotes" [191]). Another expressionistic reading involves
"Mouth's third-person protagonist . . . compulsive in its
stubborn refusal to abandon the security of the third-person
singular," which Brater traces back to Beckett's signature
to the "manifesto" "Poetry Is Vertical":
the final disintegration of the "I" in the 
creative act is made possible by the use of a 
language which is a mantic instrument, and which 
does not hesitate to adopt a revolutionary 
attitude toward word and syntax, going even so far 
as to invent a hermetic language, if necessary 
(191).
Brater also discusses the proliferation of "I's" throughout 
Beckett's trilogy where the "tension in [The Unnamablel is 
thus in the struggle for a new voice to be born," but where 
"this frustrating search for the elusive 'I' is rich in 
metaphysical implications" (192-93). Brater also develops a
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psychological perspective based on the conflict between 
Jung's "Persona" ("I") and "Shadow" ("not I") , recalling an 
image from Film in which Buster Keaton tears "up a series of 
old photographs of himself" (193, 194-97). In this there is 
more continuity between Beckett's method and a major 
representational concern in Kafka.
Brater also develops punning senses of "not I," and 
this is particularly significant with respect to oneiric 
representation, which Freud showed often relied on puns.
The first of these is "not aye" an example of a Beckett 
image of "'the screaming silence of no's knife in yes's 
wound'" where Brater contrasts Joyce's Molly Bloom to 
"Mouth's monologue [which] is a series of negations" (198). 
Beckett's complex sense of affirmation with respect to Molly 
Bloom in The Unnamable has been discussed above; here 
Beckett's allusion to Molly is more negative, but still 
sharing the monological form. The second punning sense 
involves "not eye" connecting by contrast to Beckett's Film, 
distinguished by its "eye," and Brater finds Not I "brings 
to the surface our own difficulty in seeing, in perceiving" 
(198, 199). This perceptual problem has been discussed at 
length above with respect to Film. Beckett's indefinite 
image of "not I," in the combined views of Catanzaro and 
Brater, develops a half-dozen powerful thematic renderings, 
including: representation of the feminine; linguistic and 
literary representation through pronouns; expressionistic,
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dialogic discourse through allusions; archetypal tensions 
involving the shadow; representations of the negative (a 
problem closely connected to the minimal); and 
representations of perception as a philosophical problem. 
Beckett connects all these thematic discourses through his 
minimal imagery in Not I, and this connection illuminates 
discursive intersections as well.
There is a suggestion that linguistic usage which 
distinguishes between ego ("I") and other ("not I") misleads 
through a positive privileging of personal vision (eye) 
against the negative (culturally feminine or yin) which is 
viewed as threatening (other, shadow) when, as Beckett 
appears to contend, all perception is representation, and 
this egalitarian imaging provides no basis for privilege. A 
linguistic function which distinguishes between "I" and 
"you," for example, appears to fill a function of clarity, 
but since language is a dialectic instrument, such 
"clarifications" connect to agonistic power, privileging 
particular parties as in a parent-child relationship. No 
doubt, many other "discursive intersections" could be 
derived from this indefinite collage, but in this case 
indefinite language attacks conventional usage and exposes 
faulty presuppositions which "unconsciously" inhabit 
language. These intersections of discourse prepare the way 
for an abstract recognition that is not rooted in common
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grammar; they answer Wittgenstein's formulation of the 
conflict between language and logic.
Again, Beckett's use of the linguistically simple and 
negative image phrase "not I" along with the minimal 
representations of "mouth" and "auditor" (ear) provide an 
indefinite aggregate of discourse that seems all out of 
proportion to its "positive" or "natural" qualities. The 
indefinite image provokes interpretation, with a vengeance, 
but it also withholds assent from facile interpretations, so 
interpretative, discursive aggregates result. These 
aggregates are thought-provoking, and they connect the 
subjectivities represented in the work with those of the 
audience. Brater concludes "the theatrical power in this 
intense monologue is hypnotic, the effect less Cartesian 
than visceral"; the indefinite image can create a living, 
not lifelike, art, connecting subjectivities of author and 
audience (200).
Indefinite Perspectives
Another indefinite image strategy that recurs in 
Beckett has to do with perspective or narrative point-of- 
view. This can occur in a variety of ways; some relate to 
the audience's inability to grasp an entire narrative 
context, and some relate to indefinite perspectives within 
the narrative regarding characters or their own
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perspectives. Some works that develop indefinite
perspective to an intense degree include The Unnamable. How
It Is, and The Lost Ones. Setting in The Unnamable is
intensely problematic; as indicated before, the voice of the
novel inhabits what is usually referred to as an
"afterlife," and this study uses the term "astral" to
distinguish this kind of representation. "Afterlife" is
somewhat misleading in that a definite indication of "death"
is absent. On the contrary, although this voice's abode is
highly indefinite, this voice indicates a possession of at
least some remnants of human form:
the penis, well now, that's a nice surprise, I'd 
forgotten I had one. What a pity I have no arms, 
there might still be something to be wrung from 
it" (332) .
The problem of material sustenance is also ambivalent: "did 
I say I catch flies? I snap them up, clack!" Moreover, 
this voice insists on clinging to life: "come come, a little 
cooperation please, finish dying, it's the least you might 
do, after all the trouble they've taken to bring you to 
life" (333). The term "astral" incorporates a possible 
living existence, including a dreamed existence, consistent 
with oneiric representation, but it may also include an 
existence on the "other side" of death, the territory 
typically considered the soul's abode.
A sense of precision is important with respect to 
Beckett's writing which rewards an intense concentration, 
and metaphors need to be chosen carefully when a writer is
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set on dismantling them, as is the apparent object of The
Unnamable. No names likely indicates no metaphors either.
There is no name to be given to the form of this voice's
astral existence. Similarly, the pronoun "they" quoted
above has no definite antecedent.
The problem of this indefinite antecedent is
considerable since the word "they" is repeated so often in
this novel. Further, as in the passage above "they" give
life to the Unnamable, so they are powerful. Schulz
explains that "the Unnamable's language is deeply
mythological, but there is no consistent and coherent myth,
healing the divisions of this world," but he sees this
pronominal problem in a completely expressionistic light:
it is particularly the Unnamable who fights a 
running battle against his memory, against the 
"inventions," against "them," the creatures he has 
been, because they are "of him," mutilating them, 
he hopes, beyond recognition. Because they are 
different from what he is now, the hopefully 
liberated, they are false (28, 42).
Schulz argues strongly for this expressionistic reading of
"they," that they are only the earlier and concomitant forms
of the taletellers of Beckett's trilogy. However, there is
also a sense of social dialectic, of this voice's battle
against agents of social institutions, and all of this
voice's predecessors are social outsiders, if not outcasts,
so it is unlikely that they represent the agents of
traditional institutions.
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There is also to be considered this voice's function in
its sustained attack against Cartesian thought (see above),
and it is very probable that "they" have some function as
representatives of Cartesian institutional thought. Kennedy
takes a wider view of "they," more indeterminate:
all the ideas he has received about the world of 
men had come from "delegates" (another name for 
the they voices who constantly appear to dictate 
to the Beckettian narrator, sometimes like 
messengers from an unwanted Almighty with residual 
powers, sometimes resembling characters, like 
Basil). It is "they" who have inculcated in this 
narrator the few general ideas he has —  of good 
and evil, of his mother, and "the low-down on God"
(p. 14) (143).
This Unnamable's "few general ideas" is part of an
expressionistic dialectic in that these appear to refer to
"irreducible" elements of social existence, and their
conveyance to the Unnamable from some social outside
testifies to a more or less indirect presence of some
"normal" source to that outside, either directly "delegated"
or "conveyed" through disaffected characters. Kennedy
discusses particular motifs in The Unnamable. and "they"
reappear under the heading "His master's relentless voice"
as "'a college of tyrants,' or 'deputies' (p. 29). They are
akin to characters who, like Basil/Mahood, also dictate to
the narrator" (145). There are strong arguments both for
"they" representing only the characters and for "they"
representing both characters and other entities
("delegates," "deputies"), but both versions resolve into
indeterminacy since even the argument for only the
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characters cannot decipher which characters, so "they"
remains in any utterance to some degree indeterminate.
The "they who have given life" quoted above comes from
the Mahood section of this novel (according to Kennedy) who
is "'stuck like a sheaf of flowers in a deep jar'" (147).
Just as "they" are indeterminate, so are these characters
within The Unnamable: "for the Unnamable and Mahood are
"talking" in tandem ('if we are twain, as I say we are,' p.
31) both in the first person, mostly in the present tense,"
and "the story-telling situation . . .  is deliberately
blurred in the telling" (145-46). If Mahood's denial of his
identity with the voice of the Unnamable marks off Mahood's
utterances as distinguishable, it is only in this regard,
that is, with this content, that these utterances can be
distinguished. This problem is further aggravated with
respect to Worm, which Kennedy designates as an
"insubstantial presence":
but it's time I gave this solitary a name, nothing 
doing without proper names. I therefore baptise 
him Worm. I don't like it, but I haven't much 
choice. It will be my name too, when the time 
comes, when I needn't be called Mahood any more 
(Kennedy adds this emphasis 147).
Here the recursive narrative game becomes a bit more
evident. Under the title, this "Unnamable" voice proceeds
by naming itself, from time to time, until it ultimately,
without a name, arrives at silence, or, at least, the text
stops, but the relationship of these characters, or names,
to the Unnamable voice remains indeterminate. Kennedy
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concludes there are "two voices —  self-reflection and 
endless meta-narrational reflections on the text-in-the- 
making," but these "are more seamlessly interwoven in The 
Unnamable than in the two previous novels of the trilogy" 
(144). In other words, structural trends emerge, but 
regarding particular utterances there emerges a high degree 
of ambivalence as to matching trends with these utterances.
This is always, to some extent, a narrational problem 
with most texts, and the usual resolution comes about 
through considering certain utterances ambivalently as 
direct character discourse and as indirect authorial 
discourse. Beckett has made this problem a structural focus 
of The Unnamable so that Beckett's "voice" and his 
"character's voices" are indistinguishable, except when 
specific utterances distinguish them, and all reduces to the 
Unnamables' voice as direct character discourse and as 
indirect authorial discourse. However, this reduction 
cannot easily respect important differences in this text, so 
the tension between the author's narrational voice and those 
of his characters is situated as the expressionistic subject 
of this novel's discourse, emphasizing the inextricable and 
indeterminate levels of subjectivity that create this text, 
a text distinguished by its indefinite perspective to the 
extent that designations concerning levels inside of this 
narrative can only be tentative.
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Much of Beckett's work demands highly structural 
analysis in order to determine the precise degree of 
indefinite involvement, but it is unlikely that such 
analysis would overturn these indefinite trends. Possibly, 
though, patterns might be discerned where they have not yet 
been described, since the voluminous comment required upon 
each of these texts to make such determinations has not been 
forthcoming. To the extent that Beckett criticism has been 
able to distinguish general trends in his works which 
suggest this need for intense commentary, it should be 
considered still to be in an early or developmental stage.
A somewhat simpler, since more limited, text applying 
to this problem of indefinite perspective is Beckett's 
"story" The Lost Ones. This astral representation of a 
"rubber room" is no longer than some of the celebrated 
"paragraphs" of The Unnamable, and it is reminiscent of Watt 
in its frequent invocation of logical description, although, 
as in Watt, there is every likelihood of some logical 
unreliability. Still, its more limited size hints at the 
possibility of an intensive analysis being rewarded. An 
intensive structural analysis would be required to determine 
the coherence of the narrative perspective, insofar as 
whether certain descriptive passages do not impossibly 
conflict with others, a possible outcome of logical or 
geometrical unreliability. The terms of description are 
largely geometrical, "inside a flattened cylinder fifty
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metres round and eighteen high for the sake of harmony" (7). 
Just what sort of harmony is invoked is difficult to 
perceive, and it has been shown before with respect to 
Murphy that when Beckett is most precise, he is often most 
insidious with his intrusion of unreliable elements. About 
two hundred bodies of all ages and both sexes inhabit this 
enclosed world of exceedingly dim light and relatively rapid 
and somewhat extreme temperature fluctuations: "the effect 
of this climate on the soul is not to be underestimated"
(52). However, aside from this sole remark, Beckett's 
description focuses on the effect on the bodies; for 
example,
it [the skin] continues none the less feebly to 
resist and indeed honourably compared to the eye 
which with the best will in the world it is 
difficult not to consign at the close of all its 
efforts to nothing short of blindness (52-3).
Beckett's serpentine and negative prose contributes to the
reader's difficulties in sorting out this description which
constitutes one level of indefinite perspective; another
level involves the subjects themselves, two hundred nearly
completely blind individuals searching. To some extent,
indefinite perspective is the subject of this story which
considers long-term effects of this environment, sometimes
in unexpected ways. Following Beckett's expressionistic
method as it has been developed throughout this essay, it is
unlikely that a problem like indefinite perspective in the
story's subject would not also carry through to an
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indefinite narrational perspective itself. Still, the
presentation is too formal to easily determine this without
a complete mapping of this story's narrational structures.
Part of the cinematic quality of Beckett's writing is
also developed in these indefinite texts, insofar as they
are also composed of definite elements (compare with Kafka,
above). An apparent precursor text to The Lost Ones is
•'Imagination Dead Imagine." Here a geometric description
comes early in the narration:
diameter three feet, three feet from ground to 
summit of the vault. Two diameters at right 
angles AB CD divide the white ground into two 
semicircles ACB BDA. Lying on the ground two 
white bodies, each in its semicircle (63).
Beckett's disconnection of this image from the natural world
allows for a terse but practical elaboration of this visual
image in a formal, imaginative space, like an image in a
film, an elaborated frame. Subsequent passages provide for
a dynamic or animation: "it is clear however, from a
thousand little signs too long to imagine, that they are not
sleeping" (66). As with the description of "blindness"
above, there is an asymptotic descriptive function; the eye
is not quite blind, the bodies not quite still, but the
description approaches without encountering this limit of
blindness or stillness. The definite quality of this
descriptive function coexists with an indefinite quality of
this description, and this tension approximates subtle
differences beyond the linguistic capacity to describe.
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This tension is also related to the theme of entropy, which, 
later, comes to be a major focus in the writing of Thomas 
Pynchon. This formal procedure provides an abstraction of 
fairly definite qualities which call attention to the 
shortfall between linguistic reference and the natural 
world. There is a highly ironic quality in "Imagination 
Dead Imagine" since the imagination is intensely focused 
into a vision of abstract animation which calls for a death 
or end to imagination itself, and the reader is conjoined to 
develop the indefinite qualities of this description through 
a participatory vision. This short text seeks a similar 
effect to an animated short film to be constructed in the 
reader's consciousness, imaginative or astral space.
This whole process is coherent with Jung's idea of 
creative visualization. Through the printed medium of a 
text, there is a definite organization of an abstract 
visualization, with highly indefinite variables. The total 
effect, or affect on the reader's consciousness, emphasizes 
the conflation of definite and indefinite qualities in 
imagination itself. A dialectic tension between "seeing" 
and "not seeing" shows how the imagination engages the 
natural world through language, a participatory vision which 
exposes the limits of language while it exhorts imaginative 
freeplay. Kennedy notes that Beckett's writing "has 
affinities with the fictional world of Kafka, though Beckett 
always disrupts any cluster of quasi-religious images before
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they can crystallise into allegory" (145). In many ways 
this is a relative difference, since it is not easy to draw 
an interpretive allegory out of Kafka, even though many have 
tried; Kafka promotes an indefinite kind of allegory, often 
composed of definite images, dream images. Still, Kafka's 
development of indefinite images is a precursor to Beckett 
who develops indefinite images to a far greater extent than 
Kafka. It is perhaps better to consider how Beckett extends 
the formal, abstract qualities of writing from a potential 
in Kafka.
Again, Kafka's dreamspace in its confusion with the 
natural world in Beckett becomes an imaginative, astral 
space only distantly connected to the natural world, and 
what connection there is comes through an expressionistic 
consideration of language's representational potential. 
Beckett's work provokes an imaginative montage, analogous to 
cinema, but the formal qualities of this montage illuminate 
the limits of language. Beckett likes to describe acute 
tensions in an asymptotic way, but such tensions structure 
his writing, as well as provide content for his indefinite 
descriptions.
The problem of indefinite perspective surpasses even 
the complexities of The Unnamable in Beckett's How It Is, 
although these works are closely related. In some ways How 
It Is resembles some of the logically and linguistically 
permutated passages in Watt. An early fragment of Comment
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c'est (the earlier French version) was published as
"L'Image" (1959), providing some indication Beckett's
concern with the complexities of image production (Smith
118). For Schulz "How It Is formally constitutes the most
elaborate example of the Beckettian 'anti-novel'," and
Kennedy notes its congruence to Joyce: "Beckett, like Joyce,
has always been haunted by words as 'fundamental sounds';
and in the late texts the aural patterning is intensified,
as earlier in The Unnamable. in How It Is and in Play" (29,
161). Such use of language as aural words or images of
words tends to bedevil perspective since the organizing
priority of the work does not focus on a coherent point-of-
view. Further, Sculz notes the unreal temporality with
which this novel is invested:
it is in How It Is that the immeasurability of an 
existence without time takes on the vast 
proportions of Hegel's "bad infinity" (schlechte 
Unendlichkeit) . . . the protagonist calculates
with vast numbers (142-53) and repeatedly gasps at 
the "vast tracts of time" into which his life has 
vanished (e.g. 20) (106-07).
This mythic temorality combines with mathematic abstraction
as well. Susan Brienza explains how
the narrator tries to place and thus to find 
himself among imagined millions in an infinite set 
of ordered pairs arranged along an infinite number 
line, which he keeps proclaiming is 'not circular' 
although the structure of the novel obviously is"
(31) .
The ordered pairs may refer to Cartesian geometry, and an 
infinite curve is an image of the asymptote. Vast images of 
both time and space suggest a history of language more than
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of personality (although one is represented in terms of the 
other), and the image of the asymptote suggests the abyss 
between language and reference, the concept of an infinite 
approach without closure. There is an intense irony 
involved with these abstractions since they derive from 
Descartes, and Beckett makes suspect Cartesian ideas. This 
irony is increased by his problematic texts in which if 
language actually achieved closure or direct reference it 
would be unrecognizable (this leads to the problem of 
"future" genres below). It should also be noted that terms 
like "narrator" and "protagonist" in Brienza and Schulz is 
somewhat reductive, a way of characterizing narrative voice 
which is deliberately overlooking the complexities of 
narrative perspective within this novel.
Several times before, it has been necessary to appeal 
to a metatextual level to make sense of Beckett's 
complexities, and Smith makes this leap in order to resolve 
indefinite perspectives in How It Is: "the subject of the 
book is the composing process itself" (107). Smith finds 
"the drama of this struggle between inspiration and revision 
is literally found on every page of How It Is" (113). This 
novel represents an authorial dialectic, a tension between 
authorial tendencies: "Beckett's novel is thus a brave 
attempt to bring onto the page the creative process, a 
process that remains most mysterious" (Smith 117). In a 
further irony, Beckett bucks the naturalistic trend toward
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the concealment of the author, of the writer masked by 
representation. If Beckett is representing his thoughts on 
a work-in-the-making, then distance from author to reader is 
reduced to a more intimate form, a distance associated with 
authorial aura.
On the other hand, the appeal to the general authorial 
level comes about because the reader is unable to validate 
particular passages in the text to definite narrative 
structures, such as character or point-of-view. The reader 
is closer to a participatory creation of the text's 
significance due to indefinite qualities in the text. Even 
at this authorial level, an inherent, dialectic tension 
evolves; there is both an increased sense of authorial 
intimacy and an undecidability about the author's specific 
meaning in particular instances. Smith summarizes this 
tension as a necessary reduction: "at the beginning of part 
three, Beckett mentions 'the humming-bird known as the 
passing moment' (p. 103). The moment. The voice. The 
text. That is all there is" (119).
The interpretation of Beckett's writing forces a 
theoretical perspective which splits the critical language 
into two forms or levels. "Voice" in Beckett's text 
designates the general authorial voice as implied author, 
but this voice is composed from several indefinite voices. 
This term, while theoretically reductive, should be 
recognized in all its dialectic tension as both a unitary
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designation and structurally pluralistic form. Indefinite 
perspective in Beckett brings the reader to the recognition 
of the inherent complexities of a theoretical language. 
Critical categories and structures have a limited use; these 
seem to work best when they reduce the complexities of the 
text itself. The expressionistic value of indefinite 
perspectives represented by Beckett is this recognition that 
a theoretical language is composed of dynamic terms in which 
dialectic and slippage between forms characterize literary 
representation.
At the close of this discussion on indefinite 
perspective in Beckett's writing, a consideration of social 
or political representation may help to distinguish further 
Beckett's distance from a didactic mode of writing. Like 
Kafka, Beckett's political writing is oblique. Stephen Watt 
notes how "Vivian Mercier regards allusions to natural 
beauty in Happy Days. How It Is, and Plav as evidence of a 
character's former status as 'upper middle class'" (107).
Of course, such images of "natural beauty" are closely 
connected to the class analysis of naturalistic or didactic 
writing where the author, a privileged position, instructs 
the audience, where intelligence is evidenced by "getting 
the message." The Lost Ones provides some commentary on the 
problems of didacticism and of political organization. 
Beckett discusses ideas about the cylinder held by its 
inhabitants as a kind of religious sorting:
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one school swears by a secret passage branching 
from one of the tunnels and leading in the words 
of the poet to nature's sanctuaries. The other 
dreams of a trapdoor hidden in the hub of the 
ceiling giving access to a flue at the end of 
which the sun and other stars would still be 
shining (18).
Religious terms like "sanctuaries" are further developed:
"the partisans of the trapdoor are spared this demon [being
"tempted" to "quest" for the tunnel] by the fact that the
hub of the ceiling is out of reach" (19). The linguistic
indication of religious beliefs is grounded by rapid
deployment of associations: "sanctuaries," "demon,"
"tempted," and "quest." The term "partisans" associates
politically, so there are definite indications of a
conflated religious and political discourse. The simple
demarcation of one school from the other in terms of
possibility or impossibility (the hub being out of reach) is
complicated by the environment of the cylinder in which all
the seekers are highly unlikely to discover anything for
which they are searching.
A more political section immediately follows:
all that is needed is a score of determined 
volunteers joining forces to keep it [a ladder 
arrangement] upright with the help if necessary of 
other ladders acting as stay or strut. An instant 
of fraternity. But outside their explosions of 
violence this sentiment is as foreign to them as 
to butterflies. And this owing not so much to 
want of heart or intelligence as to the ideal 
preying on one and all. So much for this 
inviolable zenith where for amateurs of myth lies 
hidden a way out to earth and sky (20-1).
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Here politically linguistic usage is emphasized, especially 
"fraternity" in the French tradition. There is also a 
balancing effect concerning the possible/impossible 
dialectic of the two schools, for through an organized 
effort the "hub" might be reached. Unfortunately, the only 
unified action comes through mob attacks on those who 
violate the protocol of the ladders. Thus, it is neither 
strictly impossible to reach the hub nor to organize 
politically, but neither is likely to occur within this 
environment. The naturalist term "butterflies," a symbol 
for the soul or psyche, both implies the effect of this 
environment on the soul (quoted above) and marks the imagery 
as associated with class individualism where individual 
concerns take precedence over social concerns, as with free 
capitalism.
These linguistic complexities support a satiric 
discourse which implicates religion and politics in a common 
institutional endeavor. This institutional force, justified 
by its "idea" —  another linguistic characterization, for an 
idea is "named" —  separates the searchers through their own 
interpretations which invariably conflict. Common action is 
thus prevented while the idea bears the name of a common 
cause, such as "fraternity," and the linguistic appearance 
of common action is upheld while linguistic interpretations 
maintain conflicts which inhibit the actualization of the 
idea's potential. In addition, biological images provide a
345
support for social structures since the shape and rubberlike 
material of the structure indicate phallic qualities and 
since the ladders themselves provide a structural metaphor 
for the DNA molecule. Clearly, Beckett develops an 
allegorical potential on several levels through this bio­
social context, but his allegory is intuitive and 
indefinite; it is achieved through the resonance of 
suggestive associations rather than through definite 
indications of direct correspondences or references.
The Lost Ones exhibits many common traits to Kafka's 
parable "Before the Law," even if a definite allusion is not 
pronounced, although an allusion is possible. This goes 
somewhat, but not far, beyond Beckett's acknowlegement of 
his serious reading of Kafka's The Castle (Sandbank 55).
The conflation of politics with religion, the subject as 
"soul," the development of the text into commentary on its 
basic situation or story, the immanence of violence, and the 
inability of the subject (multiplied by Beckett) to see the 
"reality" of its situation all strike common chords between 
these texts. Even Beckett's focus on linguistic problems 
with their concoramitant logic is not far from Kafka's 
careful commentaries within his parable; both suggest 
satire, and, ultimately, both provide an indefinite 
allegory. Although both suggest the possibility of a 
solution to their tangled webs, neither seems to imply that 
such a solution will clearly champion any institutional
346
perspective, and the invitation to interpret more deeply 
will take the reader into a realm of abstract paradox 
probably more valuable for the questions which will be 
raised than for a definite resolution, yet such questions 
are valued as the object of expressionistic writing.
Beckett's politics, as derived from his texts, remain 
rather indefinite, perhaps nihilistic, like Kafka. Beckett 
and Kafka clearly perceive a potential for improvement in 
the human community, but they mainly portray the betrayal of 
this potential. If this is merely indirection or the 
product of direct concentration is basically undecidable, 
since the obstacles to this potential are so formidably 
represented. Nevertheless, Beckett and Kafka present in 
these texts the suggestion of a line of discursive inquiry 
which ought not to be ignored by those who would analyze 
"the social mystery."
In a sense, the problem of indefinite perspective leads 
to the problem of indefinite genres, for if point-of-view is 
indeterminate, then perhaps the organization of the work 
itself may be indescribable. To a certain extent, the 
genres of black humor and black fantasy are indicated by 
certain forms of indeterminacy; that is, they can be 
distinguished from more directly positive oneiric 
representation, although this is a problem of relativity.
If a text is represented as a dream, isn't this different 
from a text in which dream elements inhabit the story? Do
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not certain texts, especially some of Beckett's, turn more 
or less completely away from mimetic representation? There 
is a suggestion in Beckett that if "true" mimetic 
representation were to occur it would be unrecognizable, for 
it would appear within an indefinite structure as just 
another indeterminate element. In at least one instance, 
Beckett leads us to the difficult problem of the existence 
of "future" genres.
Future Genres
Within the image-genre grid, those genres indicated 
within the "real time" segment that involve a future 
temporality do so in a rhetorical way. The "positive" 
genres of science fiction and science fantasy, the "SF" 
genres, designate the continuance of an aspect of the 
rhetorical present, or contemporaneity, into a future tense 
as a dialectic proposition. The simple notion of spaceships 
derives from vehicular conveyance, cars are literally 
spaceships in that they convey a subject through space, and 
outer space travel is a dialectic extension of this idea 
which presumes technology to be sufficiently powerful to 
overcome technical barriers to outer-space travel. These SF 
genres employ expressionism through this dialectic 
discourse, for the very selection of continuing aspects is a 
metatextual provocation more prominent than the selection of
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details in mimetic representation, and the rhetorical use of 
a future tense emphasizes this prominence.
The expressionistic complements to these genres, 
surrealism and tragicomedy, negate this definite aspect of 
the SF genres and assert the continuance of indeterminate or 
absurd structures into the rhetorical future. These 
expressionistic genres undermine rhetorical positivism, as 
in Beckett's Waiting for Godot. where the future is an 
extension of the indeterminacy of the present, tragicomedy. 
Surrealism juxtaposes real elements with unreal ones and 
provokes a discourse which extends into the rhetorical 
future this indeterminate mixture of the mundane with the 
mythic. The efforts of the surrealists are important 
especially insofar as they portray the dynamic of 
oppositional conceptions of reality of which culture is 
composed. The image-genre grid itself functions through the 
consideration of the relative weight given to these 
oppositional forces in image production. Another aspect of 
these expressionistic future genres is that they open out to 
those other genres based on unreal temporality. The 
rhetorical enunciation of a future tense as a dialectic 
device derives some of its power from the possibility that 
it may be predictive; for example, the novels of Jules Verne 
came to be predictive; one now can say, to some extent, that 
Verne predicted the future.
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From a realistic perspective, the only predictions of 
the future that occur have already been proved by the past, 
like Verne's submarine. However, this realistic constraint 
does not inhibit the production of texts explicitly about 
the future, prophetic texts. "Revelation” in the Bible and 
the "Centuries” of Nostradamus pose a particular problem to 
the realistic analysis of literature since they present 
themselves as prophecy and as literature. Further, they are 
distinguished by the use of a highly symbolic language which 
complicates interpretation, an unreal language of images. 
This unreal language proves a sufficient barrier to their 
predictions being proved by the past because only 
interpretations can be proved, and these may not be correct, 
but if they were correct they would go unrecognized due to 
the linguistic complexity of their presentations.
Regardless, the idea of coincidence seems a frail 
explanation in the face of Nostradamus' fairly prodigious 
poetical works. Nostradamus is a particular case in which 
the suggestion of an actually prophetic text is very strong, 
although in many respects, interpretation still bears a 
crucial role, not to mention the problem of indirection in 
political discourse (the prophet of doom whose dark message 
may inspire a progressive movement).
There are also image machines which purport to predict 
the future, to which a measure of literary value accrues; 
these include the Tarot and the I China. Again, for
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literary analysis the problem of prophecy is balanced by the 
complexity of the composition itself. These predictive 
machines apply highly complex models of the real in abstract 
forms meant to reference any particular moment with a 
predictive power for the future. Of course, a participatory 
interpretation is the key to their function, but, unlike the 
"prophetic" texts of Nostradamus or Revelations, Tarot and I 
China themselves insist upon interpretation. These 
predictive machines explicitly call for interpretation, for 
their significance is only fully demonstrable with respect 
to a temporal moment enunciated in the form of a question 
about a real situation. Without such an inquiry, these 
texts are impressive in their development of abstraction 
into a metaphysical model, yet without the function of a 
temporal application they remain indefinitely as model 
structures. A rather common, though superstitious, use of 
the Bible involves the reading of random passages and their 
application to a real situation; an even more mundane 
example involves the use of Chinese fortune cookies. 
Nevertheless, such methods derive from a perspective which 
views text as both a part of and an indication of the real, 
and this notion, although indefinite, remains provocative.
The question of the relation of text to the world is an 
essential matter regarding the nature of literature, and the 
typology of mimetic and expressionistic representations 
develops from this question. That art imitates life
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indicates how text interprets the phenomenal world, and such 
interpretation emphasizes particular phenomenal qualities 
through a choice of detail and through a hierarchical 
ordering of discourses attached to those selected details, 
mimetic representation. That life imitates art follows from 
this proposition of interpreted phenomena, insofar as this 
mimetic emphasis produces rhetorical power; the "truth" is 
the subject of mimetic emphasis, but it is projected as an 
objective correlate to enforce a sense of closure between 
language and the world.
The recognition of this relationship between literary 
text and the phenomenal world provokes the production of 
texts in which mimetic emphasis is the subject of inquiry, 
more than its object of production, and, consequently, 
mimetic emphasis is more distrubuted throughout text, just 
as emphasis is distributed throughout the phenomenal world. 
In other words, a particular emphasis does not attain 
hierarchical truth status, since it is constantly competing 
with other discourses, other versions of emphasis inhabiting 
the same text. Thus, the principle of life imitating art 
leads to the production of expressionistic texts 
characterized by oneiric representation. The mimetic 
imitation of an objective "life" is replaced in 
expressionism by an imitation of an objective and subjective 
field, with the understanding that the subjective field is 
closer to the source of production of expression. The
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common factor of these aesthetic slogans is reflection, and 
the form by which art and life enter into a reflective 
relationship in text is described by these differing modes 
of representation, of naturalism and of expressionism. The 
expressionistic text frustrates a reader who seeks answers 
because it presents questions, often progressively more 
complex questions, by, for example, insisting upon the real 
qualities of a subjective image, like Kafka's archetypal 
"scarab" or Beckett's "holes" (see below).
However, if these modes only describe particular 
degrees or types of reflection, then the question must be 
asked whether a non-reflective form of literary 
representation is possible at all. If all language devolves 
into representation, is it possible not to represent 
something through writing? Even writing which is undeniably 
incorrect, misrepresentation, remains connected to 
representation in some definite mode. All this may seem 
tautolgical, since language represents, but such a tautology 
becomes more interesting when writers apply ambitions to 
develop or enlarge the limits of representation itself.
This occurs with regard to oneiric or astral representation 
when the context of reference is enlarged to include a 
subjective universe or descriptions of consciousness in 
addition to the more objective or concrete world of natural 
events. Just as writers may blend representations of the 
objective world with representations of subjectivity,
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writers may also choose to radically revise commonplace 
notions of temporality by representing nonlinear, 
nonsequential time.
If it is not possible to escape some form of 
representation, then such a temporal representation as an 
actual futurity should be, at least partially, accurate. 
Otherwise, such temporality may represent the 
unrepresentable itself. The theoretical possibilities 
involving real future temporality include 
unrepresentability, which would indicate that language 
cannot always represent something, the basis for a literally 
nonmimetic writing; or, an actual representation of the 
future as either correct or incorrect. Incorrect future 
temporal representation still provokes an inquiry into what 
has actually been represented, since this is not a 
nonrepresentational form, and correct representation must 
await the future representation to elapse into a past 
representation in order for the common recognition to occur 
that the writing is predictive, so real future 
representation must be unrecognizable at the time it is 
composed. The future text must be indefinite, and only 
interpretation (the reader participating in the text) can be 
applied to its particular comtemporaneity, and this must be 
recognized as an inherent characteristic of language itself, 
since the whole question of future representation 
essentializes writing itself. Writing's claim to a truth
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must continue into the future, or else writing ceases.
Either nonrepresentational writing is possible or it is 
possible to represent the future, and this possible form of 
future representation is unrecognizable or indefinite.
There either must occur a complete break between writing and 
its context or else all writing is essentially indefinite, 
and this divergence characterizes the concept of "truth." 
With Beckett this discussion has shown that
nonrepresentation is only achieved by silence, which is not 
writing, so any writing is representative for Beckett, and 
much of his literary accomplishment derives from his 
development of various permutations of representation.
Again, text produces a paradoxical logic: for a text to 
be "true," it may only represent "truth" in an indefinite 
way, and recognition of this "truth" becomes strictly a 
matter of interpretation —  in this sense, true significance 
is almost out of the author's hands, for there is no logical 
test that assures a reader's interpretation coheres with 
that of the author. On the other hand, a "true" text may be 
nonrepresentational, but such a formulation defies the 
characterization of language as a representational device, 
both in theory and in practice, and this is logically 
unlikely, if not completely invalid.
The Bible has long been considered the sacred text of 
western civilization, and the interpretation of "Revelation" 
grows more widespread both by religious practioners and by
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artists. The John Carpenter film Prince of Darkness is one 
of the more interesting of many films devoted to this 
subject. It has already been shown how Beckett interweaves 
New Testament parables into absurdist presentations, and 
Beckett may also be concerned with the interpretation of 
"Revelation" (see below). That a sacred text should contain 
prophetic writing indicates the inclusive reference of 
religious writing; clearly the context of such writing 
includes the future as well as the past. In other words, 
the sacred word should have no limits set upon its 
reference, and, in this sense, text approaches a wider 
purview than the phenomenal world itself which precedes 
through temporal increments. The writings of Nostradamus 
also develop a deep sentiment of religious devotion; it may 
fairly be said that this work aspires to sacral writing.
The problem of prophetic writing is intimately connected 
with the production of the sacred text, but prophecy is 
rarely used as a justification for sacral writing, and this 
is probably the reason for Nostradamus' relative obscurity. 
The idea that text is capable of unlimited reference is a 
likely assumption with regard to the sacred text, and this 
idea is being proposed subtly, but with increasing 
frequency, by several writers.
Neil Schmitz describes Ishmael Reed's Mumbo Jumbo as "a 
more sophisticated and complex mode [than Reed's other 
works], a composite narrative containing a variety of texts,
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the most important of which (the sacred text —  the Book of
Thoth) is never revealed.” Scmitz goes on to explain that
Reed's thesis involves a liturgy seeking its text (135).
The prophetic quality of Reed's sacred text is contained in
its title, for The Book Of Thoth is the title under which
Aleister Crowley wrote his essay of commentary on the Tarot
and its divinatory methods. Reed's character Buddy Jackson
emphasizes this connection:
we learned what we had always suspected, that the 
Masonic mysteries were of a Blacker origin than we 
thought and that this man had in his possession a 
Black sacred Book and how they were worried that
we would find out and wouldn't learn that the
reason they wanted us out of the mysteries was 
because they were our mysteries! (222) .
A probable source for Reed can be found in Crowley's essay
on "Atu XXI. The Universe” :
it becomes reasonable to argue from analogy that 
since the end must beget the beginning, the 
symbolism will follow; hence blackness is also 
attributed to the sun, according to a certain 
long-hidden tradition. One of the shocks for 
candidates in the "Mysteries” was the revelation 
"Osiris is a black god” (118).
The complex and longstanding history of bickering among
occult societies need not be developed further here, except
to note that Crowley was probably censored for the amount of
secret doctrine that he published in his fairly extensive
writings. With respect to Beckett, it is worth noting that
Yeats was a member of the "Mysteries," and considering the
concern for a racial metaphysics connected with the Tarot,
there is probably also some connection with the Irish
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tradition. The indefinite status of Tarot (as "Book of 
Thoth") in Reed's Mumbo Jumbo provides an example of the 
occultation of the sacred text; its indefinite presence 
signals the problems of recognition. Reed's presentation of 
his text with its facsinating collection of photographs 
recalls Breton's novels and the methods of surrealism. The 
discussion of Beckett's How It Is (above) suggests the 
possibility of an intuitive component in Beckett's 
composition, for if this novel is indeed a portrayal of the 
struggle between authorial voices in the process of 
composition, then the subjection of such a text to any 
extensive revision would cramp its presentation, gilding the 
proverbial lily.
All this provides a preface to a curious development in 
Beckett's novel Watt concerning the introduction of 
characters. Very early on, Beckett introduces a character 
named Mr. Nixon who engages in a dialogue for several pages. 
Nixon seems not a particularly strange name for a character; 
indeed there is a certain hipness to it since "nix" is slang 
for "no" and "on" suggests a mode, a negative character by 
such a name, since "no on" suggests a negative mien. Also, 
"no" and "on" are linguistic reversals of each other, and 
each word has great significance with respect to the theme 
and tone of all Beckett's oeuvre. Moreover "no on" is short 
of the letter "e" to produce "no one," a name resonant of
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Ulysses' adventures, but also a name which suggests that it 
has been made up, a fake name or a name for a fake.
There is significant linguistic complexity here, but 
the appearance of this name in the text takes on a greater 
significance when, later, another character introduces 
himself to Watt: "My name is Spiro, said the gentleman./
Here then was a sensible man at last" (27). The 1953 
copyright for Watt stands almost twenty years ahead of the 
political scenario in which the names of "Nixon" and "Spiro" 
would figure prominently, a scenario Beckett himself would 
witness. The sense of a deia vu projection into the future 
of these passages is in no way mitigated by the fact that 
Watt is concerned with issues of the sacred text, and that 
its character "Mr. Knott" is the closest to a godlike figure 
in all Beckett's writing and is the precursor to Beckett's 
indefinite character "Godot." There are of course 
"sensible" congruences between the linguistic structures of 
"Nixon?1 and "Knott," and Beckett's utterance concerning 
Spiro —  "a sensible man at last" — is rendered extremely 
ambivalent both with regard to the characters of this novel 
and to the later political situation marked by the name 
"Spiro." Nonetheless, Beckett has provided an image of 
futurity, of unreal futurity by the image-genre grid, 
presented in a natural, indeed, mundane language, full of 
muted linguistic complexities. Such a passage provides an 
example of prophetic writing through its indefinite quality
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and through the unrecognizability of its prophetic force 
until events make it unmistakable.
This intuitive leap really cannot be dismissed as mere 
coincidence, since the text is already loaded with the 
character of sacred writing and since coincidence itself is 
a concept which masks a nonrepresentational character of 
writing, itself likely an invalid concept. Williams refers 
to such propositions as "necessarily paradoxical assertions 
that, while not formal contradictions . . . , could not 
possibly be true because their truth would defeat the 
conditions of their own assertability" (347) . After all, 
for Beckett language is representational, but such a use of 
"coincidence" seeks to deny what has ultimately come to be 
seen as a representation, albeit before the fact, of a close 
association of two names which, in fact, have come to be 
closely associated. If prophecy occurs in writing, which 
seems to some degree likely, then this passage by Beckett 
shows its occurence in an ironic, sacred text, of an 
indefinite and unrecognizable future temporality.
An Astral Image
This consideration of Beckett's indefinite image will 
conclude with an example of spatial indefinition, in that 
indefinite forms of astral space are presented with the 
definite character of their not being representations of
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mimetic space and that these forms portray a totality of
oneiric representation indicating an astral space. In The
Unnamable. during the "Worm" section Beckett presents a
spatial environment for Worm:
. . . but here it's never dark either, yes, here 
it's dark, it's they who make this grey, with 
their lamps. When they go, when they go silent, 
it will be dark, not a sound, not a glimmer, but 
they'll never go, yes, they'll go, they'll go 
silent perhaps and go, one day, one evening, 
slowly, sadly, in Indian file, casting long 
shadows, toward their master, who will punish 
them, or who will spare them, what else is there, 
up above, for those who lose, punishment, pardon, 
so they say (364-65).
Beckett opposes one form of dark with another, the "grev";
presumably the other is black, that it is not dark and dark
probably indicates not contradiction as much as a small
difference in an asymptotic description of more and of less
complete darkness. This indefinite strategy is likely a
precursor to the indefinite stages of darkness and blindess
in The Lost Ones; indeed, this passage indicates "them" as
"losers" equivalent to "lost ones." Some of the previous
analysis can be brought to bear on a possible exegesis of
this problematic passage. Again, the indefinite pronoun
"they" recurs in a sense somewhat removed from that of
"they" as precursor characters to the "voice" and "Worm,"
for it is hard to imagine Beckett's alienated characters
reporting to "their master." Subsequently, their master
interrogates them:
What have you done with your material? We have 
left it behind. But commanded to say whether yes
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or no they filled up the holes, have you filled up 
the holes yes or no, they will say yes and no, or 
some yes, others no, at the same time, not knowing 
what the master wants, to his question.
The indefinite logical structure of the forms of darkness is
paralleled by the "yes” and "no” answers with respect to the
"holes." This logical parallel suggests that the filling of
the holes connects to the formation of one form of darkness
or the other, and the passage continues to confirm this
reading:
But both are defendable, both yes and no, for they
filled up the holes, if you like, and if you don't
like they didn't, for they don't know what to do, 
on departing, whether to fill up the holes or, on 
the contrary, leave them gaping wide. So they 
fixed their lamps in the holes, their long lamps, 
to prevent them from closing of themselves, it's 
like potter's clay, their powerful lamps, lit and 
trained on the within, to make him think they are 
still there, notwithstanding the silence, or to 
make him think the grey is natural . . .
Here "natural" is a term used to distinguish the "grey" from
the other form of darkness, but this distinction from the
"natural" also calls up the context of natural space, from
which this space "within" is distinguished. The other form
of darkness, a more extreme form, unlit, also is opposed to
this "natural," but it is also "natural," or complete,
darkness, an asymptotic darkness within, apart from the
"natural" world, naturally a complete darkness. Beckett has
defined two forms of unnatural space, the dark and the grey,
by distinguishing through the presence of the lamps in the
holes two asymptotic forms of darkness, apart from the
natural world where, perhaps, the master is. Worm occupies
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an astral space, an environment determined by "holes" and
"lamps." Later in the narrative, the "voice" will explain,
beyond his "Worm" phase:
. . . what is it, a little hole, you go down into 
it, into the silence, it's worse than the noise .
. . what is it, a little hole, in the wilderness
(395) .
However this "present" quickly becomes the "past":
I've been away, done something, been in a hole,
I've just crawled out, perhaps I went silent, no,
I say that in order to say something, in order to 
go on a little more, you must go on a little more 
. . . (395).
This past and present distinction helps to mark off sections 
of this narrative: Worm talks about the holes as an 
environmental phenomenon, while the "voice," no longer Worm, 
describes a "hole" where, perhaps, Worm was to be found, an 
insubstantial existence. Also, the term "wilderness" 
carries a sacred load, for in the Bible the wilderness is 
the space where men become prophets, John the Baptist is one 
of many examples. Beckett's use of this term signals his 
development of a sacred, prophetic text, with his 
characteristic levels of irony.
Clearly, these passages are highly indefinite, but they 
carry a definite suggestion of an astral space, or 
"afterlife," with certain characteristics. Beckett's 
paradoxical style is marked by the copresence of the 
definite and the indefinite to an even greater extent than 
Kafka's. However, the preceding discussion has examined how 
Beckett comes to use certain images, for example, the lamps
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with their attendant biblical allusions in the plays and the 
asymptotic descriptions of light in The Lost Ones. Insofar 
as these images come to be more precisely delineated in 
subsequent works, they may provide some help in determining 
their use in the more fundamental, and indefinite, The 
Unnamable.
When "they" return to their "master" and report that 
they have left their "lamps" in the "holes," one may 
consider that these lamps refer to the Bible. to spiritual 
light, a connection strengthened by the abode of the 
"master" in the sky, or "azure." The book of "Revelation" 
contains several references to "lamps" and a reference to 
the parable of the wedding feast (see above): "The angel 
said to me, 'Write this: "Happy are those who are invited to 
the wedding banquet of the Lamb!"'" (Rev. 19.9). References 
to lamps occur with respect to the fall of Babylon, "no more
shall the light of the lamp appear in you" (Rev. 18.23);
with respect to the new Jerusalem, "There shall be no more 
night, nor will they need the light of lamp or sun" (Rev. 
22.5); with respect to the seven churches, "the seven lamps 
are the seven churches themselves" (Rev. 1.20); and, with 
respect to the angel of the church at Ephesus, "repent, and
do as once you did. If you do not, I will come to you and
remove your lamp from its place" (Rev. 2.5). There is a 
structural congruence between Beckett's indefinite use of 
"lamps" and "holes" and the indefinite language of this book
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of St. John which connects "lamps” to the light of God, as
churches or as a sign of faith (something established
earlier with respect to the parable of the wedding feast) at
least until the coming of the new Jerusalem when there will
be no more darkness.
The significance of comparing the contexts of
"Revelation" with The Unnamable does not only derive from
the structural congruence of indefinite language, but also
from the fact that "Revelation" itself proposes an
"unnamable" entity: "The beast [who] was allowed to mouth
bombast and blasphemy" (Rev. 13.5). There is a riddle given
concerning the beast's name:
(This calls for skill; let anyone who has 
intelligence work out the number of the beast, for 
the number represents a man's name, and the 
numerical value of its letters is six hundred and 
sixty-six) (Rev. 13.18).
So one sense of The Unnamable may refer to this unnamed
beast of Revelations, an entity in another indefinite (and
prophetic) text which contains a number of definite
references to "lamps." Beckett's "voice" appears to desire
the darkness, disparaging "them" and "their master" alike,
so The Unnamable may stake some claim to blasphemy. The
absolute antagonism between this "voice" and those agents
who oversee its existence, as well as its pervasive desire
for silence, implicate this "voice" in a struggle of cosmic
proportions, an Armageddon of words and images, of language
itself. One may be reminded of Poe's portrait of the devil
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in "William Wilson," but Beckett's portrait is more 
sympathetic. Clearly, there is some sense in which 
Beckett's text aspires to this "allowed" enunciation of 
"bombast" and "blasphemy" described in the prophecy of 
"Revelation."
Put succinctly, Beckett's "devil" is the "shadow" (in 
the Jungian sense) of language itself. Beckett's strategy 
of indefinition in The Unnamable calls attention to a 
general, linguistic alter-ego, for languages' reference is 
systemic. Naturalistic language and its extension into the 
supernatural is rooted in religious significance, just as 
the natural world is argued as proof for God's existence and 
as what is natural derives from what is perceived as 
religiously moral. Such a system operates through inclusion 
and exclusion with excluded terms being "unnamed," literally 
unthinkable. Beckett explores this world of unknown 
reference in The Unnamable. His narrative "voice" denies 
the signifiers of the natural world from within an 
"unnatural" or astral space. This denial has as its 
ultimate goal, silence, an ultimate denial, but this 
"voice's" journey through discourse individually denies 
systemic references all along the way. Moreover, the 
foregoing discussion of the definite image indicates that 
for Beckett silence likely validates all representation 
through its own nonrepresentability: only silence is not 
represented.
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Beckett's emphatic indefinition opens language to new
forms and concepts which are indirectly defined through
denials of systemic significance; probably the most obvious
example involves this "voice's" narrative incarnations, as
Mahood, as Worm, as "voice," etc. Beckett develops a new
narrative form where each entity is, at times, both distinct
and included within "voice." This indefinite strategy
denies narrative conventions of author, narrator, and
character, and "voice's" continuance demonstrates how
narrative structures are actually indefinite structures.
Jakobson describes this problem in writing:
ambiguity is an intrinsic, inalienable character 
of any self-focused message, briefly, a corollary 
feature of poetry . . . The supremacy of the
poetic function over the referential function does 
not obliterate the reference but makes it 
ambiguous. The double-sensed message finds 
correspondence in a split addressor, in a split 
addressee, as well as in a split reference (42).
Beckett plays with the inherent quality of language to be
referential. If language essentially names things, then
Beckett endeavors to "split" language into "things" which
are named and "things" which cannot be named, and this split
demonstrates both the exclusive referentiality of language
and a conceptual territory of indirection which is outside
of direct referentiality.
"Unbelieving. Questions, hypotheses, call them that";
Beckett's emphasis on the performative as provisional
undercuts the referencing system which names (291).
Disbelief, interrogation, and possibilities or potentials
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make up The Unnamable. just as Beckett says it will in this 
passage from his opening to this novel. Beckett's unique 
accomplishment through his strategies of indefinition is the 
splitting of language and writing into opposed territories. 
He not only indicts the natural in its systemic exclusion, 
but he also provides a sense of that which naturalism 
excludes; through his abstract, astral field of reference, 
Beckett reveals the inherent disorder within the reference 
of writing, though his metaphysical gaming stops short of 
ordering this other realm, this "silence." Beckett's themes 
of entropic, or indefinite, reference and of the habitation 
of language by images are later developed by the post- 
cinematic writers Thomas Pynchon and William Burroughs. 
Burroughs' dominant metaphor of language as virus points to 
alternative referentiality while Pynchon explores entropy 
and communication theory.
Conclusions
Although Beckett's writing requires an intense 
concentration in order to develop interpretation, his work 
rewards such effort. These texts exemplify the problematic 
tension between surface and substance which is engendered by 
the contact mode of image signification. On the surface, 
Beckett's texts present an image of textuality itself; 
often, this surface is of such complexity that only a
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reductive response to it is possible: it looks like text, 
but it resists facile interpretation. Nonetheless, this 
difficult surface yields a rich substance, as has been shown 
by the number of patient scholars who have found in 
Beckett's work an allusive complexity, a sophisticated 
philosphical intelligence, an acute sense of linguistic 
theory, and a broad field of participatory, interpretive 
play. A further testimony to the substance of Beckett's 
work is that it clearly requires even more precise scholarly 
attention for a more complete description and interpretation 
of his writing to emerge.
The description of Beckett's style as cinematic has 
served to emphasize how his text consists of image montage 
and, more importantly, the significance of the montage text 
with respect to problems of representation, particularly of 
linguistic referentiality. Beckett demonstrates the 
potential within the montage text to develop new abstract 
structures and alternative forms of representation. By 
exposing the presuppositions of naturalistic mimesis,
Beckett is able to develop oneiric representation into an 
astral form suitable to representations of forms of 
consciousness; Beckett replaces religious naturalism with 
the astral perspective of soul, of ubiquitous consciousness. 
The surface distinction of definite and indefinite images in 
Beckett's writing begins a line of investigation which leads 
to its resolution at a level of metatextual clarity,
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deriving important conclusions concerning abstract 
representations, asymptotic referentiality (the problem of 
entropy), and the relation of text to temporality and the 
world.
This study began by noting important aspects of 
Beckett's style: the prevalence of negative, indefinite 
structures; its cinematic construction; and, its densely 
allusive quality. Like Kafka's, Beckett's allusions are not 
easily recognizable, and this is indicative of how Kafka and 
Beckett wrench their allusions away from their traditional 
contexts, examining them as a matter of form. Such 
allusiveness exemplifies Benjamin's characterization of the 
liquidation of tradition by the reproduction of image. The 
heuristic division of Beckett's writing into definite and 
indefinite image forms provided a method for the examination 
of particular images and the discourses associated with 
them. Beckett has produced definite forms of images 
tailored to a wide variety of contact media and generic 
characteristics. Probably more than any other writer, 
Beckett has illustrated the potentials of expressionistic 
writing by providing texts exemplary of contact diversity 
and of generic variation.
Paradoxically, Beckett has developed a complex 
discourse out of a style easily characterized as negative. 
Definite images provide examples of direct negativity, of 
indirection, of misdirection, of minimalism (indirect
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negativity), and of definite structures leading to 
indefinite contexts. In fact, most instances of the 
definite in Beckett lead to forms of indefinition. Film not 
only provides a montage of definite images, but it also 
develops an interpretive discourse dealing with essential 
problems of the cinematic medium and of representation of 
the self. These most prominently include the problems of 
perception as representation, in which perception itself 
becomes a doubtful phenomenon, and the recognition of 
silence as the axis of representation, where only nothing 
can be perceived without being simultaneously represented.
The definite characteristic of allusiveness in 
Beckett's writing, to Kafka, to Joyce and to Proust, shows 
how Beckett engages these writers in dialectic play. The 
perhaps surprising profusion of Biblical allusions in 
Beckett's writing illustrates his dialectical disengagement 
from traditional contexts. Beckett's allusions to 
traditional sources, as with Kafka, tend toward a 
demystification of traditional contexts. Beckett's 
allusions directly focus on the problems of language and 
referentiality. With respect to mythic allusion, Beckett 
engages in a demythification wherein he provides an astral 
space for the recreation of mythic structures, and Beckett's 
presentation of ritual allows for the recognition of writing 
as a Heideggerian techne. an instrument that both reveals 
and conceals. This paradoxical essence of writing suggests
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that indefinition is an essential feature of language. 
However, if indefinition is the ultimate end, there are many 
definite pathways to this recognition, and Beckett's 
presentation of varieties of the absurd provides a definite 
basis for generic classifications, such as those presented 
in the image-genre matrix.
Beckett's development of philosophical allusion is 
almost wholly negative with respect to Descartes and to 
philosophical attitudes which derive from Descartes, either 
directly or structurally. On the other hand, this study has 
recognized in Beckett philosophical affinities for 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and, to a certain extent, to Hegel. 
Again, Beckett's dialectic stance against the truth claims 
of more traditional forms of philosophy drives his method of 
indefinition which makes truth unrepresentable, but which, 
nevertheless, provides a context for the representation of 
complex abstraction. Ultimately, Beckett's use of the 
definite image emphasizes the limits of definition at the 
same time that it reveals the necessity of indefinite 
representation. Beckett develops a form of writing 
antagonistic to naturalistic didacticism, but his indefinite 
strategies suggest discursive alternatives.
The major forms of indefinition in Beckett included in 
this study are minimalism, indefinite perspectives, 
indefinite (real future) genres, and indefinite (astral) 
spatial representation. Each of these problematic image
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strategies provides discursive literary value. Minimalism 
has definite and indefinite components, but its negative and 
indefinite qualities suggest its appropriateness to the 
indefinite perspective of the soul, a perspective to which, 
according to Hillman, the image signifies in a multifaceted 
rhetoric. Minimal representation also emphasizes the 
connection, or rather, the abyss, between language and 
silence, indicating the problem of referentiality. Herein, 
one finds Beckett's formulation of reference as entropic, 
for significance tends to disorder, but a complete disorder 
is not possible, just as there is no such state as complete 
entropy, or absolute disorder. This is a common property to 
physics and to information theory; this represents the 
difficulty in the quest for silence, which could correspond 
to a state of complete entropy.
The indefinite strategy of minimalism shares with the 
strategy of indefinite perspectives an interpretative 
richness. The positive lack with respect to representation 
enforces a participatory discourse derived from a 
collaboration of author, text, and reader. This is also an 
essential feature of image representation, for the image 
must be interpreted, yet the virtual quality of the image 
only manifests in a plurality of specific interpretations. 
Indefinite perspectives situated in an astral space provide 
images of the creative consciousness where no names obtain, 
since language has excluded these phenomena, and where
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narrative structures become indistinct, as, indeed, these 
structures are essentailly a complex of relative forms of 
voicing. The referential capability of language in this 
astral realm becomes asymptotic; reference can only 
approach, but never arrive at, its object, for the axis is 
silence. Regarding political imagery, Beckett shares with 
Kafka a strategy of negativity and indefinition 
characterized by the complex allegorical mode described by 
Benjamin. Beckett's The Lost Ones is an equivalent text to 
Kafka's "Before the Law," not only in an allusive sense, but 
as an alternative method of developing a similar discourse.
The development of indefinite perspectives leads to the 
recognition of indefinite genres, of genres in a real future 
tense, the problem of prophecy. Beckett's writing ennables 
the recognition of the referential principle of the sacred 
text, that if this text is incapable of definite 
representation, it is also incapable of nonrepresentation. 
Again, paradoxically, text must be capable of representation 
of the future and, therefore, of the world —  the mimetic 
dream —  but text always remains to some extent 
unrecognizable in its ultimate reference. Language can only 
approach reference. Nevertheless, Beckett is capable of 
producing texts which are equivalent to sacred texts and 
which abstract the sacred text into its formative 
principles, revealing the drives and desires which produce 
the sacred text in all their futile splendor.
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Finally, the investigation of particular astral images 
reveals a dark territory which the system of language does 
not represent. Beckett suggests that language itself has a 
shadow, a territory unrepresented, or excluded, by the 
systematic progress of language from its referential desire 
for the "truth" to the traditional, institutional versions 
of how this "truth" has been achieved, when, in fact, only 
illusions of truth have been achieved. Beckett provides a 
wider universe of representation, one of more complex and 
more diverse illusions without names, a realm where language 
comes to know itself in its instantaneous recognition and 
disfigurement of reference. Beckett provides the mirror in 
which the dream of language may recognize itself, both what 
language can do and all that it has failed to do. Beckett 
has also shown that there is more that language can do, for 
his texts provide a glimpse into language's potential 
achievements. Beckett has created a literature from a 
theoretical language. Such a theoretical language may 
provide the capability for philosophical and scientific 
descriptions of increasingly complex phenomena.
General Conclusions
Where before theorists looked to the understanding of 
words and language in order to describe literature and 
cinema, perhaps now theorists will appreciate the importance
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of understanding the image in culture. Postmodern culture 
is complex, an aggregate of many different forms. The 
Image-Genre Grid elaborates these forms with a greater 
precision than have previous models. Moreover, since this 
elaboration is both inclusive and flexible, it provides a 
ground for worthwhile discussion among professionals and in 
the classroom. This systemic approach to culture will 
eliminate much confusion of terms, such as "absurd" (which 
seldom conveys a precise notion). More importantly, a 
better appreciation of the relationship between theory and 
discourse will be forthcoming, since the manipulation of 
cultural images requires a theoretical attitude. This study 
has demonstrated how Kafka and Beckett could only have 
accomplished their works with a clear, theoretical view 
towards their respective effects.
A better appreciation of text should also be 
forthcoming. In some regards, text can never accomplish 
what some have hoped it would, that is provide accurate 
descriptions. Due to the entropic quality of reference, 
some meaning will always escape. This textual entropy 
undermines perception as well as representation, since any 
distinction between the two possesses an arbitrary 
character. Paradoxically, text is also capable of 
transmitting more than has been exprected of it. Kafka and 
Beckett both provide the sense of a contact with the future; 
they hardly need to be blamed if that future is not
promising. The presence of a real future or truth can be 
transmitted by text, but in an ocean of representation who 
can hope to recognize this presence before it is past?
NOTES
Chapter One
1.1 "Various kinds of residual orality as well as the 
'literate orality' of the secondary oral culture induced by 
radio and television awaits in-depth study," Orality and 
Literacy, p. 160; it is not the intent of this study to 
reduce the specific differences of radio, television, 
computers, and cinema to a unitary cinematic rubric, but 
rather to indicate the copresence of these modes with the 
filmic mode, which also contributed to the development of 
"secondary orality."
I*2 Melville's novel ends with the description of the 
sinking of the Pecruod: with the destruction of this point of 
view, this representational stability on an ocean of chaos, 
no further story details are forthcoming, such as the final
condition of Moby Dick. What continuance is provided in the
epilogue is owed to the vehicle of the "coffin life-buoy," a 
fragment of the ship and a representational surrogate of it, 
Mobv-Dick. p. 470.
1.3 Jennie Skerl marks the origin of the Beats with the 
forming of this literary "triumvirate":
The meeting of Burroughs, Kerouac, and Ginsberg in 
1944 was the beginning of the Beats as a literary 
and social movement, although none of them would 
publish anything for years, and they certainly had
no consciousness of having founded a group or
movement, William Burroughs, p. 9.
1.4 Jameson contributes to the confusion regarding the 
nature of postmodern products with remarks like this one: .
In film or in rock, however, a certain historical 
logic can be reintroduced by the hypothesis that 
such newer media recapitulate the evolutionary 
stages or breaks between realism, modernism and 
postmodernism, in a compressed time span, such 
that the Beatles and the Stones occupy the high 
modernist moment embodied by the "auteurs" of 
1950s and 1960s art films, "Politics of Theory," 
p. 419;
such a cultural determinism as this seeks to enlarge a 
monolithic modernism to include anything not produced by the 
current generation (the last twenty years or so) and 
provides an elitest formula for designating the postmodern 
on the basis of some very thin filaments; there is also a 
sense of "fear of influence" (reminiscent of Harold Bloom's 
The Anxiety Of Influence, also an elitest scheme); after 
all, it was "auteur" filmakers who intensified the dialectic 
against mainstream filmic realism and who promoted a
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definition of cinema as an essentially expressionistic 
medium, a view expressed by Benjamin and a focus of this 
study, although it is simplistic to view all "auteurs" in a 
common political context; regarding music, the essential 
grounding of rock is in blues music, hardly a "high 
modernist" medium, and groups like the Rolling Stones and 
the Doors are essentially blues groups; the case of the 
Beatles is more complex, owing to the diverse directions of 
its songwriters; the case for reification of rock is often 
demonstrated in the latter stages of a band's career, when 
record companies exert greater control over artistic 
content, and the product itself generates more capital; this 
factor is often reduced when highly successful bands, like 
the Rolling Stones, organize their own companies to maintain 
control of both content and capital; the politicization of 
rock begins, like jazz and blues before it, with the 
repression and redirection of sexuality by institutional 
cultural forces who view rock as "animalistic" (an 
implicitly racist attack against its roots in Black music 
forms); the explicit eroticism of rock (for example, the 
lyrics to "Louie Louie") defines an alternative, political 
stance that is extended to other political issues, like the 
Vietman war or capital fascism in general; even the 
reification of "pop" music forms has been seriously 
challenged by Ralph Bakshi in his important film American 
Po p  which situates popular music in a political context of 
class struggle for most of the twentieth century; in any 
case, it seems inconsistent for Jameson to characterize 
postmodernism as a broad cultural movement at the same time 
that he is limiting postmodern cultural praxis to a highly 
limited number of artists.
1.5 Derrida's reference to "freeplay" affirms another 
theoretical paradigm associated with postmodernism, game 
theory; see also the next note.
1.6 Besides Rabkin and Todorov, Manlove considers W. R. 
Irwin's "fantasies subscribing to his notion of 'play,' or 
'the game of the impossible'," and Rosemary Jackson's 
"'subversive fantasies' by Poe, Stevenson, Dostoevsky,
Kafka, or Pynchon," "The Elusiveness of Fantasy," p. 53; 
actually, either of these approaches has a stronger 
probability of providing an inclusive, theoretical base for 
the study of twentieth-century "fantasy" than does the 
presence of the supernatural; this study's emphasis on 
surreal-expressionist production coheres with Jackson's 
"subversive fantasies."
1.7 This discussion of the relationship of Poe's 
"William Wilson" and of Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray 
to expressionistic writing is more fully developed in
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"Narrative Discourse in Poe: Reciprocity and 'William 
Wilson'."
1.8 Metz's study Psychoanalysis and Cinema (1975-82) 
explores the imaginary qualities of both signifier and 
referent; see also "Metz's Move" by Bertrand Augst which 
solidifies the connections of Metz's work to the "game" of 
film theory, Camera Obscura 7 (1985): 31-41.
1.9 See Crumb, "'The Drum': Postmodernity and 
Textuality."
Chapter Two
2 m l Aristotle's preference for the dramatic form is 
described in The Poetics. 115; it is also discussed in "'The 
Drum': Postmodernity and Textuality"; his preference: 
partly based on the presence of music and 
spectacle in that genre, to this extent goes 
beyond what are ordinarily considered the features 
of verbal literature. The addition of music to 
literary production renders the presentation more 
complex; the work no longer consists of writing 
only, and the writing lends its significance to 
the music. With respect to spectacle, the 
versimilitude of a text that presents an image of 
itself is overdetermined, for such an image exists 
in reality whether or not it may be called 
"accurate." . . . [These] additional forms of 
aural and visual presentation . . . [develop] an 
aggregated presentation, a multi-media multiplex.
. . . Thus, it is not surprising that "as an 
organized literary movement expressionism was 
strongest in the theater in the 1920's, and its 
entry into other literary forms was probably 
through the stage" (Holman),
Crumb, 69-70.
2 •2 Arrowsmith describes the complex context of this 
part of the novel:
if Eumolpus, for instance, in his epic on the 
civil wars appears as a standard laudator temporis 
acti with his stale denunciation of a Rome turned 
rotten and effeminate through the loss of homely 
Republican virtues, Petronius' point is not what 
Eumolpus says but the contrast between his 
pretensions here and his practices elsewhere, 
xiii;
even if one grants Eumolpus' intention to put it rightly, 
there is no assurance that this "epic" will not be corrupted 
somehow, given such a dubious context; the expressionistic 
character of Petronius' writing, which finds a strong
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parallel in the Restoration writings of John Wilmot, Earl of 
Rochester, is discussed in "Dialog, Decadence, and 
Expressionism" in Comoendius Conversations.
2.3 Chamber's position is summarized here: 
canonicity is dialog; any form of dialogic 
discourse implies canonical conclusions. Chambers 
recognizes within irony two forms with respect to 
the canon: the ironic and the ironical. This 
typology "boils down to differentiating between 
ironizing (opposing) the system (of which one is a 
part) [ironic] and ironizing (opposing) the 
product of the system (as if one were not part of 
the system) [ironical]" (21),
"Dialog, Decadence, and Expressionism," 143; from this 
perspective, only the ironic form of irony is systemic and 
explicitly metatextual, since the ironical form does not 
question canonical values by only seeking to show that a 
given work conforms to those values; therefore, only the 
ironic form is expressionistic since its dialectic 
opposition to the system is explicitly political, while the 
ironical form is dialogical with respect to content (it does 
not propose an alternative context).
2.4 Explicitly political expression occurs in both 
Petronius and Rochester: two examples include Encolpius' 
hedonist manifesto, which also reads as implied authorial 
discourse, and Rochester's "A Satyr on Charles II," "Dialog, 
Decadence, and Expressionism," 145, 147.
2 *5 Peithman refers here to "Usher Unveiled" by Barton 
Levi St. Armand in Poe Studies, vol.5, who shows that "the 
painting, and the crypt in which Madeline is buried refer to 
alchemical symbols," 68, n. 35.
2,6 James Thomson's "Proem" is written in twenty-two 
sections, the first unnumbered and the last numbered twenty- 
one, corresponding to the twenty-two major arcana of the 
Tarot, which are numbered zero through twenty-one; Thomson's 
correlation goes far beyond the numbering scheme, for the 
imagery in each section of his poem develops images from the 
arcanum associated by number with the poem; even precedent 
to Thomson, the Shelley's ought to be recognized for their 
more subtle use of Tarot images; Percy Shelley uses several 
images from the major arcana in his poem of political 
protest "The Mask of Anarchy," and Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein develops imagery from Arcanum Eighteen, "The 
Moon," throughout the course of this novel; "The Moon" may 
also be the source of an important motif in Kafka's The 
Metamorphosis (see Chapter four, "Notes").
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Chapter Three
3 *1 Regrettably/ the scope of this study does not allow 
a full engagement with Metz's impressive work contained in 
Language And Cinema. partly because of space and partly 
because of the attempt here to approach this question from 
the other direction, of an image priority over language; it 
should be noted, though, that the use of the term 
"cinematic" in this study is not equivalent to Metz's use; 
Metz conceives that only a "filmic writing" is possible, 
although his recognition that "film" plays the role of 
"'legitimate interlocutor'" in modern writing "(writing as a 
textual activity)" coheres with this study's recognition of 
"cinematic" incursions into the written text, 285.
3.2 "The 'aura' of the original, single work of genius 
is replaced, as Benjamin foresaw, by the mechanical 
reproduction of fragments of history," A Poetics Of 
Postmodernism. 181.
3.3 To help the reader appreciate Benjamin's 
contribution to this theoretical synthesis, here follows a 
summary of Benjamin's essay grouped under three headings 
with section numbers attached to those headings and with 
parenthetical pagination for specific propositions:
1) Representation (I-VIX, IX): mechanical reproduction 
of art has produced two different manifestations, 
reproductions of art and the art of film (218); the "aura" 
of art works withers, detaching the reproduced object from 
the domain of tradition (221); the aura of art, like natural 
objects, can be described as the image of its distance which 
is reduced by reproduction implying a "sense of universal 
equality of things," an adjustment of reality to the masses 
and of the masses to reality (222-23); magical and ritual 
contexts of art become transformed by this erosion of 
authenticity, and a new context becomes the basis for art, 
that of politics (224) ; quantitative increases in the 
exhibition of art bring about a qualitative change in the 
function of art as exemplified by film and photography
(225); pictures become historical evidence with hidden 
implications requiring a specific approach, captions not 
free contemplation, and film intensifies this condition
(226) [consider the written dialogue in silent films and the 
sound track in modern film]; the founding of film in 
mechanical reproduction depersonalizes the actor, and film 
art leaves the realm of the "beautiful semblance" when such 
mimetic selectiveness had been art's justification (230).
2) Reception (VIII, X, XII, XIV, XV): since the actor 
performs for the camera which takes the position of the 
audience, the audience critiques the optical tests provided 
by the camera (228-29); here the defamiliarization of the 
actor is like a reproduced "mirror-image," and since
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everyone is reproducible the film audience is composed of 
experts which results in the loss of the basic character of 
the author/public relationship [writers write for writers, 
not readers] (231-32); this new relation between the masses 
and art characterized as a simultaneous collective 
experience results in the mass rejecting in traditional 
forms the same material it can accept in a collective form 
(234-35); Dada anticipated film effects through its 
relentless destruction of the aura, and it became a tactile 
art that happened to the spectator (237-28); the increased 
mass of participation changes the mode of participation from 
contemplation to distraction —  tactile appropriation comes 
about less by attention than by habit —  a state or habit of 
distraction grounds reception, especially in film, the 
public as absent-minded examiner, critics not required to be 
attentive (239-41).
3) Film discourse (VI, VII, IX, XI, XII, XIII, XIV): 
regarding captions, in film the meaning of each single frame 
appears to be prescribed by the sequence of all preceding 
ones (226) ; that earlier attempts to define film read ritual 
elements into it shows how film can express the marvelous 
and the supernatural naturally and persuasively (227-28); 
film raises spectacle to a new level, and the presentation 
of natural reality has become the height of artifice —  film 
consists of multiple fragments assembled under a new law 
(2 33-34); film deepens apperception by providing 
imcomparably more precise statements that bring art and 
science together, unconscious optics illumined like 
unconscious impulses by psychoanalysis (235-37); the mode of 
film provides shock which must be met by a heightened 
presence of mind, and, more, the shock of film reception is 
not limited to the "moral" (238), "The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction," 217-51.
3.4 See crumb, "'The Drum': Postmodernity and 
Textuality," 72-73.
3*5 Tjje material image is partly an adaptation to the 
analysis of literary representation of Hillman's psychic 
image, presented in his essay Archetypal Psychology.
3.6 This definition has been previously published in 
"Image Strategies in Postmodernism: Borges' 'The Immortal'" 
as part of the collection BORGES: Craft of Fiction.
3.7 See "Sweets of Sin: Joyce's Ulvsses and Swinburne's 
'Dolores'," an essay in the James Joyce Quarterly.
3.8 It is evident that Chew considers Swinburne's 
entire poem to be a litany, but in the essay on Joyce and 
Swinburne a litanic substructure is distinguished made up of 
the shortened final stanza lines such that:
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pairing the halfline refrains reveals the litanic 
infrastructure. Here are the refrains of stanzas 
thirteen to twenty-four:
13. Our Lady of Pain
14. And blind as the night
15. Our Lady of Pain
16. And gray as the world
17. Our Lady of Pain
18. As wine shed for me
19. Our Lady of Pain
20. Make barren our lives
21. Our Lady of Pain
22. The myrtle to death
23. Our Lady of Pain
24. To sweeten the sin
The refrains of stanzas thirty-nine to forty-four read:
39. Our Lady of Pain
40. A visible god
41. Our Lady of Pain
42. A goddess new-born
43. Our Lady of Pain
44. A mother of gods
The mockery of litanic form with concepts opposed to 
conventionally religious ideas is at once satiric and 
satanic. The emphasis is provided to show the connection to 
Joyce's invented novel title Sweets of Sin: JJQ. 241.
3,9 This passage also contains a tacit allusion, not 
mentioned in the published discussion, to Marlowe's play 
Doctor Faustus:
From thence to Venice, Padua, and the (rest),/ In 
one of which a sumptuous temple stands/ That 
threats the stars with her aspiring top (III. 1.
16-18), Marlowe. 362.
Chapter Four
4 *1 David Wills and Alec McHoul in their essay "Almost 
but not quite me . . ." discuss, among other things, more 
recent theories, particularly of Barthes and of Foucault, 
which argue: "the return to the authorial origin is 
limiting, politically motivated, conservative and 
unnecessarily psychological," Writing Pynchon, 136; with the 
destruction of the claim of the author as sole source for 
meaning in text develops a stronger recognition of the role 
of the reader in producing such meaning.
4,2 Nahum N. Glatzer provides in his chronology of 
Kafka the dates 1911-14 as "working on Amerika" with the 
main work done during 1911-12; the story "In the Penal 
Colony" was written in October, 1914 with the rest of that 
year spent on the composition of The Trial: it appears that
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the "writing-desk" was precedent to the execution machine, 
but during a relatively brief period when he was engaged in 
writing some of his most complex and important works, Franz 
Kafka: The Complete Stories. 476-77.
4.3 Paul N. Siegal accepts Breton's assertion that Leon 
Trotsky contributed most of "Manifesto: Towards a Free 
Revolutionary Art" (1938), incuding this statement on Marx:
The conception of the writer's function which the 
young Marx worked out is worth recalling . . .
"The writer by no means looks on his work as a 
means. It is an end in itself and so little a 
means in the eyes of himself and others that if 
necessary he sacrifices his existence to the 
existence of his work, Leon Trotskv on Literature 
and Art. 115, 119.
4.4 Jung believes the emotional component of the shadow 
archetype helps one to recognize its involvement: "If you 
feel an overwhelming rage coming up in you when a friend 
reproaches you about a fault, you can be fairly sure that at 
this point you will find a part of your shadow, of which you 
are unconscious," Man and his Symbols. 174.
4 •5 Freud explains how animals represent a variety of 
libidinal features in dreams:
many of the beasts which are used as genital 
symbols in mythology and folklore play the same 
part in dreams: e.g. fishes, snails, cats, mice 
(on account of the pubic hair), and above all 
those most important symbols of the male organ —  
snakes. Small animals and vermin represent small 
children —  for instance, undesired brothers and 
sisters. Being plagued with vermin is often a 
sign of pregnancy; wild beasts are as a rule 
employed by the dream-work to represent passionate 
impulses of which the dreamer is afraid, whether 
they are his own or those of other people. (It 
then needs only a slight displacement for the wild 
beasts to come to represent the people who are 
possessed by these passions. We have not far to 
go from here to cases in which a dreaded father is 
represented by a beast of prey or a dog or a wild 
horse —  a form of representation recalling 
totemism.) It might be said that wild beasts are 
used to represent the libido, a force dreaded by 
the ego and combatted by means of repression. It 
often happens, too, that the dreamer separates off 
his neurosis, his "sick personality," from himself 
and depicts it as an independent person. [1919.],
The Interpretation of Dreams. 392, 445.
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4 •6 Freud describes dream "relations of similarity": 
Parallels or instances of "just as" inherent in 
the material of the dream-thoughts constitute the 
first foundations for the construction of a dream; 
and no inconsiderable part of the dream-work 
consists in preparing fresh parallels where those 
which are already present cannot find their way 
into the dream owing to the censorship imposed by 
resistance. The representation of the relation of 
similarity is assisted by the tendency of the 
dream-work towards condensation,
The Interpretation of Dreams. 355.
4,7 Cocteau's fable "The Look of Death" is included in 
the anthology of the fantastic edited by Borges, Ocampo, and 
Casares; since it is brief, for convenience it is quoted in 
its entirety:
A young Persian gardener said to his Prince:
"Save me! I met Death in the garden this morning, 
and he gave me a threatening look. I wish that 
tonight, by some miracle, I might be far away, in 
Ispahan."
The Prince lent him his swiftest horse.
That afternoon, as he was walking in the garden, 
the Prince came face to face with Death. "Why," 
he asked, "did you give my gardener a threatening 
look this morning?"
"It was not a threatening look," replied Death.
"It was an expression of surprise. For I saw him 
here this morning, and I knew that I would take 
him in Ispahan tonight,"
The Book Of Fantasy. 96; this anthology also includes 
"Josephine the singer, or The Mouse Folk" and "Before the 
Law" by Kafka.
4 •8 References to Burroughs' development of images of 
which Kafka is the unmistakable source are included here 
because this recognition is not forthcoming from major
studies; this seems to stem from Burroughs' ambivalent
status as a "canonical" figure; Sandbank omits any 
discussion of Burroughs from his chapter on Kafka's limited
influence on American writers, namely, Barthes, Vonnegut, 
and Pynchon, After Kafka: The Influence of Kafka's Fiction.
148-49; this last is surprising since Pynchon has always 
acknowledged Burroughs as a major influence on his own 
writing; Skerl's ommission seems to develop from an opposing 
viewpoint in that Burroughs is built up into a major figure 
almost wholly original: "Burroughs has never attributed any 
influence, literary or otherwise, to his schooling," William 
Burroughs. 6 ; this seems a strange remark from an author who 
has done so much collaborative work with other writers.
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4.9 See The Soft Machine. "The Mayan Caper," 97; also, 
Nova Express. "The Chinese Laundry," 59.
4.10 This entry is confusing in that Katz credits 
Cavalcanti with the direction of only one episode while the 
film credits him with its direction.
4.11 poe/s influential story probably provided a 
pattern for Oscar Wilde's novel The Picture of Dorian Gray 
and may have reached Kafka as well:
The material image of reciprocal violence 
presented by Poe in "William Wilson" also recurs 
in Kafka: "and was it only fancy which induced me 
to believe that, with the increase of my own 
firmness, that of my tormentor underwent a 
proportional diminuation" (The Unabridged Edgar 
Allan Poe 564),
Crumb, "Narrative Discourse in Poe: Reciprocity and 'William 
Wilson'," 33, 40-41.
4 ’12 In an interview, Welles talks about the "formal" 
qualities of Kafka's writing, but in this same interview 
Peter Bogdonovich tells a story about a European showing of 
Welles' The Trial which they attended together; they both 
found themselves laughing at what was going on in the film, 
although the rest of the audience remained deadly serious; 
this is an excellent example of the "Kafka affect"; 
apparently, even Welles succumbed, With Orson Welles:
Stories From A Life In Film.
4 •13 a comparison of Bertolucci's The Last Emperor with 
Costa-Gavras' The Confession confirms Bertolucci's concern 
with films antecedent to his productions; this is even more 
apparent in Last Tango In Paris where Bertolucci includes 
allusions to many "Paris-centered" works, including 
Cocteau's Orpheus and the works of Samuel Beckett.
4,14 Poe's school has proliferated in other writers as 
well: consider "the language of Borges' labyrinthine 
descriptions in 'The Immortal'," Crumb, "Narrative Discourse 
in Poe: Reciprocity and 'William Wilson'," 40; Mervyn 
Peakes' Gormenghast castle is a more recent elaboration, 
likely based on Poe's and Kafka's (1946).
Chapter Five
5 .1 poe uses this word "thus" both as a discursive 
identifier to connect specific sections of this story and as 
a negative descriptive term which is revealed only at the 
end of this story to have the meaning "the same," referring 
to the features of the two William Wilsons, Crumb, 39.
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5 *2 Hutchings notes the "uncanny [if coincidental] 
resemblance" of Beckett's narrator to the head of Nick 
Chopper in Frank Baum's The Tin Woodman of Oz (1918); he 
also discusses biblical and medieval sources.
5-3 Fanizza cites P. de Boisdeffre, Une histoire vivant 
de la litterature d 'auiourd'hui (Paris, 1959), p. 304.
5 *4 Chambers explains how canonicity is a systemic 
dialogue rather than a set of rigid values exemplified by 
particular works.
5 *5 Rabinovitz notes the importance of "unreliable 
narrative [as] an important structural device in Murohv and 
shows how "many of the narrator's seemingly plausible 
statements are in some way misleading or inconsistent," p. 
58.
5,6 Shulz finds "Beckett and Hegel seemingly in 
agreement on the impossibility of a meaningful art to exist 
in our time," p.94, and Hegel asserts "the death of 
classical art," p. 95.
5 -7 Kawin also cites Coe who characterizes reality's 
time in Beckett as an "instantaneous present," Samuel 
Beckett. p.17.
5 *8 Schulze's chapter "Beckett and Descartes" 
concludes:
for the Beckettian hero, nothingness is the 
ultimate perfection . . . nothing, silence, 
absence. The Cartesian who imagines himself 
placed between God (existence) and nothing (non­
existence) (M [Molloy], 112), sharing in both and 
moving toward the latter in Beckett's novels 
learns the perfection, ultimate (non-) existence, 
does not 'live,' that its stasis defies definition 
and attachment," pp 31-36, 36.
5 *9 This study is somewhat opposed to Friedberg's 
extension of Benjamin's "'entirely new formations of the 
subject'" to include the postmodern subject" since this 
study takes as axiomatic Benjamin's "new formations" as 
already descriptive of postmodern culture, a culture opposed 
to classical aesthetic principles, p. 419.
5.10 This study focuses on two books on Beckett's 
mythic apect, Doll's monograph and Burkman's collection 
(including an essay by Doll).
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5.11 Doll provides an extensive list of philosophical 
approaches to Beckett, p. 83, n. 1; this list does not 
include Schulze's monograph.
5.12 Ellman and O'Clair provide background on this
poem:
"Whoroscope" was Beckett's first important work; 
it was written at high speed as his entry in a 
competition sponsored by Nancy Cunard's Hour 
Press, the prize to be given for the best poem of 
less than 100 lines about the passage of time. It 
is based on a biography of . Descartes . . .
and it won the prize, p. 711, n. 1.
5.13 Beckett is joking about Descartes' need for a more 
material substance than the substance that Descartes derived 
from his cogito: "(1) that this 'I' whose existence he has 
proved is a substance whose whole essence is to think and 
(2 ) that this substance is 'really distinct' from any 
physical body that he has," Williams, 348; of course, an 
omelet made from Descartes' substance would be as 
insubstantial as Plato's "cave phantoms."
5.14 Beckett replaces Descartes' "I think" with "to 
err," suggesting the propensity to err as prior to personal 
existence; there is a further joke suggesting that 
Descartes' existence is itself a mistake by ascribing the 
impersonal "to err" to an act of the "creator" (a cosmic 
error on the order of Gregor's transformation in Kafka's The 
Metamorphosis); further, if Descartes cannot sustain himself 
on Plato's ideas ("cave phantoms"), then he is much more 
likely to err, since this form of contempt may easily lead 
to a mistake in judgment, and Beckett attributes many such 
mistakes to Descartes.
5.15 ^ 0  confusion of "clearly and distinctly 
perceiving" and belief is an effect of Descartes' system, 
not his proposition, "which consists in the fact that if 
assent can always be withheld, even from propositions as 
powerful as the cogito, it is unclear what could ever 
suffice to prevent the assent from being withheld," Wiliams, 
351.
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